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INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 





Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public 
companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they 
monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected 
to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public 
companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and 
how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law 
scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing 
a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund 
stewardship. 
We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund 
incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds depend not just on the 
interests of index fund investors but also on the incentives of index fund 
managers. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have 
strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively 
to the preferences and positions of corporate managers. 
We then provide an empirical analysis of the full range of stewardship 
activities that index funds do and do not undertake. We analyze four 
dimensions of the Big Three’s stewardship activities: the limited personnel 
time they devote to stewardship regarding most of their portfolio companies; 
the small minority of portfolio companies with which they have any private 
communications; their focus on divergences from governance principles and 
their limited attention to other issues that could be significant for their 
investors; and their pro-management voting patterns. 
We also empirically investigate five ways in which the Big Three could 
fail to undertake adequate stewardship: the limited attention they pay to 
financial underperformance; their lack of involvement in the selection of 
directors and lack of attention to important director characteristics; their 
failure to take actions that would bring about governance changes that are 
desirable according to their own governance principles; their decision to stay 
on the sidelines regarding corporate governance reforms; and their avoidance 
of involvement in consequential securities litigation. We show that the body 
of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive problems that our 
agency-costs framework identifies. 
Finally, we put forward a set of reforms that policymakers should 
consider in order to address the incentives of index fund managers to 
underinvest in stewardship, their incentives to be excessively deferential to 
corporate managers, and the continuing rise of index investing. We also 
discuss how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates 
regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism. 
The policy measures we put forward, and the beneficial role of hedge 
 
fund activism, can partly but not fully address the incentive problems that we 
analyze and document. These problems are expected to remain a significant 
aspect of the corporate governance landscape and should be the subject of 
close attention by policymakers, market participants, and scholars. 
 
JEL Classification: G23; G34; K22. 
 
Keywords: Index funds, passive investing, institutional investors, 
corporate governance, stewardship, engagement, monitoring, agency 
problems, shareholder activism, hedge fund activism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Index funds—investment funds that mechanically track the performance 
of an index1—hold an increasingly large proportion of the equity of U.S. 
public companies. The sector is dominated by three index fund managers—
BlackRock, Inc. (BlackRock), State Street Global Advisors, a division of 
State Street Corporation (SSGA), and the Vanguard Group (Vanguard), often 
referred to as the “Big Three.”2 In a recent empirical study, The Specter of the 
Giant Three, we document that the Big Three collectively vote about 25% of 
the shares in all S&P 500 companies;3 that each holds a position of 5% or 
more in a vast number of companies;4 and that the proportion of equities held 
by index funds has risen dramatically over the past two decades and can be 
expected to continue growing substantially.5 Furthermore, extrapolating from 
past trends, we estimate in that article that the average proportion of shares 
in S&P 500 companies voted by the Big Three could reach as much as 40% 
within two decades and that the Big Three could thus evolve into what we 
term the “Giant Three.”6 
The large and steadily growing share of corporate equities held by index 
funds, and especially the Big Three, has transformed ownership patterns in 
the U.S. public market. How index funds make stewardship decisions—how 
they monitor, vote in, and engage with portfolio companies—has a major 
 
 1. For a more detailed definition of index funds, see infra section I.A.1. 
 2. The term “Big Three” has been used in reference to Vanguard, SSGA, and 
BlackRock (or, prior to 2009, Barclays Global Investors, which BlackRock acquired in that 
year) for more than a decade. For early uses of the term in the financial press, see Rebecca 
Knight, Irresistible Rise of the Flexible Fund, Fin. Times (Apr. 19, 2006) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). For the academic study that seems to have been the first to introduce 
the term to the academic literature, see Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-
Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of 
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 298 (2017). 
 3. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. 
Rev. 721, 736 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three]. That article 
substantially expands on the evidence regarding the “bigness” of the Big Three that Fichtner 
et al., supra note 2, provided by, among other things, analyzing past trends, expected future 
trends in the growth of the Big Three, and the key factors likely to lead to their continued 
dominance of the industry. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra, at 723–
24. 
 4. Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 735 (presenting 
evidence that the Big Three held, in aggregate, 1,118 positions of 5% or more at S&P 500 
companies in 2017). 
 5. Id. at 732–40. 
 6. Id. at 737–40. 
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impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the 
economy. Understanding these stewardship decisions, as well as the policies 
that can enhance them, is a key challenge for the field of corporate 
governance. This Article contributes to such an understanding. 
Leaders of the Big Three have repeatedly stressed the importance of 
responsible stewardship and their strong commitment to it. For example, 
then-Vanguard CEO William McNabb stated that “[w]e care deeply about 
governance” and that “Vanguard’s vote and our voice on governance are the 
most important levers we have to protect our clients’ investments.”7 Similarly, 
BlackRock CEO Larry Fink stated that “our responsibility to engage and vote 
is more important than ever” and that “[t]he growth of indexing demands that 
we now take this function to a new level.”8 The Chief Investment Officer 
(CIO) of SSGA stated that “SSGA’s asset stewardship program continues to 
be foundational to our mission.”9 
The Big Three leaders have also stated both their willingness to devote 
the necessary resources to stewardship and their belief in the governance 
benefits that their investments produce. For example, Vanguard’s McNabb 
has said, of governance, that “[w]e’re good at it. Vanguard’s Investment 
Stewardship program is vibrant and growing.”10 Similarly, BlackRock CEO 
Larry Fink has stated that BlackRock “intend[s] to double the size of [its] 
investment stewardship team over the next three years. The growth of 
[BlackRock’s] team will help foster even more effective engagement.”11 
The stewardship promise of index funds arises from their large stakes 
and their long-term commitment to the companies in which they invest. Their 
large stakes provide these funds with significant potential influence and 
imply that by improving the value of their portfolio companies they can help 
bring about significant gains for their portfolios. Furthermore, because index 
funds have no “exit” from their positions in portfolio companies while those 
companies remain in the index, they have a long-term perspective and are not 
tempted by short-term gains at the expense of long-term value. This long-
 




 8. Larry Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BlackRock (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 9. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016 Year End 3 (2017), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/2016-
Annual-Stewardship-Report-Year-End.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3BE-RMQ4] [hereinafter 
State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016]. 
 10. McNabb, supra note 7. 
 11. Fink, supra note 8. 
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term perspective has been stressed by Big Three leaders12 and applauded by 
commentators.13 Jack Bogle, Vanguard’s founder and the late elder statesman 
of index investing, has stated that index funds “are the . . . best hope for 
corporate governance.”14 
Will index funds deliver on this promise? Do any significant 
impediments stand in the way? How do legal rules and policies affect index 
fund stewardship? Given the dominant and growing role that index funds play 
in the capital markets, these questions are of first-order importance and are 
the focus of this Article. 
In particular, the Article seeks to make three contributions. The first 
contribution is to provide an analytical agency-cost framework for 
understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Our analysis 
demonstrates that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i) 
underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and 
positions of corporate managers. The incentive analysis builds on, and further 
develops, the analytical framework put forward in The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, a 2017 article we coauthored with Alma Cohen.15 
The second contribution is to provide the first comprehensive evidence 
of the full range of stewardship decisions made by index fund managers, 
especially the Big Three. We find that this evidence is, on the whole, 
consistent with the incentive problems that our analytical framework 
identifies. The evidence thus reinforces the concerns suggested by this 
framework. 
The third contribution is to explore the policy implications of the 
incentive problems of index fund managers that we identify and document. 
We put forward a number of policy measures to address these incentive 
problems and explain why some other measures do not merit serious 
 
 12. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Engagement—Succeeding in the New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/engagement-succeeding-in-the-
new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/NBP4-GNXG] [hereinafter 
Lipton, New Paradigm for Corporate Governance] (“[T]he BlackRock letter is a major step 
in rejecting activism and short[-]termism . . . .”). For a detailed account by one of us of the 
appeal that “long-termism” has had to corporate law scholars and practitioners, see generally 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1637, 1646–51 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Long-Term Value]. 
 14. Christine Benz, Bogle: Index Funds the Best Hope for Corporate Governance, 
Morningstar.com (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.morningstar.com/videos/830770/bogle-index-
funds-the-best-hope-for-corporate-gove.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 15. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persp. 89 (2017) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Agency 
Problems of Institutional Investors]. 
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consideration. We also explain how recognition of these incentive problems 
should inform and influence important ongoing debates, such as those on 
common ownership and hedge fund activism.16 
This Article’s analysis is organized as follows. Part I develops our 
agency-costs theory of index funds stewardship. We begin by discussing the 
nature of index funds and stewardship. We proceed to discuss the features of 
index funds, such as large stakes and long-term perspectives, that have given 
rise to high hopes for index fund stewardship. We then explain that these 
hopes are founded on the premise that the stewardship decisions of index fund 
managers are largely focused on maximizing the long-term value of their 
investment portfolios and that agency problems are thus not a key driver of 
those decisions. We contrast this “value-maximization” view with an 
alternative “agency-costs” view that we put forward. 
In the agency-costs view, because the stewardship decisions of index 
funds are not made by the index funds’ own beneficial investors (to whom 
we refer below as the “index fund investors”), but rather by their investment 
 
 16. The research that is most closely related to this Article consists of four current or 
recent works that focus on index fund stewardship but differ considerably from this Article 
in terms of scope, methodology, approach, and normative position. 
 To begin, a study by John C. Coates also focuses on the increasing concentration of 
ownership in the hands of a small number of institutional investors. See generally John C. 
Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harvard Pub. 
Law Working Paper No. 19-07 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). However, unlike this Article, Coates’s study seems to be concerned 
that these investors will exercise too much power, rather than underinvest in stewardship and 
be excessively deferential to corporate managers; see infra note 269 and accompanying text 
and see generally Coates, supra. 
 In addition, studies by Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, and 
by Edward B. Rock and Marcel Kahan, take issue with our analysis and view index fund 
stewardship much more favorably than we do. But as we explain in various places below 
(see infra notes 58, 60, 65–66, 69-70, 87, 108, 126, 134–136, 139, 143, 162, 172–174, 180, 
184–188, 193, 197, 200–201, 210, 288, 291 and accompanying text), each of these studies 
fails to recognize some of the major problems with the stewardship that our analysis 
identifies. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New 
Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, U. Pa. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192069 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let 
Shareholders Be Shareholders (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-39, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
Finally, a study by Dorothy Shapiro Lund shares our concerns about how little the Big Three 
invest in stewardship, but it differs substantially from our incentive analysis, empirical 
investigation, and policy recommendations. See generally Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case 
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); see also infra notes 109, 223–
230 and accompanying text. 
 These four studies, as well as our own work, build on the substantial earlier body of 
literature on institutional investors discussed infra note 17. 
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advisers (whom we label “index fund managers”), the incentives of index 
fund managers are critical. The remainder of Part I is devoted to developing 
the elements of the agency-costs theory. In particular, we analyze two types 
of incentive problems that push the stewardship decisions of index fund 
managers away from those that would best serve the interests of index fund 
investors. 
The first type is incentives to underinvest in stewardship. Stewardship 
that increases the value of portfolio companies will benefit index fund 
investors. Index fund managers, however, are remunerated with a very small 
percentage of their assets under management and thus would capture a 
correspondingly small fraction of such increases in value. They therefore 
have much more limited incentives to invest in stewardship than their 
beneficial investors would prefer. Furthermore, if stewardship by an index 
fund manager increases the value of a portfolio company, rival index funds 
that track the same index (and investors in those funds) will receive the 
benefit of the increase in value without any expenditure of their own. As a 
result, an interest in improving financial performance relative to rival index 
fund managers does not provide any incentive to invest in stewardship. In 
addition, we explain that competition with actively managed funds cannot be 
expected to address the substantial incentives to underinvest in stewardship 
that we identify. 
The second type of incentive problems concerns incentives to be 
excessively deferential. When index fund managers face qualitative 
stewardship decisions, we show that they have incentives to be excessively 
deferential—relative to what would best serve the interests of their own 
beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of the managers 
of portfolio companies. This is because the choice between deference to 
managers and nondeference not only affects the value of the index fund’s 
portfolio but could also affect the private interests of the index fund manager. 
We then identify and analyze three significant ways in which index fund 
managers might benefit privately from such deference. First, we show that 
existing or potential business relationships between index fund managers and 
their portfolio companies give the index fund managers incentives to adopt 
principles, policies, and practices that defer to corporate managers. Second, 
we explain that in the many companies in which the Big Three hold positions 
of 5% or more of the company’s stock, taking certain nondeferential actions 
would trigger obligations that would impose substantial additional costs on 
the index fund manager. Finally, and importantly, the growing power of the 
Big Three means that a nondeferential approach would likely encounter 
significant resistance from corporate managers, which would create a 
6 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1 
substantial risk of regulatory backlash.17 
Although we focus on understanding the structural incentive problems 
that afflict the stewardship decisions of index fund managers, we stress that 
in some cases, fiduciary norms, or a desire to do the right thing, could lead 
well-meaning index fund managers to take actions that differ from those 
suggested by a pure incentive analysis. Furthermore, index fund managers 
also have incentives to be perceived as responsible stewards by their 
beneficial investors and by the public—and thus, to avoid actions that would 
make salient their underinvestment in stewardship or their deference to 
corporate managers. These factors could well constrain the force of the 
problems that we investigate. However, the structural incentive problems that 
we identify should be expected to have significant effects, and the evidence 
we present in Part II demonstrates that this is, in fact, the case. 
As with any other theory regarding economic and financial behavior, the 
test for which of the value-maximization view or the agency-costs view is 
valid is the extent to which those views are consistent with and can explain 
the extant evidence. Part II, therefore, puts forward evidence on the 
stewardship decisions of the Big Three. We provide a detailed picture of what 
they do, how they do it, and what they fail to do. We combine hand-collected 
data and data from various public sources to piece together this broad and 
detailed picture. 
The first half of Part II considers four dimensions of the stewardship that 
the Big Three actually undertake and how they do so. First, we examine 
actual stewardship investments. Our analysis provides estimates of the 
stewardship personnel, in terms of both workdays and dollar cost, devoted to 
particular companies. Whereas supporters of index fund stewardship have 
 
 17. In analyzing the incentives of index funds, our work, as well as other current 
writings on index fund stewardship, builds on a substantial body of earlier literature on 
institutional investors and their potential benefits and agency costs. For well-known early 
works that analyze the potential benefits and limitations of institutional investors as monitors 
of portfolio companies, see generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The 
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, 
Agents Watching Agents]; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. 
L. Rev. 520 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined]; John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991). 
 For recent works in this literature, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of 
Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by 
Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of 
Corporate Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental 
Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term 
Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question]. 
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focused on recent increases in the stewardship staff of the Big Three, our 
analysis examines personnel resources in the context of the Big Three’s assets 
under management and the number of their portfolio companies. We show 
that the Big Three devote an economically negligible fraction of their fee 
income to stewardship and that their stewardship staffing levels enable only 
limited and cursory stewardship for the vast majority of their portfolio 
companies. 
Second, we consider behind-the-scenes engagements. Supporters of 
index fund stewardship view private engagements by the Big Three as 
explaining why they refrain from using certain other stewardship tools 
available to shareholders. However, we show that the Big Three engage with 
a very small proportion of their portfolio companies, and only a small 
proportion of portfolio companies have more than a single engagement in any 
year. Furthermore, refraining from using other stewardship tools also has an 
adverse effect on the small minority of cases in which private engagements 
do occur. The Big Three’s private engagement thus cannot constitute an 
adequate substitute for the use of other stewardship tools. 
Third, we describe the Big Three’s focus on divergence from governance 
principles. Our review of the proxy voting guidelines and engagements of the 
Big Three demonstrates that they largely focus on the existence or absence of 
divergences from governance principles. But value-maximizing stewardship 
decisions would require also paying attention to additional company-specific 
information, including information about financial performance or the 
suitability of particular directors up for election. 
Fourth, we discuss pro-management voting. We focus on votes cast by 
the Big Three on matters of central importance to managers, such as executive 
compensation and proxy contests with activist hedge funds. We show that the 
Big Three’s votes on these matters reveal considerable deference to corporate 
managers. For example, the Big Three very rarely oppose corporate managers 
in say-on-pay votes and do so significantly less frequently than other large 
investment fund managers. 
In the second half of Part II, we analyze in turn five dimensions of 
stewardship activities that the Big Three fail to undertake adequately. First, 
we examine their limited attention to business performance. Our analysis of 
the voting guidelines and stewardship reports of the Big Three indicates that 
their stewardship focuses on governance structures and processes and pays 
limited attention to financial underperformance. While portfolio company 
compliance with governance best-practices serves the interests of index fund 
investors, those investors would also benefit substantially from stewardship 
aimed at identifying, addressing, and remedying financial underperformance. 
Second, we analyze how the Big Three pay limited attention to some 
important characteristics of directors and to the choice of individual 
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directors. Index fund investors could benefit if index fund managers 
communicated with the boards of underperforming companies about 
replacing or adding certain directors. However, our examination of director 
nominations and Schedule 13D filings over the past decade indicates that the 
Big Three have refrained from such communications. 
Third, we explain that the Big Three fail to adequately bring about 
improvements favored by their own governance principles. Shareholder 
proposals have proven to be an effective stewardship tool for bringing about 
governance changes at large numbers of public companies. Many of the Big 
Three’s portfolio companies persistently fail to adopt the governance best-
practices that the Big Three support. Given these failures, and the Big Three’s 
focus on divergences from governance principles, it would be natural for the 
Big Three to submit shareholder proposals to such companies aimed at 
addressing such failures. But our examination of shareholder proposals over 
the last decade indicates that the Big Three have completely refrained from 
submitting such proposals. 
Fourth, we analyze the frequent tendency of the Big Three to stay on the 
sidelines of governance reforms. Index fund investors would benefit from 
involvement by index fund managers in corporate governance reforms—such 
as supporting desirable proposed changes and opposing undesirable 
changes—that could materially affect the value of many portfolio companies. 
We therefore review all of the comments submitted on proposed rulemaking 
regarding corporate governance issues by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as well as the filing of amicus briefs in precedential 
litigation. We find that the Big Three have contributed very few such 
comments and no amicus briefs over the past decade and were much less 
involved in such reforms than asset owners with much smaller portfolios. 
Fifth, we consider the Big Three’s passing on all opportunities to 
influence consequential securities litigation. Legal rules encourage 
institutional investors with “skin in the game” to take on lead plaintiff 
positions in securities class actions; this serves the interests of their investors 
by monitoring class counsel, settlement agreements and recoveries, and the 
terms of governance reforms incorporated in such settlements. We therefore 
examine the lead plaintiffs selected in the large set of significant class actions 
over the past decade. Although the Big Three’s investors often have 
significant skin in the game, we find that the Big Three refrained from taking 
on lead plaintiff positions in any of these cases. 
Taken together, this body of evidence is difficult to reconcile with the 
value-maximization view. On the whole, however, the documented patterns 
are consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view put 
forward in Part I. 
Part III turns to the policy implications of our theory and evidence. In 
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section III.A we put forward for consideration five measures for addressing 
the incentive problems of index fund managers and discuss measures that we 
believe would be counterproductive—in particular, prohibiting index funds 
from voting or having index fund investors determine funds’ votes. The set 
of approaches that we consider includes measures designed (i) to encourage 
stewardship investments; (ii) to address the distortions arising from business 
ties between index fund managers and public companies; (iii) to bring 
transparency to the private engagements conducted by index fund managers 
and their portfolio companies; and (iv) to redesign the rules governing the 
disclosure of stakes of 5% or more in portfolio companies. 
We further discuss placing limits on the fraction of equity of any public 
company that could be managed by a single index fund manager. The 
expectation that the proportion of corporate equities held by index funds will 
continue to rise18 makes it especially important to consider the desirability of 
the Big Three’s continued dominance. For instance, we explain that if the 
index fund sector continues to grow and index fund managers come to control 
45% of corporate equity, having each of the “Giant Three” holding 15% 
would be inferior to having each of a “Big-ish Nine” holding 5%. 
Section III.B discusses the significant implications of our analysis for 
two important ongoing debates. First, we consider the debate over influential 
but controversial claims that the rise in common ownership patterns—
whereby institutional investors hold shares in many companies in the same 
sector—can be expected to have anticompetitive effects. We explain that our 
analysis indicates that these claims are unwarranted and that focusing 
regulatory attention on them would be counterproductive.19 
With respect to the debate on hedge fund activism, our analysis also 
undermines claims by opponents of such activism that index fund 
stewardship is superior to—and should replace—hedge fund activism; rather, 
the incentive problems of index fund managers make the role of activist 
 
 18. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 19. We were invited by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to discuss the 
implications of our work for the common ownership debate at an FTC hearing on the subject. 
The slides of our presentation are available in Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Misguided 
Attack on Common Ownership (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-10, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298983 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Bebchuk & Hirst, Misguided Attack on Common Ownership]. 
 For recent attempts by a leading critic of common ownership to engage with the 
arguments regarding common ownership made in this Article, see Einer Elhauge, The Causal 
Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding 49–58 (2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3370675 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding]; Einer Elhauge, 
How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It 
48–70 (Aug. 2, 2019) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293822 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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hedge funds especially important. 
Part III concludes by highlighting another way in which we hope our 
analysis could contribute to improving index fund stewardship. Because 
index fund managers have an interest in having their stewardship viewed 
favorably by their investors and others, increased recognition of the agency 
problems of index fund managers could by itself induce such managers to 
reduce divergences from value-maximizing stewardship decisions. Although 
the policy measures we put forward would improve matters, the problems 
that we identify and document can be expected to remain an important 
element of the corporate governance landscape. Acquiring a full 
understanding of these problems is thus essential for policymakers and the 
field of corporate governance. 
We have been fortunate to receive reactions and responses to our work 
from many academics, both in their writings and in various fora in which 
earlier versions of this Article were presented, as well as from practitioners, 
including index fund officers. Throughout our analysis, we attempt to engage 
with and respond to comments, objections, and arguments raised by such 
commentators.20 
Before proceeding, we would like to clarify the nature of our normative 
claims. First, we do not argue that index fund stewardship produces worse 
outcomes for the governance of the economy’s operating companies than the 
outcomes that would occur if the shares of the index funds were instead held 
by dispersed individual investors. On the contrary, we believe that, despite 
the problems we identify and document with index fund stewardship, the 
concentration of shares in the hands of index funds produces substantially 
better oversight than would result from the shares currently held through 
index funds instead being owned directly by dispersed individual investors. 
The evolution from the dispersion of ownership highlighted by Adolf Berle 
and Gardiner Means21 to the concentration of ownership among institutional 
investors created the potential for improved oversight. Our interest is in 
realizing that potential to the fullest extent possible. 
Similarly, we do not claim that index fund stewardship produces worse 
outcomes than those that would occur if the shares currently held by index 
funds were instead held by active mutual funds. We have shown elsewhere 
 
 20. For examples of our engagement with arguments or counterarguments related to our 
work that have been raised by others, see, e.g., infra notes 58, 60–62, 65–66, 69–71, 87, 108–
109, 115–117, 119–120, 126, 134–141, 143, 145, 162–164, 172–174, 180, 184–188, 193, 
197, 200–201, 205, 210, 215, 217, 222–225, 227–229, 231, 269, 278–279, 288, 291 and 
accompanying text. 
 21. For the classic work documenting and lamenting the dispersion of ownership prior 
to the rise of institutional investors, see generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). 
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that the agency problems afflicting active mutual funds indicate that these 
problems are also substantial.22 We do not view the stewardship decisions of 
index funds as generally inferior to those of active mutual funds, and we do 
not advocate measures to favor actively managed funds over index funds. 
Instead, we focus on comparing the current stewardship decisions of 
index fund managers with the stewardship decisions that would best serve the 
interests of index funds’ investors. We believe that comparing current 
stewardship decisions to this (no-agency-costs) benchmark can improve our 
understanding of the shortcomings of current stewardship decisions, the 
nature and significance of these shortcomings, and the best ways to address 
them. If agency problems are indeed a first-order driver of stewardship 
decisions, as we argue, then the agency-costs framework can substantially 
contribute to a fuller understanding of stewardship decisions. Furthermore, 
the agency-costs framework can provide a basis for putting forward 
arrangements to limit the agency costs we identify and improve index fund 
stewardship. These improvements would, in turn, serve the interests of the 
index fund investors and contribute to the performance of the public 
companies in which they hold shares. 
I. AN AGENCY-COSTS THEORY OF INDEX FUND STEWARDSHIP 
This Part develops our agency-costs theory of index fund stewardship. 
We start by explaining the nature of index funds and the stewardship activities 
they undertake in section I.A. We describe views that have been expressed 
about the significant promise that the nature of index funds holds for 
stewardship in section I.B. We explain that this is the basis for the “value-
maximization view” of index fund stewardship, and we put forward our 
competing “agency-costs” view in section I.C. We then develop the agency-
costs view, showing how this view indicates that index fund managers will 
have incentives to underinvest in stewardship in section I.D, as well as 
incentives to be excessively deferential to managers of portfolio companies 
in section I.E. Finally, we consider two potential limits—arising from 
fiduciary norms and reputational considerations—on the force of these 
incentives in section I.F. 
 
 22. For analyses of these substantial problems, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at 95–104; Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active 
Mutual Funds More Active Owners than Index Funds?, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Harvard 
Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-owners-
than-index-funds/ [https://perma.cc/G6FQ-EDG7] [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Active 
Mutual Funds]. 
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A. Index Funds and Stewardship 
1. Index Funds  
Index funds are a special type of investment fund. Investment funds pool 
the assets of many individuals and entities and invest those assets in 
diversified portfolios of securities. Actively managed investment funds buy 
and sell securities of companies in accordance with their views about whether 
those companies are under- or overvalued.23 By contrast, index funds invest 
in portfolios that attempt to track the performance of specified benchmark 
indexes, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000.24 The term “index fund” 
encompasses both mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), or any 
other investment vehicle that mechanically tracks an index.25 Well-known 
examples of index funds include the Vanguard S&P 500 Mutual Fund, 
SSGA’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF, and BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500 ETF. 
While some index funds also track indexes of debt securities, this Article 
focuses on those that invest in equity securities. 
As we analyze in detail in our recent empirical study, The Specter of the 
Giant Three, the index fund sector is heavily concentrated and is dominated 
by the Big Three.26 In that study we explain that such concentration is to be 
expected and should be expected to persist.27 The dominant incumbents have 
significant structural advantages that derive from the economies of scale of 
 
 23. For a discussion of the approaches of actively managed funds and how they 
compare with index funds, see Fid. Invs., Active and Passive Funds: The Power of Both, The 
Street (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14451001/1/active-and-passive-
funds-the-power-of-both.html [https://perma.cc/4QV5-39C2]. 
 24. For a discussion of the strategy used by one of the largest index funds, see Vanguard, 
Vanguard 500 Index Fund Prospectus 8–12 (2019) 
https://personal.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/p040.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SXN-2NN6]. For 
discussions of the general workings of indexes, see Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, 
Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 6–
23 (2013), and of indexes underlying index funds specifically, see Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, 
Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion Symposium, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1231–32 
(2019); Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and Index 
Investing, Yale J. on Reg. 795, 799–809 (2019). 
 25. For a discussion of the rules governing mutual funds and ETFs, see Lois Yurow, 
Timothy W. Levin, W. John McGuire & James M. Storey, Mutual Funds Regulation and 
Compliance Handbook § 4:1 (2017); William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of 
Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 
Del. J. Corp. L. 69, 76–86 (2008). 
 26. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 727–31. For 
example, that study documents that forty-five of the fifty largest ETFs (by assets under 
management) are managed by BlackRock, Vanguard, or SSGA. Id. at 730–31. 
 27. Id. at 729–31. 
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operating index funds; the funds’ branding; and—in the case of ETFs—the 
liquidity benefits for funds with large asset bases. In addition, there are no 
significant opportunities for new entrants to attract business from the 
incumbents by introducing new products that would be difficult for the 
incumbents to imitate.28 
2. Stewardship 
In the literature on institutional investors, stewardship refers to the 
actions that investment managers can take in order to enhance the value of 
the companies that they invest in on behalf of their own beneficial investors.29 
Most advanced economies now have stewardship principles or codes that 
seek to provide guidance to institutional investors.30 We focus here on 
stewardship that aims to enhance the value of the company.31 Stewardship by 
institutional investors, including by the index funds that are the focus of this 
Article, includes three components: monitoring, voting, and engagement. 
Monitoring involves evaluating the operations, performance, practices, 
and compensation and governance decisions of portfolio companies. It 
 
 28. For an analysis of these structural advantages, see id. 
 29. See, e.g., BlackRock, The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem 6 (2018) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-
stewardship-ecosystem-july-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4KA-QLA9] [hereinafter 
BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem] (defining stewardship as “engagement with public 
companies to promote corporate governance practices that are consistent with encouraging 
long-term value creation for shareholders in the company” and stating that “[p]roxy voting 
is often associated with investment stewardship, however, voting is not the only form that 
stewardship can take”). 
 30. For recent efforts in the United Kingdom and the United States, see generally Fin. 
Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code (2012), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-
Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); About 
the Investor Stewardship Group and the Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance, 
Institutional Stewardship Grp., https://isgframework.org/ [https://perma.cc/SFP8-5U4P] 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
 31. Some institutional investors, such as socially responsible investment funds, might 
have goals other than enhancing value. We do not discuss this type of stewardship in this 
Article. For a discussion of such stewardship by one of us, see generally Scott Hirst, Social 
Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. Corp. L. 217, 222–34 (2018). 
 We also note that some investors in indexed products seek to screen out some companies 
from the portfolio in which they invest, and index fund managers therefore also manage 
portfolios that follow such exclusions. Investor demands for exclusion of certain 
investments, and the impact they might have on corporate behavior, are outside the scope of 
this Article, as we focus on the stewardship decisions of index fund managers with respect 
to those companies that are included in managed portfolios. For an article discussing index 
exclusions, see generally Hirst & Kastiel, supra note 24. 
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provides the informational basis for the voting and engagement decisions of 
index funds. 
Voting at shareholder meetings is a key function of index fund managers 
and other shareholders. Shareholders vote on the election of directors to 
manage the corporation; charter and bylaw amendments; mergers, 
dissolutions, and other fundamental changes in the corporation; and advisory 
votes on executive compensation and shareholder proposals.32 Index funds 
(along with other investment funds) generally vote on these matters, and 
index fund managers determine how their funds vote.33 
Engagement refers to interactions between index fund managers and 
their portfolio companies in ways other than voting—for example, by 
submitting shareholder proposals, nominating directors, and undertaking 
proxy contests. Among other forms of engagement, index fund managers 
(and other shareholders) can communicate publicly or privately with 
managers and directors of their portfolio companies. These communications 
can be proactive and initiated by the investor, or reactive, as when an investor 
responds to contact from a portfolio company or other investors. 
In the remainder of Part I, we will distinguish between two types of 
decisions that index fund managers must make regarding stewardship 
activities. One type of decision is quantitative: determining the level of 
investment that the index fund manager will make on stewardship activities. 
The other type of decision is qualitative: determining the level of deference 
that the index fund manager will give to the corporate managers that lead 
particular portfolio companies. In sections I.D and I.E, below, we discuss the 
respective value-enhancing benchmarks for each of these two types of 
decisions. 
B. The Promise of Index Fund Stewardship 
The leaders of the Big Three, and supporters of index fund stewardship, 
have expressed the view that such stewardship can be expected to produce 
significant benefits.34 As we explain in this section, this view seems to be 
 
 32. For a well-known article on shareholder voting, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983). 
 33. For the Department of Labor’s interpretation of investment manager voting 
requirements, see Dep’t of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of 
Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting 
Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2601-01 (2019). 
 34. For example, Vanguard has stated that “[G]ood governance and effective 
stewardship can add value . . . . Good governance is good for investors.” Glenn Booraem, 
What We Do. How We Do It. Why It Matters. 2 (2019), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-
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based on three characteristics of index funds in general, and the Big Three in 
particular: (i) their large and growing stakes in publicly traded companies; 
(ii) their inability to exit poorly-performing companies, rather than trying to 
fix their governance problems; and (iii) their long-term focus. Below we 
discuss each of these three factors in turn. 
To begin, the large and growing stakes held by each of the Big Three 
give them significant influence over the outcomes of corporate votes. This 
influence leads, in turn, to their substantial influence over the decisions of 
corporate managers, even before matters come to a vote. 
A priori, we would expect the large stakes that each of the Big Three 
holds in their portfolio companies to motivate them to maximize the value of 
those companies. A standard “free-rider” problem in corporations is that the 
benefits of improving corporate value are shared with other investors.35 A 
very large investor like a Big Three index fund family will capture a larger 
fraction of these benefits than a smaller investor. For instance, an index fund 
family that holds 5% of the shares of a particular company will capture ten 
times as much from an increase in the value of that company than a smaller 
investment fund family holding 0.5% of the same company.36 As a result, the 
interests of the investors of the large index fund manager might call for a 
larger investment in stewardship than the interests of the investors of the 
smaller investment fund family. 
The second relevant characteristic of index funds is the lack of an exit 
option. If other types of investors are dissatisfied with the performance of 
their portfolio companies they can take the “Wall Street walk” and sell their 
shares.37 By contrast, because index funds replicate their benchmark index, 
they are unable to exit from a particular portfolio company while it remains 
 
commentary/what_how_why.pdf [https://perma.cc/83AA-AZHM] [hereinafter Booraem, 
What We Do]. SSGA’s CEO has stated that “[o]ur focus in recent years has been on good 
governance.” Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO, SSGA, to Portfolio Company Board 
Members 1 (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/2019/01/2019%20Proxy%20Letter-
Aligning%20Corporate%20Culture%20with%20Long-Term%20Strategy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2UHZ-JTKN] [hereinafter Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala]. 
 35. For a classic and influential discussion of the free-rider problem, see Robert Charles 
Clark, Corporate Law 389–400 (1986). 
 36. For an explanation of fund families, see infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 37. For an excellent review of the financial economics literature on exit, see Alex 
Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, in 
Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance 541, 574-82 (Benjamin E. Hermalin 
& Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017); Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 
2014 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 23, 28–32. As Edmans has highlighted, exit decisions by other 
investors can affect corporate behavior. For surveys of his and others’ work on exit decisions 
and governance, see id. at 26–44. 
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in the index. Indeed, SSGA’s CEO has referred to SSGA as representing 
“essentially permanent capital,”38 and Vanguard’s then-CEO William 
McNabb has described Vanguard’s index funds as being “permanent 
shareholders.”39 The lack of an exit option increases the relative importance 
of stewardship and engagement. BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has stated that 
“BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the company’s 
securities as long as that company remains in the relevant index. As a result, 
our responsibility to engage and vote is more important than ever.”40 
A third characteristic of index funds that is potentially attractive to 
supporters of their stewardship is their long-term investment horizon. Both 
BlackRock and Vanguard have referred to themselves as “the ultimate long-
term investors.”41 There is significant debate in the literature about the extent 
to which the existence of investors with short-term horizons has adverse 
effects on corporate governance.42 The long-term investment horizons of 
index funds obviate any such concerns and therefore makes stewardship by 
index fund managers especially attractive to commentators who are 
concerned about short-termism.43 Consistent with this view, SSGA states that 
they “actively engage with [their] portfolio companies to promote the long-
term value of [their clients’] investments.”44 Vanguard states that it is “the 
ultimate long-term investor,”45 and that its “emphasis on investment 
 
 38. Cyrus Taraporevala, Index Funds Must Be Activists to Serve Investors, Fin. Times, 
(July 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4e4c119a-8c25-11e8-affd-da9960227309 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). Supporters of index fund stewardship have also focused 
on the lack of exit options for index funds. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript 
at 43) (“Passive investors must . . . rel[y] on voice, rather than exit.”). 
 39. F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder 
Engagement, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (June 24, 
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-
significant-shareholder-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/5QZL-VZCY]. 
 40. Fink, supra note 8. 
 41. Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 6 (“Vanguard is the ultimate long-term 
investor.”); Fink, supra note 8 (“[I]ndex investors are the ultimate long-term investors.”). 
 42. For an exchange on this subject between one of us and Delaware Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Leo Strine, Jr., see Bebchuk, Long-Term Value, supra note 13, and Strine, One 
Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 17. 
 43. For instance, Martin Lipton has stressed that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard 
have continued to express support for sustainable long-term investment.” Martin Lipton, 
Activism: The State of Play, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. 
Regulation (Sept. 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/23/activism-the-state-
of-play/ [https://perma.cc/4KEA-JUFB] [hereinafter Lipton, State of Play]. For a detailed 
review by one of us of the short-termism concerns expressed by many academics, 
practitioners, and public officials, see Bebchuk, Long-Term Value, supra note 13, at 1658–
86. 
 44. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016, supra note 9, at 3. 
 45. Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 6. 
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outcomes over the long term is unwavering.”46 
Can the large stakes of index funds, their lack of exit options, and their 
long-term perspective combine to enable them to deliver on the promise they 
hold for corporate governance? In subsequent parts of this Article we analyze 
the impediments to such delivery. 
C. The Value-Maximization and Agency-Costs Views  
In highlighting the above characteristics, index fund leaders and 
supporters of index fund stewardship implicitly assume that the managers of 
index fund families largely act to maximize the long-term value of the 
portfolios they manage;47 we therefore refer to this view as the “value-
maximization” view of index fund stewardship. This view attaches limited 
significance to potential agency problems within index funds and does not 
view such problems as first-order drivers of stewardship decisions. 
Below we put forward an alternative to the value-maximization view. 
Because stewardship decisions are made by investment managers, we believe 
that it is critical to assess their incentives regarding stewardship. An 
examination of these incentives and the evidence we put forward regarding 
investment managers’ stewardship decisions, indicates that agency problems 
are a first-order driver of the stewardship decisions of index fund managers, 
and that these decisions cannot be properly understood without recognizing 
these agency problems. 
Before examining the incentives of index fund managers, it is useful to 
recognize several characteristics of index fund managers that play an 
important role in our theory. To begin, index funds are generally structured 
as corporations or statutory trusts, with their own directors or trustees. But 
these directors or trustees have a very limited set of responsibilities, and the 
key decisions in operating index funds are made by the funds’ investment 
 
 46. Vanguard, Investment Stewardship 2018 Annual Report 3 (2018), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/annual-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GFV4-RDD4] [hereinafter Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018]. 
 47. For communications by Big Three officers making these premises explicit, see, e.g., 
BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship Engagement Priorities for 2019, at 2 (2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-stewardship-priorities-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW7G-7NLP] [hereinafter BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement 
Priorities 2019] (“BlackRock, as a fiduciary investor, undertakes all investment stewardship 
engagements and proxy voting with the goal of protecting and enhancing the long-term value 
of our clients’ assets.”); BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 6 
(“BlackRock’s approach to investment stewardship is driven by our role as a fiduciary to our 
clients, the asset owners.”); Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 1, 6 (“[Vanguard has] 
grown only more steadfast in our sense of responsibility for our clients and our safeguarding 
of their interests . . . . We act in the best interest of Vanguard fund investors.”). 
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advisors.48 We use the term “index fund managers” to refer to these 
investment advisors of index funds, including BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
SSGA, that make key decisions.49 It is the incentives and decisions of index 
fund managers that are our focus in this Article.50 
The economies of scale in investment management mean that most 
investment managers now manage dozens or hundreds of investment funds, 
often referred to collectively as “fund complexes” or “fund families.” While 
some investment fund families consist largely of actively managed funds, 
each of the Big Three fund families consists predominantly of index funds.51 
For the Big Three, as with many other investment managers, the key 
stewardship decisions are centralized in a dedicated stewardship department 
of the index fund manager.52 An important component of the stewardship 
 
 48. For a detailed discussion of the governance of index funds, see Eric D. Roiter, 
Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 
1, 13–24 (2016). 
 49. BlackRock is a public company, and SSGA is an operating unit of a public company, 
so it is reasonable to assume that they both seek to maximize their profits and, in turn, the 
value of their index fund management business. In contrast, Vanguard is owned by its 
investment funds. For an explanation of Vanguard’s ownership structure, see Why 
Ownership Matters at Vanguard, Vanguard, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-
vanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/ [https://perma.cc/XS5E-TJDN] (last visited Aug. 
30, 2019). Vanguard appears to operate by constraining its fees to the point that leaves its 
business with no profit. This raises the interesting question of which objectives the business 
leaders of Vanguard maximize. One plausible assumption, which is consistent with our 
incentive analysis in this Part, is that these business leaders aim to be successful by 
expanding the scale of their business. For Vanguard’s own view of how its ownership 
structure affects its incentives, see Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“This unique 
structure aligns our interests with those of our investors . . . . It’s their money.”). 
 50. For early writing stressing the need to consider the incentives of institutional 
investors, see Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 17, at 595–96; Jill E. 
Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 1009, 1038–
47 (1994); Rock, supra note 17, at 469–78. 
 51. As of June 2017, the proportion of assets invested in index funds was 79% for 
SSGA, 74% for Vanguard, and 66% for BlackRock. In contrast, only 14% of Fidelity’s assets 
under management were invested in index funds. Hortense Bioy, Alex Bryan, Jackie Choy, 
Jose Garcia-Zarate & Ben Johnson, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to 
Investment Stewardship 4 (2017), https://www-
prd.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-
Active-Stewardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQY2-F68E]. 
 52. See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 316–17 (showing empirically that the 
centralized stewardship departments of each of the Big Three produce highly consistent 
voting within fund families); Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 3 (“Historically, proxy 
voting on behalf of all of Vanguard’s index and actively-managed funds has been 
administered centrally by Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team.”); State St. Glob. 
Advisors, Stewardship Report 2018–2019, at 22 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-
topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/09/annual-asset-stewardship-report-2018.pdf 
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decision making of the index fund manager relates to the level of resources it 
devotes to this department, as well as to the qualitative decisions that the 
department makes. 
The remainder of this Part develops an analytical framework for 
understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Sections I.D and I.E 
below analyze how the fact that investment managers manage other people’s 
money incentivizes them to diverge from this benchmark in two important 
ways. In particular, section I.D examines the index fund managers’ incentives 
to underinvest in stewardship compared to the value-maximizing level. 
Section I.E focuses on the qualitative stewardship decision of how deferential 
to be toward corporate managers, and shows that index fund managers have 
incentives to be excessively deferential. Finally, section I.F discusses some 
constraints that limit the force of the distorted incentives that we identify. 
D. Incentives to Underinvest in Stewardship 
In this section we consider index fund managers’ incentives with respect 
to the first dimension of stewardship decisions we identified in section I.A, 
the level of investment in stewardship activities. Section I.D.1 discusses the 
value-maximization benchmark—that is, the investment level that would best 
serve the interests of index fund investors. Section I.D.2 discusses the 
investment-level decisions that index fund managers will make, assuming, 
for simplicity, that both the fee levels that index fund managers charge and 
the size of their investment portfolio are fixed. Section I.D.3 relaxes this 
assumption and considers how the possibility of a competitive benefit from 
stewardship could affect index fund manager incentives. 
1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark 
To assess the investment-level decisions of index fund managers, it is 
first necessary to define a benchmark for desirable stewardship decisions. 
The benchmark for value-enhancing stewardship decisions made by the 
investment managers are those that would be best for investors in the index 
funds. These are also the stewardship decisions that would be made if there 
were no agency separation between the index fund manager and the investors 
in the index fund—that is, in a “sole-owner” benchmark, in which the index 
fund’s portfolio had a sole owner that managed the portfolio and was 
expected to make all of the stewardship decisions that would enhance its 
value. 
 
[https://perma.cc/N37N-QM9D] [hereinafter State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2018] (“All voting and engagement activities are centralized within our Stewardship 
Team . . . .”). 
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Investment in a certain stewardship activity will be desirable to the 
extent, and only to the extent, that the marginal gain to the index fund’s 
portfolio, on an expected value basis, will exceed the marginal cost of this 
investment. To formalize our analysis, we refer to the investment stewardship 
activity as the “stewardship investment,” denoted by IS. We will refer to the 
“expected gain from stewardship investment” to the portfolio of the index 
fund as G(IS). As is standard in economics, it is reasonable to assume that the 
marginal expected gain from additional investment is positive, but that this 
marginal gain declines as the level of investment rises.53 
From the perspective of the beneficial investors in an index fund, it will 
be desirable for the investment fund manager to continue increasing the level 
of investment IS as long as the marginal gain from each additional dollar of 
investment exceeds one dollar. Thus, it will be desirable to set the level of 
investment that is optimal for the beneficial investors, which we denote as 
IS*. This is the level that occurs where G’(IS*) is equal to 1, that is, the 
marginal gain from an extra dollar of stewardship investment is equal to one 
dollar. 
We wish to note two comments regarding this benchmark of the value 
maximizing level IS*. First, the level that is optimal from the perspective of 
the index fund’s beneficial investors, IS*, is generally lower than the socially 
desirable stewardship investment level. That is because the gain produced by 
this stewardship for the index fund’s portfolio is only a fraction of the increase 
in the value of the portfolio company. Because the index fund investors will 
not fully capture the gains to the portfolio company from the investment in 
stewardship, the optimal level of investment from the perspective of these 
investors would not take into account the positive externalities that the index 
fund stewardship would confer on other shareholders in the portfolio 
company. This divergence reflects the free-rider problem among investors 
that has long been recognized.54 
Second, although the level of the stewardship investments that would be 
best from the perspective of the index fund’s beneficial investors would not 
take into account benefits to other shareholders, the stewardship investment 
 
 53. This is an application of the so-called “law of diminishing returns.” For an 
examination of the history of the law of diminishing returns, see generally Stanley L. Brue, 
Retrospectives: The Law of Diminishing Returns, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 185 (1993). For examples 
of the use of the standard assumption in a standard textbook, see, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, 
Principles of Economics 525 (8th ed. 2017) (“The traditional view of the production process 
is that capital is subject to diminishing returns: As the stock of capital rises, the extra output 
produced from an additional unit of capital falls.”). Applying the standard premise to our 
analysis, the formal assumption is that G’(IS) (the first derivative of G with respect to IS) is 
positive, and that G’’(IS) (the second derivative of G with respect to IS) is negative. 
 54. See supra note 35. 
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level could be substantial for index fund managers that have very large 
amounts of assets under management. For instance, if an index fund manager 
holds a stake of $1 billion in a portfolio company and stewardship is expected 
to increase the value of the company by 0.1%, it would be desirable to make 
an additional marginal investment of up to $1 million in such stewardship. 
Even if the expected gain were as little as 0.01%, it would justify an 
additional marginal investment in stewardship as long as that investment is 
below $100,000. Each of the Big Three has positions of $1 billion or more in 
numerous companies.55 As of June 30, 2019, the Big Three collectively held 
more than 1,000 positions of $1 billion or more, with BlackRock holding 
more than 400 such positions, Vanguard more than 500, and SSGA more than 
250.56 From the perspective of a beneficial investor in a Big Three index fund, 
substantial investments in stewardship are therefore likely to be value 
enhancing in many cases. 
2. The Manager’s Fraction of Value Increases 
Let us first assume that index fund managers take their assets under 
management and fee structures as given. This simplifying assumption 
highlights a key driver of the gap between the interests of index fund 
managers and those of beneficial investors in their funds. Index fund 
managers generally cover the cost of investments in stewardship from the 
stream of fee income that they receive over time from investment funds. As 
we explain below, however, the increase in the present value of fee revenues 
they can expect to receive is only a tiny fraction of the expected value 
increase from stewardship. 
Given our assumption that stewardship does not affect the level of assets 
under management, the private benefits to index fund managers from 
stewardship only come from the increased fees that would result from an 
increase in the value of the index funds’ given assets. Under existing 
arrangements, index fund managers charge their investors fees that are 
usually specified as a very small fixed percentage of assets under 
management.57 As a result, the index fund manager will be able to capture a 
 
 55. The median value of positions in S&P 500 companies for BlackRock, Vanguard, 
and SSGA as of June 30, 2019 were $1.6 billion, $2.0 billion, and $1.0 billion, respectively. 
Calculations are based on ownership data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership Database (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2019) and S&P 500 constituency data from Compustat (last visited Oct. 3, 
2019). 
 56. These calculations are based on ownership data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership 
Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 57. Amounts that investment managers charge to investors also include certain 
expenses, such as legal expenses and expenses related to custody of portfolio assets. See 
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gain that represents only a small fraction of the gain produced by the 
stewardship. 
To be sure, if stewardship produces a sustainable increase in value, the 
index fund manager will benefit from a small increase in fees in future years 
as well as the current year, but the present value of the stream of small fee 
increases over time will still represent only a small fraction of the value 
increase produced by the stewardship. To illustrate, consider an index fund 
manager that has a $1 billion position; that expects a certain stewardship 
investment to produce an expected (sustainable) value increase of 0.1% (that 
is, $1 million); and that charges and expects to continue to charge an annual 
fee of 0.1% of the value of assets under management. In this case, the 
manager would expect to capture increased fees with an expected value of 
$1,000 (0.1% × $1 million) each year. Assuming this stream is expected to 
continue indefinitely, and that the discount rate is 10%, the present value of 
an extra $1,000 a year is $10,000, which is equal to 1% of the expected value 
increase of $1 million produced by the stewardship. 
Formally, let us use the term “fractional fee,” which we will denote as θ, 
for the fraction of any gain from stewardship that the index fund manager 
will be able to capture.58 Given the fractional fee θ, if a stewardship 
investment of IS is expected to produce an increase of G(IS) in the value of 
the index fund manager’s position, then the index fund manager would be 
able to capture for itself only θ × G(Is) of the expected gain to the portfolio. 
From the perspective of the index fund manager, it will be desirable to 
increase the level of investment in stewardship only up to the point after 
which a further increase would produce a private marginal gain to the index 
 
SEC, Form N-1A, https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3MB-JNLB] 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019). These are all included in the annual fund operating expenses that 
investment funds are required to disclose, see 17 C.F.R. § 274.11A (2019), which are 
calculated as a percentage of investment, and commonly referred to as the “expense ratio.” 
When we refer to fees charged to investors we include all amounts included in the expense 
ratio. 
 58. Formally, denoting by α the (small) percentage of each dollar under management 
that the index fund manager can expected to receive as fees each year, and denoting by r is 
the relevant discount rate, the fractional fee θ is equal to the sum of α × 1 + α × 1 / (1+r) + 
α × 1 / (1+r)2 + α × 1 / (1+r)2 . . . . Kahan and Rock argue that we understate the incentives 
of index fund managers because we “assum[e] annual fees are earned for only one year.” 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 15 n.59. However, as stated above and in earlier versions 
of this Article, we use the present value of the stream of fees. This definition of the fractional 
fee as the fraction of value represented by the present value of the increases in the stream of 
fees was already included as an element in the analytical framework introduced in our work 
with Alma Cohen on which this Article builds. See Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at 97 (defining the fractional fee as the “fraction of the 
increase in the value of a portfolio company that an investment fund will be able to capture, 
in present value terms, from additional fees” (emphasis added)). 
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fund manager that no longer exceeds the private cost to the manager from 
such an increase. The private gain to the index fund manager from a marginal 
$1 increase in stewardship investment is equal to θ × G’(Is) (as G’(Is), the 
derivative of G with respect to Is, is the marginal increase in the value of the 
index fund’s position as a result of the marginal $1 increase in stewardship 
investment). Thus, the level of stewardship investment that will be desirable 
from the perspective of the index fund manager, which we denote as IS**, 
will occur when the marginal private gain of θ × G’(Is**) equal to the $1 cost 
of an additional dollar of stewardship investment. 
As a consequence, the level of investment that will be desirable from the 
private perspective of the index fund manager, IS**, will generally be lower 
than the level of investment that is desirable for the beneficial investors in the 
index fund, IS*. This is because the investment fund manager will capture 
only a fraction, θ, of the marginal gain to the beneficial investors in the index 
fund. For the index fund manager’s private marginal gain to be equal to one, 
the marginal gain in the value of the portfolio will not be one, but will be 
much higher, 1 / θ. When the potential investment in stewardship is between 
IS** and IS*, the marginal gain to the index fund portfolio from an additional 
$1 investment will be more than $1. Such additional stewardship investment 
would therefore be desirable from the perspective of the index fund’s 
beneficial investors. But throughout this range, additional stewardship 
investment will not be in the interest of the index fund manager. 
What is the practical significance of this problem? In assessing this 
critical question, it is important to recognize the very small quantum of the 
fees that index funds charge. The average expense ratios for the Big Three—
the combined fees and expenses that they receive for their services as a 
percentage of assets under management—are 0.30%, 0.09%, and 0.17% for 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively,59 and the fee percentages are 
even lower as these figures also include expenses. The tiny fee percentages 
charged by index funds are attractive to investors and have driven their 
phenomenal growth. As the analysis above has demonstrated, however, the 
tiny fraction of expected gains captured by index fund managers through 
these fees gives them a correspondingly tiny incentive to make additional 
marginal investments in stewardship. 
Recall the example of an index fund with a $1 billion position in a 
company for which stewardship would generate a modest gain of 0.1%. Even 
though the level of the expected gain is small, given the size of its position, 
it would be value maximizing for the index fund to increase its marginal 
investment in stewardship up to $1 million to achieve such a gain. That is, 
the index fund should employ a team of professionals that would dedicate 
 
 59. Morningstar, Inc., U.S. Fund Fee Study 12 (2019) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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significant time to stewardship at that particular company. But if the index 
fund’s fractional fee, θ, is 1%, the index fund manager’s interests would not 
be served by any additional marginal increase in stewardship investments 
exceeding $10,000. 
More generally, the highest level of additional marginal stewardship 
investment that would serve the private interest of the index fund manager in 
that case is 1% of the level at which additional marginal stewardship 
investment would result in marginal stewardship gains for index fund 
investors. Thus, the index fund manager would not have an incentive to 
employ a team of professionals to spend significant time on stewardship for 
that company, even though such stewardship would result in marginal gains 
to the index fund portfolio. The $10,000 additional marginal investment in 
stewardship that would serve the index fund manager’s interests could fund 
only a limited fraction of a single person’s annual salary, and hence, their 
time. 
Consider now a situation in which the expected gain is a mere 0.01%. In 
this case, it would be in the interests of the beneficial investors in the index 
fund to make additional marginal stewardship investments of up to $100,000 
to bring about this gain. But if the index fund manager’s fractional fee is again 
1%, the index fund manager would have no incentive to make additional 
marginal stewardship investments of more than $1,000. 
We wish to stress that even though IS**, the investment level that best 
serves the private interests of the index fund manager, is lower than the level 
that is desirable for the beneficial investors, IS*, the level of investment that 
would serve the interest of the index fund manager might well be significant 
in many cases. This is the case even though the fractional share, θ, is small, 
because the gain for the portfolio, G(IS), will be very large for an index fund 
that has very large amounts of assets under management—as do each of the 
Big Three.  
Thus, in this respect, our analysis agrees with those academic 
commentators engaging with our work who argue that the large stakes the 
Big Three managers hold in many portfolio companies give them meaningful 
incentives to invest in stewardship.60 However, those commentators fail to 
 
 60. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 15) (“The size of the Big Three 
enables them to capture outsize benefits from [investments in corporate governance].”); 
Patrick Jahnke, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Investors’ Governance Through 
Voice and Exit, 21 Bus. & Pol. 327, 338 (2019) (“[T]he Big Three asset managers have such 
large asset bases . . . that the cost of engagement is minimal when compared to the profits 
they generate.” (footnote omitted)); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 15 (noting that “even 
these low fees [of index fund managers] generate incentives in the context of voting that 
compare favorably to those of most other shareholders because the principal advisors to 
equity index funds are very large . . . .”). In this respect, we take a different view than that of 
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recognize the key point established by our analysis above: Even when the 
stewardship investments of the Big Three are significant, they can be 
expected to be significantly lower than the investment levels that are 
desirable for the beneficial investors of the index fund. 
For example, Patrick Jahnke has argued that the large stakes that the Big 
Three hold in many companies “ensures sufficient return on any governance 
investment.”61 However, our analysis indicates that this “sufficient return” 
view is incorrect. Because the Big Three capture just a small fraction of the 
benefits to their beneficial investors produced by investment in stewardship, 
our analysis above indicates that the private returns from stewardship to the 
index fund manager would generally be insufficient to induce the level of 
stewardship investment that would best serve the interests of beneficial 
investors. This insight follows from the general economic insight that an 
economic agent who captures only a fraction of the benefits of an activity can 
be expected to underinvest in this activity, and to set the activity at a 
suboptimal level.62 
3. The Limited Effects of Competition for Funds 
So far, our analysis has assumed that index fund managers take their 
assets under management and fees as given. We now relax this assumption 
and examine how the competition to attract assets affects index fund 
managers’ incentives to invest in stewardship. We first discuss competition 
with other index funds and then turn to competition with actively managed 
funds. 
To begin, an index fund manager faces clear and direct competition with 
other index fund managers.63 An investor in a given index fund could choose 
 
the critics of index fund managers who argue that such managers follow an “unthinking” 
mode of operations because of their lack of any incentives to invest in stewardship. See, e.g., 
Lund, supra note 16, at 513 (“[P]assive fund managers will be especially likely to adhere to 
a[n] . . . unthinking approach to governance . . . .”). 
 61. Jahnke, supra note 60, at 329 (citing Fichtner et al., supra note 2). 
 62. This is a version of the general problem of private production of an activity that has 
positive external benefits on others that the private producer is unable to capture. A canonical 
example is that of a lighthouse; for a discussion of the history of this example and the 
underlying concept by Ronald Coase, see R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. 
& Econ. 357, 357 (1974). 
 We are grateful to Alon Brav, the discussant of our article at the NYU Roundtable, for 
encouraging us to stress this difference between the conclusions of our analysis and the 
positions of commentators taking issue with our view. 
 63. For a study showing that the flow of assets into investment funds is significantly 
influenced by performance relative to investment fund managers operating similar funds, see 
Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. Fin. 1589, 1598–
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to invest instead in an index fund run by another manager that tracks the same 
or a similar index. Index fund managers thus have an incentive to make their 
funds as attractive as possible, and to perform as well as possible, relative to 
other index funds. 
However, competition with other index funds tracking the same index 
gives index fund managers precisely zero additional incentive to invest in 
stewardship for any of their portfolio companies. If the index fund manager 
invests in stewardship that increases the value of a particular portfolio 
company, the increase will be shared with all other investors in the company, 
including rival index funds that replicate the same index. These rival index 
funds will capture the same benefit even though they have not themselves 
made any additional investment in stewardship. An index fund manager’s 
investment in stewardship will therefore not result in any increase in the 
fund’s performance compared to that of its rivals, and will not allow the fund 
to attract investments from its rivals or to increase its fee levels.64 
The index fund manager cannot even increase its fees or expenses to 
cover the cost of the investment in stewardship: Since its gross returns are the 
same as those of rival index fund managers, if it increases its fees or expenses, 
its net returns will be below those of its rivals. Stewardship will therefore not 
provide any competitive benefits to index fund managers and will not give 
them any incentive to ameliorate their underinvestment in stewardship from 
the level described in section I.D.2. 
Finally, while the above analysis has implicitly assumed that index fund 
investors care exclusively about the financial return from their investment, 
some index fund investors might well have a preference for investing with an 
index fund manager whose stewardship activities they view favorably, or at 
least not unfavorably, and may expect index fund managers with which they 
invest to be good stewards. The more widely held these preferences are, the 
stronger the index fund managers’ incentives to be perceived as good 
stewards. But incentives to be perceived as good stewards are quite different 
from incentives to make desirable stewardship decisions. 
Investors may not recognize certain deviations from optimal stewardship 
decisions. As a result, accommodating their preferences would not 
 
1601, 1619 (1998) (finding that “consumers of equity [mutual] funds disproportionately 
flock to high performing funds”). 
 64. In this respect, index funds are different from actively managed funds. For analyses 
of how the stewardship incentives of actively managed funds are influenced by competition 
with other actively managed funds, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors, supra note 15, at 97–100 (theoretical analysis), and Jonathan Lewellen & 
Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be 
Engaged 13–28 (Tuck Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 3265761, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265761 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (empirical 
analysis). 
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necessarily discourage suboptimal stewardship. Although the interest of 
index fund managers in being perceived as good stewards cannot eliminate 
such deviations, it can be expected to affect index fund manager behavior, in 
a way that we will return to in section I.F, below. 
Turning to competition with actively managed funds, Jill Fisch, Assaf 
Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon have recently offered support for 
index fund stewardship, arguing that index fund managers compete for funds 
“not only with each other but also with . . . active funds,” and that this 
competition provides them with “the incentive to improve the governance of 
companies in their portfolio.”65 According to this view, by improving the 
governance of public companies, index fund managers may eliminate 
potential advantages that actively managed funds may have—advantages that 
may otherwise provide those funds with opportunities to outperform index 
funds.66 But as we explain below, this argument provides little basis for 
expecting index fund managers to have significant incentives to invest in 
stewardship. 
A key driver of the movement from actively managed funds to index 
funds has been the understanding, backed by empirical evidence in the 
financial literature, that actively managed funds significantly underperform 
index funds on average.67 To the extent that this understanding leads investors 
to switch from actively managed funds to index funds, the relevant 
competition for any given index fund manager is other index funds that track 
the same or similar indexes. 
Of course, substantial assets under management are still invested in 
actively managed funds; this is mainly because, even though actively 
managed funds underperform (on average) whichever index they use as a 
benchmark, some such funds do outperform these indexes.68 As Fisch, 
 
 65. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 12). 
 66. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“[Passive funds] lack . . . active funds’ ability to generate alpha 
through investment choices. Passive investors also do not have the firm-specific information 
or expertise necessary to address operational issues. Instead, passive investors compete by 
using their voice and seeking to improve corporate governance.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition 
into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. Fin. 1655, 1655–
56 (2000) (reporting that “the majority of studies now conclude that actively managed 
funds . . . on average, underperform their passively managed counterparts”). 
 68. For studies by financial economists on such occasional outperformance, see, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 Ann. Rev. Fin. 
Econ. 147, 158–62 (2017) (describing evidence regarding the relationship between 
management skill and investor performance); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun 
Lee, Precision about Manager Skill, Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 
N. Am. J. Econ. & Fin. 222, 229–36 (2017) (describing evidence regarding the effects of 
imprecision in management skill). 
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Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon note, some actively managed funds 
“continue to attract substantial new assets” despite the existence of lower-
priced index funds.69 Importantly for our purposes, even if index fund 
stewardship increases value in some or all of their portfolio companies, some 
actively managed funds will still outperform their benchmark indexes. The 
constituent companies in any given index can be expected to perform very 
differently, depending on their industry and the success of their strategies, 
services, and products. Active managers that disproportionately hold 
positions in companies that outperform the index will outperform index funds 
that track that index. 
Indeed, to the extent that stewardship by index fund managers brings 
about expected governance gains in a subset of portfolio companies, those 
active managers that disproportionately hold those companies in their 
portfolios will outperform the index. As a result, an interest in lowering the 
performance of actively managed funds relative to index funds should not be 
expected to provide index fund managers with substantial incentives to 
undertake value-maximizing stewardship.70 
E. Incentives to be Excessively Deferential 
Section I.D discussed one key dimension of stewardship decisions: the 
choice of how much to spend on stewardship investments and the incentives 
that index fund managers have to underinvest in stewardship. In this section 
we turn to a second key dimension: the choice between deference to corporate 
managers and nondeference. As we show, the private interests of index fund 
managers are likely to affect their deference/nondeference choices in ways 
that could well distort these choices. Below we first discuss this problem in 
general; we then proceed to discuss three significant ways in which the 
private interests of index fund managers, and especially the Big Three, could 
be served by being excessively deferential.71 
 
 69. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 14). 
 70. For additional criticisms of the argument that the desire to compete with actively 
managed funds encourages stewardship by index funds, see J.B. Heaton, All You Need is 
Passive: A Response to Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon (Jul. 7, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209614 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). Other prominent commentators who generally look favorably at index fund 
stewardship take issue with the argument by Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 6, 12–
20), that competition with actively managed funds provides substantial incentives for 
stewardship. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 26–28. 
 71. In a response to this Article provided to the Financial Times, an SSGA 
representative expressed doubt with respect to our excessive deference concerns, stating that 
“I doubt that you would be able to obtain a company that says that State Street is a pushover.” 
 
2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 
1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark 
The second important dimension, which is qualitative in nature, is the 
level of deference that index fund managers give to the views and preferences 
of the managers of their portfolio companies. Such deference/nondeference 
decisions include whether to vote for or against a company’s say-on-pay 
proposal; whether to vote for or against a company’s director slate in a proxy 
contest against an activist; whether to support or withhold support from the 
directors on the company slate in uncontested elections; whether to vote for 
or against shareholder proposals opposed by the managers of a company; and 
whether to submit shareholder proposals to a company. 
Deference/nondeference decisions may also involve the choice of general 
principles, policies, or practices that apply to a wide range of situations, such 
as proxy voting guidelines.72 
Some deference/nondeference decisions—such as voting—are purely 
qualitative; they will involve the same resource cost regardless of the level of 
deference chosen. For other decisions—such as submitting a shareholder 
proposal—the nondeferential choice requires greater resources. While there 
is thus some interaction between the choice of investment level and the choice 
between deference and nondeference, we discuss the two choices separately 
for the sake of conceptual clarity. Similarly, for simplicity of exposition, we 
discuss deference/nondeference as a binary decision, but the insights from 
our analysis are equally applicable to situations in which the level of 
deference involves a range of choices. 
What is the deference/nondeference decision that would be value-
maximizing for index fund investors? In many cases, the positions preferred 
by corporate managers would be viewed independently as value-enhancing 
by the index fund manager. In some cases, the index fund manager may be 
uncertain, but may rationally conclude that deferring to the views of corporate 
 
See Owen Walker, BlackRock, Vanguard and SSGA Tighten Hold on US Boards, Fin. Times 
(Jun. 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/046ec082-d713-3015-beaf-c7fa42f3484a (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). But even if a given company’s managers were to view 
SSGA as a “pushover,” their interests would be best served by not stating this belief, and 
instead not questioning the effectiveness of the investor oversight to which they are subject. 
Furthermore, and importantly, the SSGA officer’s response does not engage with our analysis 
in this section regarding the three drivers of excessive deference that we identify, nor with 
the evidence consistent with excessive deference provided in Part II. 
 72. For simplicity, this section’s analysis assumes that the deference decision consists 
of a binary choice: deference or nondeference. To be sure, in many situations, investors face 
a continuum of choices and thus can be viewed as choosing the level of deference within a 
range of possible levels. An analysis assuming that investors set the level of deference within 
a continuum of possible choices yields a qualitative similar conclusions to the one presented 
below: that index fund managers will have an incentive to be excessively deferential to 
corporate managers. 
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managers would likely be value-enhancing because of the corporate 
managers’ superior information. 
In some other cases, however, deferring to corporate managers may not 
be value-enhancing. Nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if its 
expected effect on the value of the index fund’s position in the portfolio 
company would be positive. Formally, we denote the expected change in 
value from nondeference as ΔVND. The change in value from nondeference, 
ΔVND, can be positive if certain deferential actions are value enhancing for 
the company, but there can also be a loss from nondeference if deference to 
portfolio company managers would be the best course of action in a particular 
case. That is, nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if ΔVND > 0. 
When an index fund manager faces a binary choice between deference 
and nondeference to a particular portfolio company’s managers, value-
maximizing stewardship calls for nondeference whenever the expected value 
effect from nondeference is positive, and for deference whenever the 
expected value effect from nondeference is negative. But the choice between 
deference and nondeference may also affect the interests of the index fund 
manager in other ways, some of which we discuss in sections I.E.2–I.E.4. Let 
us suppose the expected change in the value of the portfolio from 
nondeference, ΔVND, is positive, so nondeference would be desirable for the 
beneficial investors in the index fund, but that nondeference imposes costs of 
CND on the index fund manager. The index fund manager captures only the 
fractional fee (θ) of the expected gain from nondeference: θ × ΔVND. Even 
though nondeference is value-maximizing it does not benefit the index fund 
manager when CND > θ × ΔVND. Thus, costs to index fund managers from 
nondeference create a distortion: Value-enhancing nondeference would not 
serve the interests of index fund managers if and only if: 
0 < ΔVND < CND / θ. 
It is useful to note the role that the fractional fee (θ) plays in determining 
the range of situations in which the index fund manager will have distorted 
incentives. Because the value of θ is likely to be very small for index fund 
managers, CND / θ will likely be higher, and the range of distorting situations 
will likely be wider. Because the fractional fee (θ) is likely to be very small, 
the expected gain from nondeference (ΔVND) gets a substantially reduced 
weight in the calculus of index fund managers’ incentives, and is thus more 
likely to be outweighed by private costs from nondeference. 
To illustrate, consider again the index fund with a $1 billion position, an 
expected gain from nondeference of 0.1% (that is, $1 million), and a 
fractional fee of 1%. Nondeference will be against the interests of the index 
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fund manager if the cost of nondeference exceeds $10,000.73 
The practical significance of distortions from private costs of 
nondeference depends on the extent of those costs. In sections I.E.2–I.E.4 we 
consider, in turn, the significance of three sources of costs: (i) business ties 
with public companies; (ii) legal requirements that nondeferential index fund 
managers make Schedule 13D disclosures; and (iii) the risk that, by “stepping 
on the toes” of corporate managers or by making their own power more 
salient, the Big Three could trigger a managerial and regulatory backlash. 
2. Business Ties with Corporate Managers 
Index fund managers, including the Big Three, have a web of financially-
significant business ties with corporate managers, so they may pay close 
attention to how corporate managers perceive them. One important source of 
investment manager revenue that has received considerable attention relates 
to defined contribution plans, commonly referred to as “401(k) plans.”74 The 
assets under management in 401(k) plans are very large, and a majority of 
those assets were held in mutual funds.75 Index fund managers derive a 
substantial proportion of their revenues from 401(k) plans76 in two ways: (i) 
by providing administration services to such plans,77 and (ii) by having their 
index funds included in the menu of investment options available to plan 
participants.78 
 
 73. In the second example used in section I.D.1, when the expected gain is only 0.01%, 
nondeference would be against the interests of the index fund manager as long as the private 
cost of nondeference is greater than $1,000. 
 74. 401(k) plans are so called for § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code governing the 
tax treatment of “qualified cash or deferred arrangement[s].” Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012). 
 75. For evidence on the scale of assets in 401(k) plans, and the substantial proportion 
invested in mutual funds, see Sean Collins, Sarah Holden, James Duvall & Elena Barone 
Chism, The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2016, ICI 
Res. Persp., June 2017, at 1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 76. According to the Pensions & Investments database, the proportion of U.S. client 
assets under management for each of the Big Three that came from 401(k) plans in 2017 was 
14%, 20%, and 17%, for BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively. See 2018 Survey 
of Money Managers, Pensions & Invs., https://www.pionline.com/specialreports/money-
managers/20180528 [https://perma.cc/E2N2-LHD8] (last visited July 11, 2018). 
 77. As of December 31, 2018, Vanguard ($454 billion in plan assets) was the fourth-
largest provider of plan administration services, after Fidelity, TIAA, and Empower 
Retirement. See 2019 Recordkeeping Survey, Plansponsor (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.plansponsor.com/research/2019-recordkeeping-survey/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). A substantial proportion of these plan assets are likely to be 
associated with public companies. 
 78. For evidence that an index fund that provides administration services is also more 
likely to have its funds appear on the menus for 401(k) investments, see Veronika K. Pool, 
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Index fund managers can reasonably expect that the extent to which 
corporate managers view them favorably might influence their revenues from 
401(k) plans. In public companies, a committee of employees often chooses 
the plan administrator and the menu of investment options.79 Although these 
choices are subject to fiduciary duties, the decision makers often have a 
number of reasonable choices, and in such cases the views and preferences 
of corporate managers could influence these employees’ decisions. 
Furthermore, the incentives discussed below arise even if decisions are often 
not influenced by the preferences of corporate managers, so long as index 
fund managers believe that such influence might sometimes have an effect. 
Turning to analyze how business ties provide incentives for deference, 
we would like to distinguish two types of effects of business ties on 
deference/nondeference decisions. The first type of effect, client favoritism, 
has received significant attention in the literature,80 though—for the reasons 
discussed below—we view it as less important. Index fund managers may be 
more deferential to managers of particular companies with which they have 
(or hope to have) business ties than they are to managers of other companies. 
For example, an index fund manager may have incentives to support the say-
on-pay proposal of a company that is a current or potential client, even if that 
index fund manager would vote against such a proposal at other companies. 
Indeed, client favoritism is consistent with the empirical evidence; for 
example, a recent study by Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta, and 
Konstantinos Zachariadis finds that investment managers are more likely to 
vote in support of portfolio company managers on closely contested 
proposals when the investment manager has significant business ties to the 
portfolio company.81 
 
Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options 
in 401(k) Plans, 71 J. Fin. 1779, 1787 tbl.2 (2016). 
 79. For smaller companies, the plan fiduciary is a staff member in the company’s human 
resources or finance department. For a discussion of plan fiduciaries, see Stephen Davis, Jon 
Lukomnik & David Pitt-Watson, What They Do with Your Money: How the Financial 
System Fails Us and How to Fix It 104 (2016). 
 80. For early works discussing this type of effect, see, e.g., John Brooks, Corporate 
Pension Fund Asset Management, in Abuse on Wall Street 224, 231–40 (The Twentieth 
Century Fund 1980); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 17, at 596–98; 
Coffee, supra note 17, at 1321–22; Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, A Social 
Movement Perspective on Corporate Control, 39 Admin. Sci. Q. 141, 161–62 (1994); Rock, 
supra note 17, at 469–72. For a current discussion of this type of conflict, see Sean J. Griffith 
& Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151, 
1181–86 (2019). 
 81. Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Ties That 
Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism, 71 J. Fin. 2933, 2933 (2016) 
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Responding to concerns about client favoritism problems, some 
investment fund managers, including the Big Three, have put in place internal 
“walls” separating stewardship personnel from the individuals who maintain 
and cultivate business ties. For example, SSGA publishes “Conflict 
Mitigation Guidelines” that explain how SSGA’s stewardship team is 
insulated from others within the organization whose role is to develop and 
maintain business ties with corporate managers.82 Even assuming that internal 
walls can be expected to eliminate the problem of client favoritism 
completely, such walls cannot eliminate other problems arising from business 
ties. 
In particular, although client favoritism has thus far received the most 
attention,83 we would like to highlight another key channel that we view as 
the most important for incentivizing deference. Setting general principles, 
policies, and practices more deferentially enhances the likelihood that 
corporate managers will view the index fund manager more favorably and 
does so without producing any inconsistency in the treatment of clients and 
nonclients. For example, rather than tending to vote at particular client 
companies in ways that managers of those companies are likely to prefer, an 
index fund manager can set its general principles, policies, and practices to 
enhance the likelihood of supporting management in votes across all portfolio 
companies. This reduces the likelihood that current or potential clients will 
receive negative votes and therefore view the index fund manager 
unfavorably. 
We refer to this problem as “general management favoritism,” by 
contrast to client favoritism, because it involves the manager’s interest in 
business ties to induce the manager to be excessively deferential not only 
toward managers of companies with which the manager has business ties but 
toward corporate managers of public companies in general. We note the 
existence of empirical evidence that is consistent with this problem. In 
particular, empirical studies indicate that investment fund managers that have 
greater business ties with issuers are more likely to vote in ways that favor 
managers not only at client companies but at companies in general. In 
particular, Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman, and Harley Ryan show that, 
in voting on executive pay in public companies, the volume of business that 
investment managers receive from companies is associated with voting more 
 
(finding that “business ties significantly influence promanagement voting at the level of 
individual pairs of fund families and firms”). 
 82. 2019 State Street Global Advisors Conflict Mitigation Guidelines, State St. Glob. 
Advisors (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/na/us/institutional-investor/en/our-
insights/viewpoints/2019-ssga-conflict-mitigation-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/6ZXX-
RMYQ]. 
 83. For studies considering the problem of client favoritism, see supra note 81. 
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frequently in support of corporate managers.84 Similarly, a study by Gerald 
Davis and E. Han Kim documented that, in voting on shareholder proposals 
in public companies, “[a]ggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a 
positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with 
management.”85 
Importantly, the general management favoritism we discuss could make 
an index fund manager’s stewardship more deferential than desirable 
substantially beyond the subset of companies that are current or potential 
clients. Such general management favoritism will affect the stewardship 
decisions of index fund managers with respect to public companies in 
general. Furthermore, because decisions influenced by general management 
favoritism do not manifest themselves in favoritism toward existing clients, 
this problem cannot be addressed by internal walls and other policies aimed 
at avoiding client favoritism.86 The breadth of this effect, and the difficulty of 
addressing it through such policies, strengthens concerns about distortions of 
the deference/nondeference decisions of index fund managers. Although 
commentators taking issue with our views discuss the problem of client 
favoritism, they have thus far not engaged with our identification of general 
management favoritism as the problem that is likely to be more costly and 
substantial.87 
3. The Private Costs of Section 13(d) Filer Status 
We now turn to a substantial cost of nondeference for the Big Three that 
arises from the very large number of companies in which they hold stakes of 
5% or more: 2,330 companies (BlackRock), 2,004 companies (Vanguard), 
 
 84. See Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related 
Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals 
on Executive Compensation, 47 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 567, 587 (2012). 
 85. Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 
85 J. Fin. Econ. 552, 569 (2007) (examining voting on shareholder proposals and 
documenting that “the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely it is to vote in 
favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by management . . . although individual votes 
appear evenhanded, business ties affect the overall voting practices at the fund family level”). 
For an additional empirical article based on evidence from another jurisdiction that shows 
general favoritism reflected in an association between the business of institutional investors 
and more pro-insider voting, see Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Investors as 
Minority Shareholders, 17 Rev. Fin. 691, 700–13 (2013) (presenting evidence that 
institutions that are potentially conflicted are more likely to vote for insiders proposals than 
are standalone investors).  
 86. See supra note 84. 
 87. For articles by such commentators, see generally Fisch et al., supra note 16; Kahan 
& Rock, supra note 16. 
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and 183 companies (SSGA).88 For all of these companies, the Big Three have 
incentives to avoid any nondeference that would require filing on Schedule 
13D.89 
Under section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act, an investor that 
obtains more than 5% of a public company is required to make certain 
disclosures, either on Schedule 13D or on Schedule 13G.90 The criterion for 
whether the investor must make detailed disclosure on Schedule 13D, rather 
than more limited disclosure on Schedule 13G, is whether the investor makes 
the acquisition “with the purpose [or] the effect of changing or influencing 
the control of the [portfolio company].”91 A number of stewardship activities 
by index fund managers could be viewed as having such a purpose, including 
making proposals to sell or restructure the portfolio company, or engaging 
with the portfolio company to propose or facilitate the appointment of 
particular individuals as directors. 
Schedule 13D filings must be made more frequently and are much more 
extensive than Schedule 13G filings. Schedule 13D must be filed within ten 
days after every acquisition and subsequent change in holdings, compared to 
once per year for Schedule 13G.92 Schedule 13D filings also require 
particularized disclosure of each acquisition for each entity, compared to 
disclosure of aggregated positions for Schedule 13G.93 Schedules 13D and 
13G apply not just to the index funds managed by the index fund manager 
but to all the investments for which they have voting power, including 
actively managed funds and separate client accounts.94 
Given the frequency of trades in the Big Three’s portfolios, making the 
additional extensive disclosures that Schedule 13D requires would be 
 
 88. See infra section II.B.2. Calculations are based on data from FactSet Res. Sys., 
Ownership Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 89. For early discussions of the possibility that section 13(d) could deter stewardship, 
see Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism Symposium: Issues in 
Corporate Governance, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 117, 161–63 (1988); Mark J. Roe, A 
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10, 26 (1991) 
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]. 
 90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b) (2019). For an 
analysis of the law and economics of blockholder disclosure, see generally Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39 (2012). 
 91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i). For a general discussion of this rule and the 
conditions for filing on Schedule 13G, see Arnold S. Jacobs, The Williams Act—Tender 
Offers and Stock Accumulations § 2:64 (2019 ed.). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a), (b)(2). 
 93. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Schedule 13D), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102 
(Schedule 13G). 
 94.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a). 
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incredibly costly and time consuming. If a Big Three index fund manager has 
a position of 5% or more in a company, nondeference that would require 
filing Schedule 13D would impose significant costs, which would be borne 
by the index fund manager rather than by the index fund. Such nondeference 
would therefore be against the interests of the index fund manager, even 
though it is desirable for the index fund. 
4. Fears of Backlash 
Finally, we turn to what we believe to be an especially strong factor 
inducing the Big Three to be excessively deferential to corporate managers: 
The Big Three’s substantial and growing power puts them at risk of public 
and political backlash that might constrain index fund managers in ways they 
would find detrimental.95 As explained below, deference could reduce the risk 
of such backlash. 
The Big Three’s dominance of the ever-growing index fund market puts 
them in a very desirable position. The economies of scale and first-mover 
advantage that they enjoy provide substantial protection for the dominance 
of their firms in the index fund marketplace. Are there any clouds on the 
horizon? Is there anything major that could go wrong for the leaders of the 
Big Three? 
The most significant risk is likely to be a backlash reaction to the growing 
power of the Big Three.96 Business history suggests that the concentration of 
power over “Main Street” companies in the hands of large “Wall Street” 
interests can lead to a backlash. Referring to the current period as a “new era 
of financial capitalism,” scholars have compared it to a chapter in American 
history a century ago in which Wall Street interests, led by J.P. Morgan, 
wielded substantial power.97 But this earlier chapter of finance capitalism 
 
 95. For a discussion of the concept of backlash in economic and legal systems generally, 
and of how the risk of backlash affects decision making, see generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 
98 COLUM. L. Rev. 217 (1998). For a media report discussing concerns about the size and 
power of index funds, see, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Passive Attack: The Story of a Wall 
Street Revolution, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/807909e2-0322-
11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ome detractors say 
that index investing is an insidious disease.”). 
 96. For a recent expression of concern about the growing concentration of index funds 
from the founder of Vanguard, see John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, 
Wall St. J. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-
funds-1543504551 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“I do not believe that such 
concentration [of equity investments in the hands of the Big Three] would serve the national 
interest.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and 
Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11, 11 (2008) (stating 
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ended with a strong regulatory backlash. As Mark Roe’s well-known work 
has documented, vested interests were able to mobilize popular sentiments 
against the concentrated power of Wall Street financiers, leading to an array 
of legal rules that curtailed the power of financial blockholders and their 
ability to intervene on Main Street for decades.98 
Perhaps most telling for the purposes of our analysis is a more recent 
chapter of business history that took place in the nineteen-eighties and -
nineties, when the rise of hostile takeovers led to a backlash that, in turn, 
produced legislation protective of managers.99 Various scholars viewed the 
possibility of hostile takeovers as potentially beneficial, facilitating the 
replacement of some underperforming management teams and confronting 
management teams in general with a disciplinary threat that could provide 
incentives to be attentive to shareholder interests.100 But regardless of their 
effect on shareholder interests, hostile takeovers threatened the interests of 
incumbent managers. 
As Mark Roe, Roberto Romano, and others have carefully documented, 
management interests played an important and active role in bringing about 
a wave of antitakeover legislation in a large majority of U.S. states—
legislation that produced severe impediments to hostile takeovers and 
provided incumbents with substantial insulation from such threats.101 
Pressure from advisers affiliated with incumbents also seems to have played 
a role in encouraging the Delaware courts to develop doctrines that provided 
incumbents with power to impede hostile takeovers.102 It is therefore natural 
 
that the capital markets of the current era have ownership patterns “reminiscent” of those 
existing in the era of “JP Morgan a century ago”); Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 299 
(remarking that the current concentration of ownership is “reminiscent of the early twentieth-
century” and citing Davis, supra). 
 98. For an influential work providing a historical account of backlash against Wall 
Street, see Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 89, at 32–53. 
 99. For an account of this chapter in business history, see Mark J. Roe, Takeover 
Politics, in The Deal Decade 332–47 (Margaret Blair ed., 1993) [hereinafter Roe, Takeover 
Politics]. 
 100. For articles discussing the potential benefits of hostile takeovers, see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 
988–94 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1165–74 (1981); Henry 
G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112–14 
(1965). 
 101. For significant contributions to this line of work, see generally Roe, Takeover 
Politics, supra note 99, at 338–52; Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: 
Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457, 458–65 (1988). 
 102. For a discussion of the evolution of Delaware law in the direction favored by 
managers, see Roe, Takeover Politics, supra note 99, at 340–47. A famous memo issued by 
Martin Lipton warned that companies may reincorporate out of Delaware in light of the 
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for leaders of the Big Three to consider the risk that their potential 
stewardship activities could pose a substantial threat to incumbents’ power 
and interests and could thereby lead to a regulatory backlash. Leaders of the 
Big Three appear to be aware of concerns about the power of large index fund 
managers,103 and have made statements that appear to reduce the salience of 
their power.104 
Let us consider how the approach of the Big Three may influence the 
prospect of public or political backlash. Consider a hypothetical 
interventional strategy in which the Big Three would seek to improve the 
value of portfolio companies by (i) making executive compensation 
incentives more tightly linked to performance, (ii) eliminating antitakeover 
defenses, (iii) monitoring the business performance of CEOs very closely, 
and (iv) forcing out CEOs who do not meet a relatively high standard of 
performance. Let us further assume that the interventional strategy would be 
expected to enhance the value of the Big Three portfolios by about 5%, and 
that the Big Three know of this expected beneficial effect. 
Of course, it might be argued that the interventional strategy would be 
value decreasing rather than value enhancing. However, our focus here is not 
on debating the merits of the interventional strategy, but rather on showing 
that the Big Three would have incentives to avoid the strategy even under the 
assumed scenario in which the strategy is expected to be beneficial for their 
portfolios and the Big Three know this to be the case. 
This interventional strategy would create a significant risk of a backlash. 
Even though the interventional strategy would be expected to enhance value, 
managers of portfolio companies would have strong incentives to resist it and 
to mobilize against the Big Three because of the strategy’s adverse effect on 
their power and private interests. Because managers control the massive 
resources of Main Street companies, they are a formidable foe in the political 
 
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 
A.2d 787, 799–800 (1988). Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz, to Clients (Nov. 3, 1988) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The 
Delaware Supreme Court subsequently overruled the decision and adopted a position far 
more protective of incumbents. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1153 (Del. 1988). 
 103. See, e.g., Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing “growing 
concerns about the influence of large index managers”). 
 104. For a recent release by BlackRock that seems to downplay the power of the Big 
Three, see BlackRock, Shareholders Are Dispersed and Diverse 1 (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-shareholders-
are-dispersed-and-diverse-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8C5-RAMA] (“[I]ndex funds 
and ETFs represent less than 10% of global equity assets. . . . As of year-end 2017, Vanguard, 
BlackRock, and State Street . . . represent a minority position in the $83 trillion global equity 
market.” (footnote omitted)). 
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arena.105 
Furthermore, management interests could be expected to receive 
substantial public support. Even though we have stipulated that the 
interventional strategy is expected to enhance value, this fact would not be 
incontestable, and it may not necessarily be salient to the public. To the 
contrary, corporate managers, and the groups, advisors, and researchers 
associated with them, would be expected to argue forcefully that the 
interventional strategy would destroy value. They may claim that the Big 
Three would be excessively micromanaging or second-guessing the business 
decisions of well-informed managers, creating distraction, or pressuring them 
toward short-termism. Indeed, business history suggests that public opinion 
would view with suspicion any substantial concentration of power over Main 
Street companies by financial decision makers.106 
Thus, pursuing any such strategy whereby the Big Three used their power 
in ways that adversely affect corporate managers would have a significant 
risk of backlash. Such backlash could lead to the imposition of considerable 
legal constraints on the power and activities of large index funds and would 
thereby have substantial adverse effects on the Big Three. Their leaders 
therefore have a significant interest in reducing the risk of such backlash. 
The Big Three can reduce the risk of a backlash by limiting the extent to 
which their stewardship constrains the power, authority, compensation, and 
other private interests of corporate managers. Indeed, a strategy of deference 
would likely convert corporate managers into quiet allies rather than foes. 
With such a strategy, corporate managers could be expected not to resist the 
increasing equity concentration in the hands of the Big Three but rather to 
view such concentration as favorable to their own interests. We note that 
Martin Lipton, who has long been associated with support for takeover 
defenses and other pro-management positions, has favorably described the 
increasing influence of index funds.107 
Substantial nondeference that would involve frequent resistance to 
choices favored by corporate managers would also increase the salience of 
the Big Three’s power, and with it, potential concerns from those parts of the 
 
 105. For a study of the political power of corporate managers in a historical context, see 
Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 89, at 45–48. For an article coauthored by one of us that 
develops a formal model of this issue and highlights the importance of the large resources of 
public companies for the political influence of the managers of such companies, see generally 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 23 
Rev. Fin. Stud. 1089 (2010). 
 106. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text 
 107. See, e.g., Lipton, State of Play, supra note 43 (praising the Big Three for their 
“continued . . . support for sustainable long-term investment”); Lipton, New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, supra note 13 (praising the 2018 letter by BlackRock CEO Larry 
Fink as “a major step in rejecting activism and short-termism”). 
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public that are resistant to large concentrations of financial power. Thus, even 
when significant nondeference would serve the financial interests of index 
fund investors, index fund managers would recognize that such nondeference 
could be costly to their private interests by triggering opposition not only 
from corporate managers but also from parts of the public that are resistant 
to concentrations of power. Thus, as long as excessive deference does not 
become so salient that it imposes significant reputational costs (as discussed 
below), deference would serve the interests of Big Three managers by 
reducing the risk of backlash. 
* * * 
Our analysis above of the private interests of index fund managers 
identifies three sources of incentives that can induce index fund managers, 
and in particular the Big Three, to be excessively deferential toward corporate 
managers. Our empirical analysis, described in section II, documents 
evidence that is consistent with the presence of such incentives. But although 
commentators taking issue with our view have attempted to engage with 
concerns about underinvestment in stewardship, they have thus far not 
attempted to respond to concerns about excessive deference.108 Indeed, even 
those writers who have recently criticized index fund stewardship have 
tended to focus on concerns regarding underinvestment rather than concerns 
regarding excessive deference.109 
In our view, however, the problem of excessive deference that we analyze 
and document deserves the close attention of anyone who is interested in 
index fund stewardship. Indeed, even if index funds were to devote adequate 
resources to stewardship, to the extent that their qualitative choices (such as 
how they vote) are afflicted by excessive deference, that alone would have 
substantial adverse effects on public companies and on the interests of the 
funds’ beneficial investors. 
F. Limits on the Force of Distorting Incentives 
Thus far we have focused on the significant incentives that index fund 
managers, and especially the Big Three, have to underinvest in stewardship 
and to defer excessively to corporate managers. We conclude this Part with 
some comments on two factors that may limit the force and the potentially 
 
 108. For articles that engage with the former concern but not the latter, see, e.g., Fisch et 
al., supra note 16, at 11 (engaging with arguments regarding underinvestment made in an 
earlier version of this Article); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 6 (same). 
 109. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 16, at 531 (basing a proposal for those investing in 
passive funds to abstain from voting on the funds’ “low-cost” mode of operations rather than 
any deference inclinations). 
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damaging consequences of these distorting incentives. 
1. Fiduciary Norms 
To begin, in addition to index fund managers’ economic incentives, 
fiduciary norms and individuals’ desire “to do the right thing” may well have 
a significant influence on index fund managers.110 This may lead to behavior 
that is more desirable for their investors than that suggested by a pure 
incentive analysis. Analyzing the strength of such motivations is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but we wish to stress that these motivations might have 
a significant effect on behavior. They should not, however, be expected to 
eliminate the agency problems we identify, for two reasons. 
First, fiduciary norms regarding beneficial investors may sometimes be 
in tension with fiduciary norms regarding shareholders. Some index fund 
managers (including BlackRock and the parent company of SSGA, State 
Street Corporation) are public companies. Fiduciary norms call for executives 
of those index funds to maximize the value of the fund management company. 
For the reasons we have explained in this Part, the value of the fund 
management company might be maximized by the index fund manager 
underinvesting in stewardship and displaying deference to the managers of 
portfolio companies. 
Second, and more importantly, the premise underlying most corporate 
governance arrangements is that incentives matter. If we could rely 
exclusively on fiduciary norms many key corporate law arrangements would 
be unnecessary. To illustrate, if fiduciary norms were sufficient to induce 
desirable behavior by managers, then there would be no reason to adopt 
executive pay arrangements aimed at generating incentives. The voting 
guidelines of index fund managers encourage such executive pay 
arrangements and give significant consideration to the incentives they create 
in determining how to cast say-on-pay votes.111 Thus, even fully accepting 
 
 110. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“[Vanguard] act[s] in the best 
interest of Vanguard fund investors. Doing the right thing is part of our DNA.”). 
 111. See, e.g., BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s Approach to Executive 
Compensation 1 (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-our-approach-
to-executive-compensation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V479-F5YA] (“The key purpose of 
executive compensation is to attract, reward, and retain competent directors, executives and 
other staff . . . with reward for executives contingent at least in part on controllable outcomes 
that add value”); Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Portfolio Companies 12 
(2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-
resources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T4Z-KM62] [hereinafter 
Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines] (“Compensation policies linked to long-term relative 
performance are fundamental drivers of sustainable, long-term value for a company’s 
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that fiduciary norms and a desire to do the right thing play a role in shaping 
behavior, it remains important to analyze carefully the incentives of index 
fund managers. 
2. Reputational Constraints 
As we have noted, index fund managers might care about how their 
stewardship is perceived, not just by the managers of their portfolio 
companies but also by their current and potential customers.112 While some 
index fund investors will choose their index fund manager solely on the basis 
of financial considerations, other current and potential investors—such as 
public pension funds, endowments, and individuals with nonfinancial 
preferences—might also base their choices among index fund managers on 
nonfinancial considerations.113 In particular, such investors might base their 
choice partly on nonfinancial considerations, such as their perceptions 
regarding the stewardship quality of the index fund managers they use or are 
considering. 
To the extent that some investors disfavor investing with index fund 
managers that they believe to be inferior stewards, even if the investors’ 
returns are the same as from other index fund managers, index fund managers 
will have an incentive to avoid being perceived as inferior stewards.114 Thus, 
index fund managers will have an incentive to emphasize their commitment 
to stewardship in their public communications. This might also lead index 
fund managers to take positions on subjects that they expect to appeal to such 
 
investors.”); 2019 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America (United States 
& Canada), State St. Glob. Advisors (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-
insights/viewpoints/2019-proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and 
Engagement Guidelines 2019] (“We support management proposals on executive 
compensation where there is a strong relationship between executive pay and performance 
over a five-year period.”). 
 112. Vanguard has stated, “We are not a public company, but we must continuously earn 
and maintain the public trust. We do that by taking a stand for all investors, by treating them 
fairly, and by giving them the best chance for investment success.” Booraem, What We Do, 
supra note 34, at 14. 
 113. For a recent example of public pension fund clients raising concerns about the 
stewardship activities undertaken by index fund managers, see Jennifer Thompson, Pension 
Funds Raise Concern over Index Manager Stewardship, Fin. Times (June 23, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f75459e3-3a6d-383e-843b-6c7141e8442e (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“Passive fund managers are failing to fulfil their stewardship duties, 
according to their pension scheme clients . . . .”). 
 114. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“In addition to professional 
investment management, what people expect when they invest in a mutual fund is 
professional investment stewardship.”). 
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investors, such as gender diversity on boards and climate change 
disclosure.115 
These incentives are also likely to discourage behavior on the part of 
index fund managers that would make more salient their incentives to 
underinvest in stewardship or to be deferential to corporate managers. But as 
we have stressed above, most investors are unlikely to have sufficient 
expertise or resources to evaluate the many stewardship decisions made by 
index fund managers. As a result, incentives to avoid being perceived as 
inferior stewards are unlikely to eliminate the many nonsalient ways that the 
incentives described by the agency-costs view affect the behavior of index 
fund managers. 
Consistent with our analysis that the Big Three have an incentive to make 
their power less salient, communications by the Big Three have sought to 
downplay their power. For example, a recent release by BlackRock seeks to 
challenge views that “index fund managers may wield outsized influence 
over corporations due to the size of their shareholdings in public 
companies.”116 The release presents a detailed empirical analysis showing 
that a large majority of votes are determined by margins larger than the stake 
held by any given index fund manager. It concludes that “claims that index 
fund managers are determining the outcome of most proxy votes is not 
supported by the data.”117 However, a finding that a particular index fund 
manager frequently does not have decisive power over the outcome of 
shareholder votes does not imply that the manager does not wield substantial 
power and influence. Indeed, even though the Big Three managers often do 
not have decisive power to determine by themselves the outcome of 
shareholder votes, their significant influence on the outcome leads issuers and 
their advisors to pay close attention to the Big Three’s positions and voting 
behavior.118 
 
 115. See, e.g., John Gapper, Index Fund Managers Are Too Big for Comfort, Fin. Times 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ad8c8a12-fd5f-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Big Three have realised they cannot keep quiet 
and hope that no one will notice them.”). For a view that passive investors devote attention 
to stewardship to “boost their firm’s image,” see Dick Weil, Passive Investors, Don’t Vote, 
Wall St. J. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/passive-investors-dont-vote-
1520552657 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 116. See BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes: By the Numbers 1 (2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-proxy-voting-
outcomes-by-the-numbers-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6HU-DBJW] [hereinafter 
BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes]. 
 117. Id. 
 118. For media reports that pay close attention to the positions of the Big Three, see, e.g., 
Cara Lombardo & Dawn Lim, Vanguard to Take Tougher Stance Against Overextended 
Board Members, Wall St. J. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-to-take-
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Similarly, another release by BlackRock seeks to downplay the impact 
that it and other Big Three managers have on executive pay arrangements.119 
The release explains that not only do index fund managers not have a decisive 
impact on whether say-on-pay votes pass but there are other players that 
could have more impact. The release stresses that boards of directors, 
compensation committees, and independent compensation consultants for 
such committees play important roles in shaping pay arrangements, and that 
say-on-pay votes are merely “non-binding advisory votes by shareholders.”120 
But although say-on-pay proposals are formally nonbinding, issuers seek to 
avoid having a significant proportion of shares voted against say-on-pay 
proposals, and they are therefore likely to pay attention to the preferences and 
positions expressed by shareholders in their say-on-pay votes and in their 
guidelines with respect to executive compensation.121 In any event, putting 
 
tougher-stance-against-overextended-board-members-11554980403 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (reporting on an update to Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines); 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, World’s Biggest Investor Tells C.E.O.s Purpose Is the ‘Animating 
Force’ for Profits, N.Y. Times Dealbook (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/business/dealbook/blackrock-larry-fink-letter.html 
[https://perma.cc/F5HK-54J5] (reporting on BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s letter to 
companies). 
 For posts on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation by various advisors that report on and expect companies to pay close attention to 
positions expressed and votes cast by the Big Three, see, e.g., Pamela L. Marcogliese, 
Elizabeth K. Bieber & Brennan K. Halloran, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, 
Synthesizing the Messages from BlackRock, State Street, and T. Rowe Price, Harvard Law 
Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/28/synthesizing-the-messages-from-blackrock-
state-street-and-t-rowe-price/ [https://perma.cc/96L2-JA9J] (commenting on governance 
letters issued by BlackRock and SSGA); Ellen J. Odener & Aabha Sharma, Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP, Updated BlackRock Proxy Voting Guidelines, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on 
Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/09/updated-blackrock-proxy-voting-guidelines/ 
[https://perma.cc/D86F-Z7V4] (discussing changes to BlackRock’s voting guidelines). 
 119. See BlackRock, Executive Compensation: The Role of Public Company 
Shareholders 1 (Apr. 2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/ 
policy-spotlight-executive-compensation-the-role-of-public-company-shareholders-april-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N6G-YV8N]. 
 120. Id. 
 121. The BlackRock release also stresses that proxy advisors have “considerable 
influence” on the outcome of say-on-pay votes, and might influence 15–25% of the votes. 
Id. (“[R]ecommendations by proxy advisory firms can determine between 15-25% of a say-
on-pay vote.”). But recent academic work estimates that the influence of proxy advisors is 
substantially lower than 15–25%. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power 
of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (“Overall, we consider 
it likely that an ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of shareholder votes . . . .”). Of 
course, if a 15–25% influence amounts to “considerable influence,” then the Big Three’s 
shares of votes cast should also be viewed as wielding “considerable influence.” 
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aside the merits of the substantive arguments in this release, BlackRock’s 
issuance of this release is consistent with our argument that the Big Three 
have an incentive to downplay and reduce the salience of their power as much 
as possible. 
Finally, we note that this discussion carries significant implications for 
the potential value of this Article. To the extent that our analysis serves to 
inform investors of index fund manager incentives and disincentives 
regarding stewardship quality, it could contribute to reducing deviations from 
desirable stewardship decisions. We return to this issue in section III.C below. 
II. EVIDENCE 
In this Part we turn from theory to evidence. As we stressed in the 
Introduction, the critical test for any financial and economic theory is 
empirical. Are the predictions of our incentive analysis borne out? Does the 
agency-costs view fit and explain the evidence better (or worse) than the 
value-maximization view? We consider these questions below. 
Our empirical investigation puts forward evidence regarding the full 
range of stewardship activities that the Big Three do and do not undertake. 
We combine data from various providers with hand-collected data. We focus 
on the Big Three because they manage most of the index assets under 
management by investment managers and because their stewardship reports 
enable an empirical assessment of their stewardship activities. 
Section II.A begins by examining four dimensions of the stewardship 
activities that the Big Three do undertake, and how they do them. Section 
II.B then considers five stewardship activities that the Big Three do not 
adequately undertake. 
In the course of our analysis, we assess the extent to which the evidence 
is consistent with the value-maximization and agency-costs views of index 
fund stewardship. On the whole, the empirical patterns we document in this 
Part are inconsistent—or at least in tension—with the value-maximizing 
view. As we explain below, however, these empirical patterns are consistent 
with—and can be explained by—the predictions generated by the agency-
costs view: that index fund managers have considerable incentives to both 
underinvest in stewardship and defer excessively to corporate managers. 
In assessing the evidence on index fund stewardship, we consider 
arguments that the absence or infrequency of some stewardship activities is 
consistent with value maximization because such activities are outside the 
“business models” of the Big Three. As we explain, however, such arguments 
raise the question of why such activities are outside the business models. The 
“business models” of the Big Three and the stewardship activities they choose 
to undertake are not exogenous. Rather, they are a product of choices made 
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by index fund managers, and thus they follow from the incentives that we 
analyze. 
A. What the Big Three Do, and How They Do It 
Section II.A examines what the Big Three do in terms of stewardship, 
and how they do it. The four dimensions of stewardship activities that we 
examine are (i) their level of investments in stewardship; (ii) their private 
engagements; (iii) their focus on divergences from governance principles; 
and (iv) their voting decisions. 
1. Stewardships Budgets and Personnel  
In recent years, the Big Three have substantially increased the resources 
they devote to stewardship.122 Vanguard’s stewardship “team has doubled in 
size since 2015,”123 and BlackRock has announced its intent “to double the 
size of [its] investment stewardship team over the next three years.”124 The 
Big Three have also noted the significant numbers of stewardship personnel 
that they employ, the number of corporate meetings at which they vote, and 
the number of companies with which they engage.125 Supporters of index fund 
stewardship have viewed these figures as reassuring and promising.126 
However, any assessment of the Big Three’s stewardship activities must 
 
 122. A survey of investment fund managers conducted in October 2017 showed that, 
from 2014 to 2017, the number of stewardship team members (excluding environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) analysts and portfolio managers of investment teams) 
increased from twenty to thirty-three at BlackRock, from ten to twenty-one at Vanguard, and 




 123. Vanguard, Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report 2 (2017), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/annual-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8KK-TZ6D] [hereinafter Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 
2016-17]. 
 124. Fink, supra note 8. 
 125. For instance, a senior Vanguard officer stated that, in 2018, “[w]e voted [our] funds’ 
proxies at nearly 20,000 meetings and engaged directly with more than 700 portfolio 
companies.” Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 46, at 2. Vanguard’s 
then-CEO F. William McNabb III stated that Vanguard’s investment stewardship team “held 
more than 950 engagements with company leaders” in 2017. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 1. 
 126. For discussions by commentators taking issue with our view and who favorably cite 
the Big Three’s statements on the scale of their activities, see Fisch et al., supra note 16 
(manuscript at 25–26). 
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consider both the vast number of portfolio companies in which they invest 
and the many such companies in which they hold substantial stakes with 
significant monetary value. We conduct such an assessment below and find 
that it raises significant concerns that the Big Three substantially underinvest 
in stewardship.127 
 
 127. For the empirical analyses in section II.A.1, including the results reported in Tables 
1–3, we used the most recent data that we were able to obtain for each of the Big Three 
relating to (a) level of personnel, (b) total number of portfolio companies, (c) number of U.S. 
portfolio companies, (d) total equity assets under management, (e) equity under management 
invested in U.S. portfolio companies, and (f) fees and expenses: 
(a) Data on the number of stewardship personnel for BlackRock were obtained from the most 
recent annual stewardship report; for SSGA, from a recent article in the Wall Street Journal; 
and for Vanguard, from Bioy et al. 
(b) Data on the total number of portfolio companies for Vanguard are from its annual 
stewardship report. BlackRock and SSGA do not disclose the total number of their portfolio 
companies. We estimate those figures as the number of company meetings at which 
BlackRock and SSGA voted, multiplied by the ratio of the number of meetings at which 
Vanguard voted to the number of Vanguard’s portfolio companies. 
(c) Data on the number of U.S. portfolio companies for BlackRock and Vanguard are from 
their annual stewardship reports, and, for SSGA, from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership 
Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
(d) Data on total equity assets under management for BlackRock and SSGA are from their 
most recent annual reports on Form 10-K, and, for Vanguard, from its annual stewardship 
report. 
(e) Data on the equity assets under management in U.S. companies are from FactSet 
Ownership. 
(f) Fees and expenses for each of the Big Three are estimated by multiplying total equity 
assets under management by the average expense ratios for each of the Big Three. Average 
expense ratios are from Morningstar. 
See BlackRock, 2019 Investment Stewardship Annual Report 24 (2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C4S-EBWU] [hereinafter BlackRock, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2018-19]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52, 
at 9; Vanguard, Investment Stewardship: 2019 Annual Report 9, 29 (2019) [hereinafter 
Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19], https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/perspectives-and-
commentary/2019_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAW8-
CD9G]; Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, Wall St. J. (Sep. 18, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street-
11568799004 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Bioy et al., supra note 51, at 19 
exh.10 (stewardship personnel data); BlackRock, Annual Report for the Year Ended 
December 31, 2018 (Form 10-K), at 2 (filed Feb. 28, 2019); State St. Corp., Annual Report 
for the Year Ended December 31, 2018 (Form 10-K), at 71 (filed Feb. 21, 2019); Fast Facts 
About Vanguard, Vanguard, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts/ 
[https://perma.cc/CN8M-HB35] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019); Morningstar, supra note 59, at 
12. We refer to BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA stewardship reports collectively as the “Big 
Three Stewardship Reports.” 
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(a) Current Levels of Stewardship Investment. Table 1 below uses data 
from Morningstar and the most recent stewardship reports of the Big Three 
to present the number of stewardship personnel that each manager employs, 
and the number of portfolio companies that each manages in the United States 
and abroad. 
Table 1. Stewardship Personnel and Portfolio Companies 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
Stewardship Personnel 45 21 12 
Portfolio Companies 
(Worldwide) 
11,246 13,225 12,191 
Portfolio Companies (U.S.) 3,896 3,836 3,311* 
* Estimated 
We next estimate the total investment in stewardship by each of the Big 
Three. We assume, conservatively, that the average cost of each stewardship 
staff member (including benefits and payroll loading rates) is $300,000 per 
year.128 Table 2 shows the estimated cost of each of the Big Three’s 
stewardship departments and that cost as a proportion of the estimated fees 
from managing these assets. As the Table shows, the estimated investment in 
stewardship by BlackRock and Vanguard is below $15 million each, and that 
of SSGA is below $5 million. All three stewardship budgets are less than one-
fifth of 1%—only 0.2%—of the estimated fees that each of the Big Three 
charge for managing equity assets. Thus, although the Big Three stress the 
importance of stewardship, their stewardship budgets are not economically 
significant in the context of their operations and relative to the fees that they 
charge. Clearly, the stewardship budgets of each of the Big Three could be 
increased multiple times without creating any material funding problem or 
requiring any material change in fee levels. 
 
 128. According to Glassdoor.com, the average base salary at Blackrock is $76,273 for 
analysts; $100,196 for associates; $132,409 for vice presidents; $173,398 for directors; and 
$218,898 for managing directors. See BlackRock Salaries, Glassdoor, 
https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/BlackRock-Salaries-E9331.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C56M-DUQQ] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Furthermore, BlackRock’s own 
disclosure indicates that the total median pay for BlackRock employees in 2018 was 
$136,313. BlackRock, 2019 Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 83 (2019). These sources 
suggest that our assumption of an average per-person cost of $300,000 is likely to be 
conservative. Our understanding from conversations with investment manager employees is 
that employees in corporate governance positions receive lower salaries, on average, than 
those in investment positions. 
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Table 2. Stewardship Investments Relative to Investment Manager Fees 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
Stewardship Investment as % of Estimated 
Fees 
   
 Estimated Stewardship Investment ($m) $13.5 $6.3 $3.6 
 Estimated Fees & Expenses ($m) $9,107 $3,467 $2,625 
 Stewardship as % of Fees & Expenses 0.15% 0.18% 0.14% 
 
In addition to stewardship personnel expenses, the Big Three also pay 
proxy advisors (including ISS and Glass Lewis) for their services. But these 
payments are unlikely to affect the economic significance of the Big Three’s 
stewardship spending. Furthermore, whereas the Big Three’s stewardship 
operations likely make some use of the reports issued by the proxy advisory 
firms, Big Three officers regularly stress that they do not defer to proxy 
advisor conclusions, but rather that they make their own decisions.129 
Financial economists have empirically confirmed that institutional investors 
with large assets under management such as the Big Three often do not follow 
the recommendations of proxy advisors.130 
 
 129. See, e.g., BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 10–11 (presenting 
data on differences between BlackRock’s voting record and the recommendations of Glass 
Lewis and ISS); Barbara Novick, BlackRock Makes Its Own Proxy-Voting Choices, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-makes-its-own-proxy-
voting-choices-1538075415 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); see also 
BlackRock, Proxy Voting and Shareholder Engagement FAQ, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faq-
global.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3MN-A2PX] (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“We do not follow 
any single proxy advisor’s voting recommendations.”); Booraem, What We Do, supra note 
34, at 11 (“We don’t . . . vote in lockstep with proxy advisor recommendations.”); SEC, 
Roundtable on the Proxy Process 182 (2018) (comments of Rakhi Kumar, Senior Managing 
Director and Head of ESG Investments and Asset Stewardship, SSGA), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NMU4-VLDS] (“[SSGA] use[s] the proxy advisory firms in three ways. 
One is to execute our vote guidelines; two, as research insides [sic]; and three, for the 
operational ease that they provide to their platform . . . . We have our own voting 
guidelines . . . .”). 
 130. For empirical evidence that many large investment managers do not follow the 
recommendations of proxy advisors ISS or Glass Lewis, see Peter Iliev & Michelle Lowry, 
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 446, 465–66 (2015) (presenting 
evidence that index fund voting differs significantly from ISS recommendations); Davidson 
Heath, Daniele Macciocchi, Roni Michaely & Matthew Ringgenberg, Do Index Funds 
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Another important dimension for assessing the levels of investment in 
stewardship is the amount of personnel time that each of the Big Three 
dedicates to particular portfolio companies. To estimate this amount, we 
assume (conservatively) that each stewardship team member works on all 
weekdays other than federal holidays (that is, they take no vacation or sick 
days), for a total of 250 workdays per year. We also assume (again 
conservatively) that stewardship personnel spend 100% of their time on 
“pure” stewardship and no time at all on other activities, such as 
administration, training, and reporting. 
To estimate the amount of personnel time or stewardship budget devoted 
to a given company we had to make assumptions regarding how the Big Three 
allocate their stewardship time among their portfolio companies. In 
particular, we examined four different potential allocation scenarios. Scenario 
1 assumes that the Big Three divide their stewardship resources equally 
among all of their portfolio companies. Because our focus is on 
understanding the quality of corporate governance in U.S. public companies, 
Scenario 2 assumes (conservatively) that the Big Three spend 75% of their 
stewardship resources on U.S. portfolio companies (even though those 
companies constitute less than 25% of each manager’s total portfolio 
companies). Because index fund managers are likely to allocate more 
stewardship time to portfolio companies in which their investments are larger, 
Scenario 3 calculates how much time and investment the Big Three make for 
each $1 billion equity position in their worldwide portfolios, and Scenario 4 
calculates the stewardship time and investment for each $1 billion equity 
position in U.S. public companies (again assuming that the Big Three devote 
75% of their stewardship resources to U.S. companies). 
For each of these four scenarios, Table 3 provides estimates of the 
amount of personnel time and the dollar cost of this personnel time that the 
Big Three allocated to stewardship. Table 3 indicates that, no matter the 
scenario, each of the Big Three spent very limited resources on stewardship—
either in personnel time or in dollar cost—per portfolio company, including 
for positions of significant monetary value. Even under the most conservative 
assumptions, in order to oversee each of their billion-dollar positions, 
BlackRock spent less than 4 person-days per year and less than $5,000 in 
 
Monitor? 10–11 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-08, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259433 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting 
evidence of index funds voting against ISS recommendations for more than 50% of proposals 
on which ISS disagrees with company management); Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The 
Party Structure of Mutual Funds 13–14 (Mar. 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting 
evidence of variation between Big Three voting and ISS recommendations). In section 
II.A.4, infra, we provide empirical evidence on the divergence between say-on-pay votes of 
the Big Three and those recommended by proxy advisors. 
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stewardship costs per year, and each of SSGA and Vanguard spent less than 
5 person-days per year and less than $2,500 in stewardship costs per year. 
Table 3. Stewardship Per Portfolio Company 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
Stewardship Time (Person-Days)    
 Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship 
Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide) 
1.00 0.40 0.25 
 Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S. 
Companies, per U.S. Company 
2.17 1.03 0.68 
 Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, 
per $1bn Position Worldwide 
3.71 1.36 1.94 
 Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, 
per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies 
3.81 1.57 1.77 
Stewardship Investment ($)    
 Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship 
Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide) 
$1,200 $476 $295 
 Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S. 
Companies, per U.S. Company 
$2,599 $1,232 $815 
 Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, 
per $1bn Position Worldwide 
$4,447 $1,635 $2,332 
 Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, 
per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies 
$4,575 $1,887 $2,128 
 
To be sure, it is possible to conceive of many other scenarios for 
allocating personnel time among portfolio companies. For instance, the Big 
Three might devote more time to companies that are targets of hedge fund 
activists and less time to the (many more) companies that are not. Or the Big 
Three might devote more time to companies that have been afflicted by 
scandals or that have experienced poor financial performance, and less time 
to the (many more) companies that have not. While these scenarios would 
obviously involve shifting personnel time from some companies to others, 
they would not affect the aggregate personnel resources devoted to 
stewardship by each of the Big Three reported above. The question we 
consider is whether these aggregate resources are sufficient for effective 
stewardship.  
(b) Assessing Current Investment Levels. Recall the factors that provide 
the Big Three with incentives to underinvest in stewardship relative to what 
would be desirable for their beneficial investors. Given that the Big Three 
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hold positions of about 5% or more in a large number of significant U.S. 
companies,131 with many of these positions worth more than $1 billion, it 
would be in the interest of index fund investors for those portfolio companies 
to receive significant time and attention from the Big Three’s stewardship 
personnel. 
Recall the example, discussed in section I.D.1, of an index fund portfolio 
with a sole owner-manager and a $1 billion investment in a particular 
portfolio company. In that case it would be in the interests of the index fund’s 
beneficial investors to make additional marginal investments in stewardship 
up to $1 million if such spending could bring about a 0.1% increase in value. 
But as we discussed in section I.D, an index fund manager that has a 
fractional fee of 1% of assets under management would have an incentive to 
make additional marginal investments in stewardship up to $10,000. The 
concerns raised by this analysis are reinforced by the evidence presented in 
Table 3. The levels of stewardship described in Table 2 and Table 3 would 
enable only limited and cursory attention to a large majority of the Big 
Three’s portfolio companies, including those in which they hold positions of 
significant monetary value. 
In assessing these concerns, we note that evaluation of the governance 
and performance of each public company requires reviewing hundreds of 
pages of documents, at a minimum. These include (i) the annual report and 
proxy statement, (ii) the company’s long term plans and performance, (iii) 
executive compensation arrangements, and (iv) management proposals and 
shareholder proposals going to a vote. Investors with large stakes may also 
want to review other materials, such as analyst reports and proxy advisory 
assessments.132 
We consider three possible responses to the above concerns. First, it 
could be argued that our analysis of per-company personnel time assumes 
that a certain amount of time must be spent with respect to every portfolio 
company. But many portfolio companies—such as those that do not suffer 
from a crisis or a major governance or performance problem—arguably may 
not require any attention or investment in personnel time. In this view, the 
 
 131. See infra Table 8. 
 132. A recent study provides empirical evidence that “the largest five fund families 
[including the Big Three] access governance-related filings of 29% of their portfolio firms.” 
Peter Iliev, Jonathan Kalodimos & Michelle Lowry, Investors’ Attention to Corporate 
Governance 3 (Mar. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162407 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). This finding indicates that Big Three personnel 
might not even “access” governance-related filings for a majority of their portfolio 
companies in which they are substantial shareholders. We note that “accessing” governance-
related filings does not by itself indicate that those filings were reviewed in ways that go 
beyond mere cursory examination. 
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time saved by ignoring these companies could be devoted to those companies 
that do face such major problems with performance.133 
However, the interests of index fund investors would not be served by 
ignoring or paying little attention to the majority of public companies that do 
not obviously suffer from such problems. Monitoring and engaging with such 
companies could still improve value by addressing problems falling short of 
a crisis or a governance failure and can also reveal the presence of substantial 
problems before they become clearly apparent. This is especially the case 
since the Big Three will generally be among the largest shareholders in the 
company, and so would have to rely on smaller and potentially less-well-
resourced shareholders to identify these problems. 
Second, it could be argued that economies of scale (from dealing with 
many portfolio companies with similar problems) allow the Big Three to 
spend much less time on any individual company.134 When the stewardship 
staff of a Big Three manager studies an issue that arises in numerous 
companies, so the argument goes, the staff can apply their conclusions to all 
of those many companies, thereby spreading the cost of their research.135 But 
even with the use of some generally applicable insights, effective stewardship 
also requires considering detailed, company-specific information, and using 
it to make adjustments to general policies. Without such consideration, it is 
not possible to make decisions that are best suited to the great variation in 
circumstances of different portfolio companies.136 
 
 133. We are grateful to Mark Roe for encouraging us to respond to this objection. 
 134. For versions of this argument by commentators that view index fund stewardship 
favorably, see, for example, Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of 
Corporate Compliance, 105 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–9), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194605 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that 
institutional investors can enjoy the benefits of economies of scale with respect to macrolegal 
risks common to their large portfolio of companies); Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript 
at 7) (asserting that passive investors are able to spread the cost of obtaining information 
across their portfolios); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 34–35 (explaining that investment 
managers with broad portfolios have economies of scope in considering issues that affect 
many of those companies). We are grateful to John Coates for stressing the need to respond 
to this objection. 
 135. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 26) (“[G]iven the fact that passive 
funds do not focus on individual firm-specific characteristics, the size of their governance 
staffs offers substantial manpower to analyze governance issues.”). 
 136. Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon seek to defend the Big Three’s existing 
levels of stewardship investment by arguing that “the total number of employees at many 
hedge funds, which engage in significantly greater firm-specific research, is not dramatically 
higher than full-time governance staff at the major passive investors.” Id. In making this 
claim, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon cite to a media report that activist hedge fund 
Pershing Square reduced its total number of employees to 46. See id at n.160. But this 
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Consider decisions whether to vote for or against a company’s executive 
compensation arrangements at the company’s annual meeting. Clearly, 
researching compensation arrangements at many companies gives the staff of 
index fund managers experience and expertise that might reduce the average 
time they require to make each individual voting decision. But effective 
assessment of compensation arrangements requires staff members to obtain 
and assess information about the details of the company’s financial 
performance and compensation arrangements from the company’s disclosure 
documents, and possibly to compare those arrangements to the compensation 
arrangements of relevant peer companies. 
To take another example, consider index fund managers’ decisions 
regarding whether companies have appropriate mechanisms for dealing with 
various legal and compliance risks. According to one supporter of index fund 
stewardship, Asaf Eckstein, these decisions are a good example of an activity 
that involves substantial economies of scale, and could therefore be 
effectively and inexpensively carried out by a Big Three manager holding 
positions in many companies.137 But the monitoring necessary for these 
decisions cannot be effectively carried out using general principles 
augmented with cursory examinations of company-specific information. To 
illustrate, consider the list of compliance mechanisms that Eckstein argues 
that pharmaceutical companies should put in place.138 Our review of this list 
 
argument overlooks two critical differences between the stewardship of a Big Three index 
fund and that of an activist hedge fund such as Pershing Square. 
 First, each of the Big Three index funds has trillions of dollars of equity investments, 
whereas Pershing Square managed less than $10 billion in assets at the time of the media 
report. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Ackman Cuts Staff, Shuns Limelight as He Seeks to Turn 
Around Fund, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds-
ackman-exclusive-idUSKBN1FB32Y [https://perma.cc/BW4T-5JN3]. 
 Second, each of the Big Three index funds has hundreds of positions that are valued at 
more than $1 billion, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, whereas an activist hedge 
fund such as Pershing Square is likely to have less than a handful of such positions at any 
one time. See Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at 
105. Indeed, as of the end of the month immediately prior to the media report cited by Fisch, 
Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon, Pershing Square held positions exceeding $1 billion in 
value in only two companies (a position in a third company was valued at $995 million). See 
Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Information Table (Form 13F) (Feb. 14, 2018). For 
these reasons, the stewardship investment level that would best serve the interests of the 
beneficial investors of each of the Big Three index funds would likely be substantially higher 
than the level of stewardship investment that would best serve the interest of the beneficial 
investors of an activist hedge fund such as Pershing Square. 
 137. For Eckstein’s detailed account of this argument, see Eckstein, supra note 134 
(manuscript at 30–53). 
 138. This list includes:  
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indicates that monitoring whether any given company adequately maintains 
such mechanisms would require obtaining and assessing detailed company-
specific information.139 
Third, it might be argued that some stewardship activities of the Big 
Three that are not very expensive may produce benefits in a large number of 
companies, generating a relatively large impact for the amount spent. For 
example, the Big Three’s proxy voting guidelines and their materials 
expressing their general views on certain corporate governance matters could 
affect many companies for a limited per-company cost.140 But our analysis 
does not question that Big Three stewardship produces significant benefits. 
The problem on which we focus is that, in addition to the stewardship 
activities that can be undertaken at very low per-company cost, there are some 
value-enhancing stewardship activities that require consideration of detailed 
company-specific information. Consistent with the evidence in this section, 
the Big Three have incentives to underinvest in these activities, such that the 
total benefit produced by their stewardship is less than would be desirable for 
their beneficial investors. 
 
“the establishment of a system to monitor transactions with members of the healthcare 
community, an improved anti-corruption training program, a third-party due diligence 
program, independent control functions, creating an office charged with addressing reports 
of misconduct and a dedicated Global Compliance Audit group; as well as improved 
mechanisms to ensure that no illegal influence will be made through means that seem to be 
legitimate such as marketing events, educational seminars and medical studies.”  
Id. (manuscript at 29–30) (footnote omitted). 
 139. Kahan and Rock, who also take issue with our view, acknowledge that there are 
many matters in which company-specific information is valuable. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 16, at 36 (“The information that is material to a vote on any particular issue 
consists of some mix of issue-specific information [and] company-specific 
information . . . .”). But they argue that company-specific information is included in proxy 
statements. See id. at 39 (“[O]n many matters on which company specific information is 
valuable . . . a significant amount of company-specific information and analysis will be 
publicly disclosed in proxy statements and other campaign materials.”). Although we agree 
that significant company-specific information is provided in proxy statements (as well as in 
other company disclosures, proxy advisor reports, and other materials), absorbing and 
evaluating all the relevant company-specific information often requires significant time and 
attention. 
 140. In a response to an earlier draft of this Article that an SSGA officer discussed with 
the Wall Street Journal, the SSGA officer stressed the “extensive thought-leadership work 
that [SSGA] believes influences corporate behavior.” Simon Constable, Index-Fund Firms 
Gain Power, but Fall Short in Stewardship, Research Shows, Wall St. J. (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-fund-firms-gain-power-but-fall-short-in-stewardship-
research-shows-11562637900 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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2. Private Engagements 
Later in this Part we discuss evidence that the Big Three largely refrain 
from using valuable stewardship tools. Before doing so, however, we 
consider the argument that “behind-the-scenes” engagement with portfolio 
companies is an effective substitute for these other stewardship tools.141 Over 
the last several years, Big Three executives have stressed the central role that 
private engagement plays in their stewardship, and have expressed their view 
that private, behind-the-scenes engagement is a superior stewardship tool.142 
Academic commentators who view index fund stewardship favorably have 
also emphasized the significance of the private engagement channel.143 
 
 141. Responding in the same Wall Street Journal article, Vanguard stressed the critical 
importance of engagement to the Big Three’s stewardship activities. Commenting on the 
evidence we provide on pro-management voting by the Big Three, Vanguard stated that 
voting is “only one part of the larger corporate governance process. We regularly engage 
with companies on our shareholders’ behalf and believe that engagement and broader 
advocacy, in addition to voting, can effect meaningful changes that generate long-term value 
for all shareholders.” See id. 
 142. For comments by senior officers of BlackRock stressing the central role of 
engagement, see, for example, BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report: 2017 Voting and 
Engagement Report 2 (2017), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-2017-annual-voting-and-
engagment-statistics-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAE4-3CVX] [hereinafter BlackRock, 
Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17] (“The key to effective engagement is constructive and 
private communication.”); BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 7 
(“Engagement is core to our stewardship program.”); Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, 
Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk–Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& Bus. 385, 392 (2016) (“Engaging with boards and firm executives . . . can bring about 
change through incremental, non-confrontational means.”); Sarah Krouse, David Benoit & 
Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors, Wall St. J. (Oct. 
24, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-
investors-1477320101 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[M]eetings behind closed 
doors can go further than votes against management . . . .”). For similar comments by a senior 
officer of Vanguard, see Glenn Booraem, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, Vanguard 
(June 20, 2013), https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/research-
and-commentary/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlor 
[https://perma.cc/RS9T-RUT4] (“[Private engagement is] perhaps [the] more important . . . 
component of [Vanguard’s] governance program; . . . [it] provides for a level of nuance and 
precision that voting, in and of itself, lacks . . . [and] is where the action is  . . . [engagement] 
is the foundation of our Investment Stewardship Program.”). 
 143. For a discussion of private engagements by such supporters, see, for example, Fisch 
et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 24–25) (“In recent years, private engagement by mutual 
funds has grown dramatically. . . . The engagement of the large passive investors has 
particularly increased.” (footnote omitted)). But Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon do 
not engage with the evidence provided in this section that such private engagement still takes 
place in only a small minority of the Big Three’s portfolio companies. 
 
2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 57 
This section therefore examines private engagements.144 Any assessment 
 
 144. The analyses in section II.A.2, including the results reported in Table 4, are based 
on data from the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We use this data to obtain or estimate, for 
each of the Big Three, in each year from 2017 to 2019, (a) how many portfolio companies 
they had, (b) how many of those companies they engage with, and (c) how many of those 
companies had more than one engagement. For (a) we use the data for the number of portfolio 
companies used in section II.A.1 and Table 1 and described in supra note 127. Below we 
explain how we derive (b) and (c) for each of the Big Three. 
 SSGA provides information regarding the number of companies with which it engaged 
and the number of companies with which it had multiple engagements for each year from 
2017 to 2019 in its Annual Stewardship Reports. 
 BlackRock’s 2019 Annual Stewardship Report provides data on the number of 
companies with which it engaged, and the proportion of those companies with which it had 
multiple engagements, but in prior years that data is not available. In 2018 BlackRock 
disclosed the number of companies with which it engaged, but not the number of companies 
with which it had multiple engagements. We infer that number by assuming, conservatively, 
that BlackRock conducted no more than two engagements with any portfolio. This allows us 
to deduce the maximum number of companies with which BlackRock held multiple 
engagements. This estimate is conservative because if BlackRock held more than two 
engagements with any companies then the number of companies with which it held multiple 
engagements would be fewer than we estimate. Indeed, our approach would result in an 
estimate of 40.6% of the companies it engaged with having multiple engagements, whereas 
by its own disclosure the actual proportion was 25%. In 2017 BlackRock disclosed the total 
number of its engagements, but not the number of companies it engaged with or the number 
of companies that had multiple engagements. We estimate the number of companies engaged 
and the number of multiple engagements by assuming that the proportion of companies that 
BlackRock engaged with in 2017 that involved multiple engagements was the same as for 
2018. 
 Vanguard’s 2017 Annual Stewardship Report disclosed the number of its engagements 
and the number of companies with which it held engagements in that year. We use that data 
to infer the maximum number of multiple engagements in the same way as for BlackRock. 
Vanguard did not disclose its total number of engagements for 2018 or 2019. We therefore 
estimate the proportion of its portfolio with which it held multiple engagements by assuming 
that the proportion of the companies it engaged with that involved multiple engagements was 
the same in 2018 and 2019 as it was in 2017. 
 See BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 142, at 20; BlackRock, 
BlackRock Investment Stewardship 2018 Annual Report 20 (2018) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAK5-ZBGV] [hereinafter, BlackRock, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2017-18]; BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 4; 
State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016, supra note 9, at 5; State St. Glob. 
Advisors, Stewardship 2017, at 6–7 (2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-
topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VY47-TF8R] [hereinafter, State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2017]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52, at 
13–14; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 15; Vanguard, 
Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 46, at 8; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 7. 
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of the significance of the private engagement channel requires an evaluation 
of the scale and nature of those private engagements undertaken by the Big 
Three. The annual stewardship reports of the Big Three (which we refer to, 
collectively, as the Big Three Stewardship Reports) indicate that these 
managers conduct private communications with hundreds of companies, and 
supporters of index fund stewardship have highlighted these absolute 
numbers.145 But the number of companies with which the Big Three privately 
engage should be examined in relation to the very large number of the Big 
Three’s portfolio companies. We undertake such an examination below. 
Table 4 reports our findings regarding the proportion of their portfolio 
companies with which each of the Big Three companies had engagements for 
each of the last three years, and the average for each of the Big Three over 
that period.146 Panel A of Table 4 shows the proportion of each of the Big 
Three’s portfolio companies with which it had no engagement in each of the 
last three years. From 2017 through 2019, the average proportion of portfolio 
companies with no engagement were 88.9% for BlackRock, 94.2% for 
Vanguard, and 94.5% for SSGA. Thus, on average, the Big Three had no 
engagement with 92.5% of their portfolio companies during the period from 
2017 through 2019. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the proportion of each of the Big Three’s 
portfolio companies in each year in with which it had a single engagement. 
During the period from 2017 through 2019, BlackRock had single 
engagements with an average of 7.2% of its portfolio companies, Vanguard 
3.5%, and SSGA 5.0%. On average, over this period, the Big Three held 
single engagements in a given year with 5.2% of their portfolio companies 
on average. 
Panel C of Table 4 shows the proportion of companies in the portfolios 
 
 145. For such a discussion stressing the number of engagements, see, for example, 
Eckstein, supra note 134 (manuscript at 43–45). 
 146. BlackRock’s 2017 and 2018 reports divided its engagements by the resource level 
they involved. “Basic” engagements were “generally a single conversation on a routine 
matter,” and “Moderate” or “Extensive” engagements involved more than one conversation. 
Basic engagements constituted 56.8% of BlackRock’s 2017 engagements and 67.8% of its 
engagements in 2018. See BlackRock, Voting and Engagement Report 2017, supra note 142, 
at 3; BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report: 2018 Voting and Engagement Report 3 
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-voting-and-
engagment-statistics-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW6Q-MDWZ]. Vanguard 
and SSGA did not provide such detail about how their investment of time and resources 
varied among their engagements. 
BlackRock’s and Vanguard’s Annual Stewardship Reports are for the twelve month period 
that ended June 30, 2019; SSGA’s Annual Stewardship Report is for the 2018 calendar year. 
Averages for years and managers reported in the table are the average of the proportions in 
those years, or for those managers, and are not weighted by number of engagements or assets 
under management. 
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of each of the Big Three with which they had multiple engagements in a 
particular year. From 2017 through 2019, BlackRock had multiple 
engagements with an average of 3.9% of its portfolio companies, Vanguard 
2.3%, and SSGA 0.6%. On average, the Big Three had multiple engagements 
with only 2.3% of their portfolio companies over this period. 
Thus, the Big Three engage with only a small minority of their portfolio 
companies, and have multiple engagements in a given year with an even 
smaller minority of companies in their portfolios. The incidence of 
engagement is especially low for Vanguard and SSGA, which had any 
engagement with fewer than 6% of their portfolio companies each year from 
2017 to 2019. Although BlackRock’s level of engagement was higher, the 
percentage of its portfolio companies with which it had any engagement in a 
given year was less than 12%, on average, during the period from 2017 
through 2019. 
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Table 4. Private Engagement 
Panel A: Portfolio Companies with No Engagement 
Year Big Three Avg. BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
2017 94.1% 92.5% 94.8% 95.0% 
2018 91.8% 87.1% 94.3% 94.0% 
2019 91.6% 87.0% 93.4% 94.4% 
Average 92.5% 88.9% 94.2% 94.5% 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Companies with a Single Engagement 
Year Big Three Avg. BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
2017 4.0% 4.4% 3.1% 4.6% 
2018 5.5% 7.6% 3.4% 5.4% 
2019 6.2% 9.7% 3.9% 4.9% 
Average 5.2% 7.2% 3.5% 5.0% 
 
Panel C: Portfolio Companies with Multiple Engagements 
 Big Three Avg. BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
2017 1.9% 3.1% 2.1% 0.4% 
2018 2.7% 5.3% 2.3% 0.6% 
2019 2.2% 3.2% 2.6% 0.7% 
Average 2.3% 3.9% 2.3% 0.6% 
 
For the large majority of cases in which each of the Big Three had no 
engagement with the portfolio company, private engagement cannot be 
argued to have provided a substitute for the use of other stewardship tools. 
Furthermore, even in those cases in which private engagement does occur, 
there are reasons for concern that the effectiveness of such private 
engagement is reduced by the Big Three’s reluctance to use other stewardship 
tools.147 For example, private communication by a Big Three manager in 
favor of a given change—either a strategic change, or a governance change 
 
 147. For a report indicating that the use of shareholder proposals “ignites and amplifies 
investors’ engagement efforts,” see Jackie Cook, The Proxy Process: Raising the Investor 
Voice to Address New Risks 19 (2019), 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20190208_Morningstar.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7VQN-27R5]. 
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such as moving to majority voting or annual elections—would make clear to 
corporate managers that a substantial shareholder supported the change. But 
if corporate managers expected that failing to make the change would cause 
the Big Three manager to nominate director candidates or submit a 
shareholder proposal, they would presumably be more likely to make the 
change. Conversely, current expectations that the Big Three manager will not 
take such actions if corporate managers fail to make such a change (as we 
discuss below) make private engagement less effective than it could be.148 
3. Focusing on Divergences from Governance Principles 
This section focuses on the substantial extent to which the Big Three’s 
stewardship activities focus on divergences from governance principles.149 
The practice of comparing the practices and arrangements of portfolio 
companies with general governance principles is commonly referred to as 
“check-the-box” governance.150 As we explain below, focusing on 
divergences from governance principles serves certain private incentives of 
index fund managers. To be sure, it may sometimes be desirable for investors 
 
 148. For instance, in a recent statement of its stewardship priorities, BlackRock has 
explicitly stated that “[w]e seek to engage in a constructive manner . . . , but we do not [] tell 
companies what to do . . . . [W]e explain our concerns and expectations [to companies] . . . 
and then allow time for a considered response.” BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement 
Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 3. But in a separate release, BlackRock officers emphasize 
that “our patience is not infinite—when we do not see progress despite ongoing engagement, 
or companies are insufficiently responsive to our efforts . . . we will exercise our right to vote 
against management recommendations.” BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, 
at 7. This statement indicates that, even if BlackRock faces no progress or insufficient 
responsiveness in an ongoing engagement, BlackRock will consider voting against 
management recommendations but not initiating a shareholder proposal. 
 149. The analyses in section II.A.3 are based on a review of the Big Three Stewardship 
Reports and the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big Three. 
See BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Corporate Governance 
Guidelines & Engagement Principles (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-
engprinciples-global.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y53Q-WX73]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy 
Voting and Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111; Vanguard, Proxy Voting 
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 12. We refer to the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big 
Three collectively as the “Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines.” 
 150. For uses of the term “check-the-box,” see, for example, Robert A.G. Monks & Nell 
Minow, Corporate Governance 172 (5th ed. 2011); Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald 
B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. Fin. Econ. 111, 134 (2016) 
[hereinafter Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners]; Martin Lipton, Corporate 
Governance: The New Paradigm, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. 
Regulation (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-
governance-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/35HH-5P6A]. 
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to make decisions based on how company activities vary from general 
governance principles. As we explain below, however, some value-
maximizing stewardship decisions require additional company-specific 
information that goes beyond check-the-box stewardship. 
Consider the proxy voting guidelines that the Big Three follow in 
determining whether to support incumbent directors standing for reelection 
or to withhold their support.151 Each of the Big Three’s guidelines lists 
situations and conditions that would lead to a withhold vote. Our review of 
these guidelines indicates that, for each of the Big Three, the important 
decision whether to support a director or withhold support is based 
exclusively on the existence or absence of certain divergences from good 
governance principles. 
For example, Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines call for withholding 
votes from one or more directors if the board or a specific director deviates 
from certain governance principles in one or more specified ways, such as: 
(i) the board failing to have a majority of independent directors; (ii) the board 
failing to have audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committees 
that are fully independent; (iii) a specific director serving on five or more 
public company boards; or (iv) a specific director failing to attend more than 
75% of board or committee meetings.152 BlackRock and SSGA’s approaches 
differ in some details but are similarly based on comparison with good 
governance principles.153 
Furthermore, the Big Three Stewardship Reports indicate that the Big 
Three’s private, behind-the-scenes engagements—when they do occur—also 
focus on companies that diverge significantly from desirable governance 
principles. For example, SSGA indicates that its engagement seeks to provide 
“principles-based guidance.”154 BlackRock indicates that its engagement 
might occur when a company lags behind its peers on environmental, social, 
or governance matters; when it is in a sector with a thematic governance issue 
material to value; or for other reasons that do not include financial 
underperformance.155 Vanguard in turn states that its stewardship focuses on 
 
 151. For releases providing the Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines, see supra note 149. 
 152. For Vanguard’s voting guidelines regarding these matters, see Vanguard, Proxy 
Voting Guidelines, supra note 111, at 3–6 (listing as reasons for withholding votes from 
directors these and other specified deviations from governance principles). 
 153. For the voting guidelines of BlackRock and SSGA listing their criteria for 
withholding support from directors, see BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement Priorities 
2019, supra note 47; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines 
2019, supra note 111, at 3. 
 154. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-2017, supra note 9, at 3. 
 155. BlackRock, Voting and Engagement Report 2017, supra note 142, at 3. In its 
Investment Stewardship Priorities for 2019, BlackRock lists its five engagement priorities as 
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board composition, governance structures, executive compensation, and 
board processes for oversight of risk and strategy.156 
In assessing this focus on divergences from governance principles, we 
do not question the relevance and importance of such divergences for voting 
or engagement decisions. It is clearly valuable to take information regarding 
such divergences into account. In our view, however, value-maximizing 
decisions on these matters would also require consideration of other types of 
information. As we discuss in sections II.B.1 and II.B.2 below, value-
maximizing voting and engagement decisions would also incorporate 
detailed information about the business performance of the portfolio 
company and the qualifications, expertise, and experience of its directors. 
Importantly, the proxy voting guidelines of the Big Three call for 
consideration of detailed company-specific information regarding business 
performance and the characteristics of particular directors in the case of a 
proxy contest over director elections between incumbents and a challenger’s 
competing slate. To illustrate, for such contested director elections, 
Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines call for “case-by-case” decisions based 
on considerations including “[h]ow . . . the company [has] performed relative 
to its peers,” and the extent to which the incumbent directors are “well-suited 
to address the company’s needs” compared with the directors proposed by 
the challenger.157 The proxy voting guidelines of BlackRock and SSGA 
similarly call for using such information for voting in contested elections.158 
But as we make clear above, the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big 
Three do not call for using such considerations and information where the 
Big Three decide whether to support directors not facing a proxy challenger, 
which constitute the vast majority of their voting decisions. 
Although focusing on divergences from governance principles may not 
be value-maximizing for an index fund’s beneficial investors, it could well 
serve the private interests of the index fund’s managers that we analyzed in 
 
“Governance,” “Corporate Strategy and Capital Allocation,” “Compensation that Promotes 
Long-Termism,” “Environmental Risks and Opportunities,” and “Human Capital 
Management,” and does not mention financial or operating performance. BlackRock, 
Stewardship Engagement Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 2. 
 156. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 4. 
 157. Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra note 111, at 5–6. 
 158. BlackRock’s voting guidelines regarding contested elections indicate that they “are 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. We evaluate a number of factors, which may include: the 
qualifications of the dissident and management candidates; [and] the validity of the concerns 
identified by the dissident . . . .” Blackrock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities 5 
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-
investment-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN3U-2YDJ] [hereinafter Blackrock, Proxy 
Voting Guidelines]. SSGA’s voting guidelines state that they “vote for the election/re-
election of directors on a case-by-case basis after considering various factors.” State St. Glob. 
Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111, at 2. 
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Part I, for two reasons. First, the focus on divergences from governance 
principles enables an index fund manager to avoid focusing significantly on 
issues such as business performance and the individual characteristics of 
directors. Assessing these issues would require detailed company-specific 
information. Focusing on governance principles thus serves the interests of 
the Big Three in limiting investments in stewardship. 
Second, focusing on compliance or divergence relative to governance 
principles that enjoy broad support avoids the need to make many 
discretionary decisions or contestable judgments. Instead, the Big Three’s 
decision making is supported by governance best practices that have 
widespread support. This makes their use of their power less salient, and thus 
reduces the risk of backlash. 
4. Pro-Management Voting 
Our analysis in Part II raises concerns that the Big Three index fund 
managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers 
when they vote, especially with respect to issues affecting managers’ 
authority and private interests. This section investigates this concern 
empirically by focusing on the voting decisions of the Big Three on say-on-
pay resolutions, a subject that is close to the hearts of corporate managers.159 
We find that these voting decisions seem to exhibit pro-management 
tendencies that are consistent with the predictions of our agency-costs view. 
We gather evidence regarding the say-on-pay voting decisions of the Big 
Three. Table 5 provides evidence of the incidence of “no” votes by each of 
the Big Three in say-on-pay votes at S&P 500 companies in each full year 
since the 2011 adoption of a say-on-pay mandate by the Dodd-Frank Act.160 
 
 159. The analyses in section II.A.4, including the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, are 
based on voting data on say-on-pay proposals from ISS Voting Analytics (accessed Oct. 3, 
2019). S&P 500 constituency data is from Compustat (last Oct. 3, 2019). Equity holdings of 
investment managers is based on Form 13F data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership Database 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 We consider a fund manager to have voted “no” on a company’s say-on-pay proposal if 
a plurality of their respective funds cast against votes on that proposal. Weighted averages of 
vote proportions from different funds are weighted by the total assets under management in 
U.S. equities. The largest active fund managers were determined based on their aggregate 
ownership positions for all U.S. equities. Abstentions and proposals for which no vote was 
recorded for a particular investment manager are excluded from the proportions presented, 
but due to the negligible incidence of abstentions and non-votes, their inclusion would not 
have any qualitative effect on the results.  
 160. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (adding to § 14A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2012)). 
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As Table 5 indicates, each of the Big Three very rarely opposed say-on-pay 
proposals: BlackRock opposed only 2.0% of such proposals over this period, 
SSGA 4.5%, and Vanguard 3.0%.161 
Table 5 also compares the voting behavior of the Big Three to the 
recommendations of ISS, the leading proxy advisor. The three columns on 
the right of Table 5 show the proportion of those say-on-pay proposals that 
ISS recommended against which each of the Big Three actually voted against. 
As Table 5 shows, each of the Big Three vote against only a minority of the 
proposals that ISS recommends against. 
Table 5. Big Three “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes 
 All Proposals 
Proposals with ISS “Against” 
Recommendation 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
2012 2.5% 5.9% 3.3% 13.0% 37.0% 18.5% 
2013 2.0% 2.2% 3.2% 14.6% 22.5% 31.7% 
2014 2.3% 2.7% 5.9% 26.5% 32.4% 55.9% 
2015 0.7% 2.1% 4.5% 7.5% 22.5% 35.0% 
2016 1.6% 1.6% 5.1% 18.9% 16.2% 43.2% 
2017 2.8% 3.6% 5.5% 26.7% 35.6% 48.9% 
2018 2.2% 2.7% 3.7% 15.8% 23.7% 32.4% 
Average 2.0% 3.0% 4.5% 17.6% 27.1% 37.9% 
 
Of course, the patterns displayed in Table 5 are only suggestive and do 
not demonstrate excessive deference. It could be argued that index fund 
managers’ general support for say-on-pay proposals reflects the adequacy of 
executive pay arrangements in the vast majority of S&P 500 companies, that 
ISS is excessively critical of executive pay arrangements, and that the Big 
Three serve the interests of index fund investors by voting in support of a 
majority of say-on-pay proposals that ISS recommends against. But at a 
minimum, the Big Three’s general support for executive pay in the 
overwhelming majority of S&P companies is consistent with the deference 
predictions of the agency-costs view. 
 
 161. For a recent report presenting similar results for a set of companies with especially 
highly paid CEOs, see Rosanna Landis Weaver, The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs: Are Fund 
Managers Asleep at the Wheel? 9–13 (2019), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59a706d4f5e2319b70240ef9/t/5c6edf92971a180d1fef
1597/1550770069046/100MostOverpaidCEOs_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QKS-YVJV]. 
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To provide another benchmark for comparison, we gathered data on how 
the investment managers of fund families that are largely actively managed 
vote on say-on-pay proposals. Table 6 compares the votes of the Big Three 
with the three largest active managers, Capital Group, Fidelity Investments 
Inc., and T. Rowe Price Group, Inc., and the ten largest active managers, for 
each year from 2012 to 2018. As Table 6 shows, the frequency of “no” votes 
on say-on-pay proposals for the Big Three is less than half (and closer to one-
third) of the frequency for the largest three active managers or the largest ten 
active managers. Of course, it could still be argued that these active managers 
are excessively critical of executive pay, and that the substantially more 
deferential voting by the Big Three reflects a better assessment of pay 
arrangements. Without clear reasons to expect large active managers to be 
excessively critical and adversarial toward managers of S&P 500 companies, 
however, the results reported in Table 6 are consistent with the prediction of 
our incentive analysis and the agency-costs view: The Big Three’s voting 
behavior is likely to be excessively deferential. 
Table 6. Big Three and Active Manager “No” Votes 
in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes 
 Big Three 
Largest 3 Active 
Managers 
Largest 10 Active 
Managers 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
2012 3.9% 3.8% 12.3% 12.8% 9.2% 10.1% 
2013 2.4% 2.4% 9.6% 10.2% 7.3% 8.0% 
2014 3.7% 3.4% 7.8% 8.4% 6.3% 6.9% 
2015 2.4% 2.1% 5.2% 5.6% 6.8% 6.6% 
2016 2.8% 2.4% 6.9% 7.3% 8.4% 8.1% 
2017 4.0% 3.7% 7.3% 7.4% 8.5% 8.0% 
2018 2.8% 2.7% 6.1% 6.6% 7.5% 7.2% 
Average 3.1% 2.9% 7.9% 8.3% 7.7% 7.9% 
 
Some of the commentators taking issue with our view and evaluating 
index fund stewardship more favorably argue that, among the thousands of 
votes that the Big Three cast each year at U.S. public companies, only a 
limited number of votes—and substantially less than 100—are “potentially 
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consequential” because they involve contested elections.162 Relatedly, a 
recent BlackRock release stresses that the vast majority of ballot items are 
not closely decided,163 and that say-on-pay votes are, in any event, not legally 
binding.164 In our view, however, Big Three say-on-pay voting matters. 
Companies pay close attention to say-on-pay votes and design their pay 
arrangements with an eye toward avoiding significant negative say-on-pay 
votes.165 Big Three voting on say-on-pay is therefore a potentially significant 
instrument for influencing and improving pay arrangements. Accordingly, 
nondeferential voting on say-on-pay resolutions could operate to improve pay 
arrangements and thereby produce significant benefits for index fund 
investors. 
Our findings regarding voting decisions are consistent with those 
reported by four other current empirical studies. Three studies—one by Ryan 
Bubb and Emiliano Catan; another by Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta 
Ravina, and Howard Rosenthal; and a third by Davidson Heath, Daniele 
Macciocchi, Roni Michaely, and Matthew Ringgenberg—document that, in 
general, index funds tend to vote in a more pro-management way than other 
investment fund managers.166 Furthermore, a fourth study by Alon Brav, Wei 
Jiang, and Tao Li finds that the votes of index funds are more pro-
management than other investment managers in contested elections, another 
 
 162. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 34 (“How many potentially 
consequential votes are there? It is a little hard to tell because of settlements before a proxy 
contest comes to a conclusion but the number is likely a two-digit figure (and likely in the 
low two-digits).”). 
 163. See BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes, supra note 116 (“The vast majority of 
ballot items are won or lost by margins greater than 30%, meaning that even the three largest 
asset managers combined could not change the vote outcome.”). 
 164. See id. (“[S]ay-on-pay is a mandatory, non-binding advisory vote . . . .”). 
 165. See, e.g., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, A Say-on-Pay Update—Plus Strategies for 
Responding to a Negative Recommendation by a Proxy Advisory Firm 1 (2018), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-11-29-a_say-on-pay_update_plus_strategies.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7D9-K2KZ] (“[P]erforming poorly on a say-on-pay vote is not only 
disheartening, but can impact shareholder votes on election of directors[,] . . . result in greater 
scrutiny of CEO performance, and require management and compensation committee 
members to expend significant time and resources to address concerns reflected by the 
vote.”). 
 166. See Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina & Howard Rosenthal, Investor 
Ideology 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 557/2018, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119935 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (characterizing 
the voting behavior of BlackRock and Vanguard as close to that reflected by management 
recommendations); Heath et al., supra note 130, at 12 (describing index funds as “more likely 
to cede authority to firm management”); Bubb & Catan, supra note 130, at 3 (characterizing 
the voting behavior of the Big Three as “support[ing] management at much greater rates” 
than other investors). 
 
68 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1 
context in which vote outcomes are important for corporate managers.167 The 
results of these studies are all consistent with and reinforce the deference 
predictions of our incentive analysis. 
B. What the Big Three Fail to Do Adequately 
We now turn to discuss five types of stewardship activity that the Big 
Three do not adequately undertake. The activities on which we focus are (i) 
monitoring business performance; (ii) influencing director identity; (iii) 
submission of shareholder proposals to facilitate changes favored by the 
index fund’s own governance principles; (iv) contributing to corporate 
governance reforms by filing comments to SEC rulemaking and amicus briefs 
in precedential litigation; and (v) taking on lead plaintiff positions in 
consequential securities cases. 
1. Monitoring Business Performance 
Enhancing the financial returns of portfolio companies is an important 
objective for Big Three investors. Those investors would benefit from 
stewardship that identifies underperforming portfolio companies, analyzes 
changes that could improve their performance, and uses the substantial voting 
power of the Big Three to bring about such changes.168 In discussing his view 
that index funds offer “the best hope for corporate governance,” Vanguard 
founder Jack Bogle stressed that “the new index fund rule is that if you don’t 
like the management, fix the management because you can’t sell the stock.”169 
However, as we explain in this section, in the vast majority of companies in 
which a hedge fund activist is not agitating for change, the Big Three pay 
little attention to whether a company suffers from financial or business 
 
 167. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking 
(Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3101473 
[https://perma.cc/62QQ-RS52] (describing “direct evidence that passive funds are 
significantly more ‘pro-management’ than active funds in proxy contests”). 
 168. A study by Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, and Tracie Woidtke provides evidence 
that stewardship paying attention to underperformance could provide benefits, even if it 
would just lead to increased vote withholding from directors of companies that 
underperform. The study provides evidence, including “significant post-campaign operating 
performance improvements” and “a forced CEO turn-over rate of 25% in target firms in the 
1 year following a campaign.” Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards 
Pay Attention when Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. Fin. Econ. 84, 85 
(2008). 
 169. See Benz, supra note 14. 
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underperformance that might call for “fixing the management.”170 
Consider the important decisions that index funds make in the vast 
number of companies that hold uncontested elections in any given year—
whether to vote for the incumbent directors up for election, or to withhold 
votes. As we explained in section II.A.3, each of the Big Three’s proxy voting 
guidelines makes the decision to withhold votes conditional entirely on 
certain specified divergences from governance principles. Importantly, our 
review of the Big Three’s guidelines indicates that none of those guidelines 
list financial underperformance, no matter how severe or persistent, as a basis 
for withholding votes from directors. 
Similarly, as we discussed in section II.A.2, the Big Three Stewardship 
Reports indicate that the Big Three’s private, behind-the-scenes 
engagements—in those relatively infrequent cases in which they do occur—
focus on addressing significant divergences from desirable governance 
principles. Importantly, these private engagements do not target or focus on 
business underperformance. We reviewed all of the examples of behind-the-
scenes engagements described in the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We 
found zero cases where engagement was described as being motivated by 
financial underperformance. To be sure, some Big Three engagements follow 
interventions by activist hedge funds seeking to improve performance and 
focus on those interventions.171 However, even in those cases, the Big Three 
did not themselves identify underperformance but merely reacted to activist 
hedge funds doing so and proposing to address it. 
Writers supportive of index fund stewardship seek to justify their limited 
attention to financial underperformance by arguing that index fund managers 
“lack the expertise and the resources necessary to [identify and address firm-
specific operational deficiencies] effectively.”172 But because such arguments 
take such lack of “in-house expertise” as a given, they fail to recognize that 
it is a product of the decisions made by index fund managers. Index fund 
managers have the resources to obtain or develop any in-house expertise that 
they might consider desirable. 
Indeed, given the hundreds of companies in which the Big Three hold 
 
 170. The analyses in section II.B.1 are based on a review of the Big Three Stewardship 
Reports and the Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines. 
 171. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-2017, supra note 123, at 7. 
 172. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 20); see also Charles M. Nathan, 
Institutional Investor Engagement: One Size Does Not Fit All, Conf. Board (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6826 [https://perma.cc/3KLK-
SQ9B] (explaining that the Big Three’s stewardship teams “are principally focused on big 
picture environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues . . . [and] lack the skill-sets and 
manpower necessary to deal in depth with company specific issues of strategy design and 
implementation, capital allocation, M&A opportunities, and operational and financial 
performance”). 
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positions of $1 billion or more, the interests of their beneficial investors could 
be well served by adding in-house personnel with financial expertise. Adding 
a sufficient number of such personnel could allow the Big Three to identify 
severe or persistent underperformance at particular portfolio companies. 
Once such underperformance is identified, those personnel could generate 
proposals for improving performance through changes in corporate 
leadership or strategy, and they could facilitate those changes using the Big 
Three’s power and influence. Why then do the Big Three not employ such 
personnel on the significant scale that their holdings warrant? The lack of 
such personnel is consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs 
view of index fund stewardship. 
Some commentators taking issue with our view of index fund 
stewardship have argued that index fund managers do not need to pay 
attention to financial underperformance as they can count on activist hedge 
funds to bring such underperformance to the attention of other investors and 
to initiate proposals for improving performance.173 The empirical evidence, 
however, indicates that companies often underperform for several years 
before an activist emerges to push for change.174 The interests of index fund 
investors are therefore not served by ignoring underperformance for long 
periods in the hope that an activist hedge fund may choose to address it 
sometime in the future. 
Furthermore, as we discuss in section III.B.2(b), activist hedge funds 
have incentives to engage only when performance problems are very large 
and can be fixed quickly. The interests of index fund investors would be 
served by having other performance problems addressed as well. Thus, while 
the work of activist hedge funds often provides benefits to index fund 
investors, it cannot fully substitute for work that index fund managers could 
do themselves to address financial underperformance. Index fund managers 
largely avoid such work at the moment, even though it could provide index 
fund investors with significant additional benefits. 
2. Influencing Director Identity 
Directors matter. Their characteristics, background, and experience have 
considerable influence on the governance and performance of companies. 
 
 173. For arguments that index funds rely on and interact with hedge funds that monitor 
companies, identify problems at those companies that would benefit from changes, and make 
proposals for such changes, see, for example, Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 27–
29); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 5–6, 45. 
 174. For evidence that activist targets underperform significantly during the three years 
prior to the emergence of an activist hedge fund, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei 
Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1123–30 
(2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism]. 
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The Big Three’s governance principles impact the selection of directors, such 
as by discouraging the selection of directors who did not consistently attend 
past board meetings and encouraging gender diversity among directors. But 
among the very many potential directors who would comply with the Big 
Three’s principles, some candidates would clearly be better choices than 
others given the particular portfolio company’s circumstances and needs. 
A board with governance processes that accord completely with the Big 
Three’s standards may sometimes select one or more individuals who are not 
well suited to the company’s needs, or fail to select individuals likely to 
improve board performance. When the Big Three hold large stakes in such a 
company, their beneficial investors would be served by the index fund 
managers identifying when changes to the individuals on the board are 
desirable and facilitating those changes. Those changes might not require the 
index fund manager to be represented on the board—adding or removing one 
or more independent directors could be sufficient.175 
In this section we therefore examine whether the Big Three do in fact 
seek to influence the selection of directors of their portfolio companies.176 We 
examine both (i) formal nominations of directors, and (ii) mere 
communications to portfolio companies suggesting that particular directors 
be added or removed. We find that the Big Three appear to avoid both types 
of activities. 
We begin by gathering data on director nominations. Table 7 shows that 
there were approximately 3,800 director nominations at U.S. companies 
during the twelve-year period from 2007 through 2018. Our review of these 
nominations indicates that not a single nomination was made by any of the 
Big Three. 
 
 175. For empirical evidence that a significant goal of activist hedge funds in negotiating 
settlement agreements with managers of activism targets is to introduce new independent 
directors into the boardroom, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas 
Keusch, Dancing with Activists, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9-10, 20-25, 64), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948869 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 176. The analyses in section II.B.2, including the results reported in Tables 7 and 8, are 
based on data on director nominations from SharkRepellent.net (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) 
and Schedule 13D filings from the SEC’s EDGAR database (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). 
S&P 500 constituency data are from Compustat (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Data regarding 
Big Three positions of 5% or more are based on institutional ownership data from FactSet 
Res. Sys., Ownership Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Data for BlackRock for 2010 
onwards includes positions held by Barclays Global Investors, which BlackRock acquired in 
December 2009. 
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Table 7. Actual and Proposed Director Nominations 
Year Director Nominations Year Director Nominations 
2007 360 2013 354 
2008 474 2014 349 
2009 332 2015 315 
2010 286 2016 282 
2011 250 2017 241 
2012 290 2018 259 
Total (2007-2018): 3,792 
 
Even though the Big Three did not formally nominate any directors it is 
possible that they may have suggested that particular directors be added or 
removed. To evaluate whether this was the case we reviewed the examples of 
engagements described in their Stewardship Reports. Our review indicates 
that such communications were not part of any of the numerous engagements 
with named companies or examples of engagements with unnamed 
companies in the Stewardship Reports. 
We examine this issue more systematically by gathering data on positions 
of 5% or more held by the Big Three during the twelve-year period from 2007 
through 2018. As Table 8 indicates, the incidence of Big Three positions of 
5% or more was large and increasing throughout the period, exceeding 2,000 
in each year from 2009 and exceeding 4,000 each year from 2014. 
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Table 8. Big Three Positions of 5% or More 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA Total 
2007 1,233 106 62 1,401 
2008 1,666 158 91 1,915 
2009 1,882 241 57 2,180 
2010 1,975 432 68 2,475 
2011 1,971 819 98 2,888 
2012 1,979 1,302 142 3,423 
2013 2,123 1,419 150 3,692 
2014 2,188 1,721 186 4,095 
2015 2,178 1,842 132 4,152 
2016 2,274 1,903 197 4,374 
2017 2,258 1,994 203 4,455 
2018 2,373 2,051 183 4,607 
 
As we discuss in section I.E, an index fund manager with a block of 5% 
or more must file disclosure on Schedule 13D if its activities have the purpose 
or effect of influencing the identity of the individuals serving on the board.177 
We therefore gathered data on Schedule 13D filings over the same period. 
We find that neither Vanguard nor SSGA made a single Schedule 13D 
filing from 2007 through 2018. BlackRock made only nine Schedule 13D 
filings during this twelve-year period, during which it had an average of more 
than 1,000 5% positions per year. Of those nine Schedule 13D filings, seven 
related to going-private transactions that a BlackRock-affiliated private 
equity fund manager was party to, and the other two related to IPOs that a 
BlackRock fund manager managed shares in. None of these cases related to 
attempts to influence the composition of the board of directors of 
“midstream” public companies. This is the case even though the Big Three 
held thousands of positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies.178 This 
 
 177. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (requiring the filing of disclosure on Schedule 13D 
with the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018) (same). 
 178. Our findings in this section were reinforced by the subsequent finding reported by 
Heath et al., supra note 130, at 31–32, that index funds “are less likely to file Schedule 13D 
and more likely to file Schedule 13G.” According to the evidence that we obtained, each of 
the Big Three is not merely “less likely” to file Schedule 13D, but in fact two of the Big 
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evidence supports our analysis in section I.E.3 concerning the Big Three’s 
incentives to avoid filing on Schedule 13D. Furthermore, this evidence 
indicates that the Big Three refrain from communications about particular 
individuals who they believe should be added to or removed from boards of 
directors in the vast number of cases where one or more of the Big Three had 
positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies.179 
As with the argument discussed in section II.A.3 that the Big Three may 
not need to monitor financial performance because activist hedge funds do 
so, it could be argued that the Big Three do not need to engage with 
companies about adding or removing particular directors because activist 
hedge funds take on this role.180 But the Big Three’s views on optimal board 
members likely differ from those of activist hedge funds. For example, SSGA 
has criticized portfolio companies that reach settlement agreements with 
activist hedge funds to add directors favored by activists without consulting 
other investors.181 The best way for the Big Three to increase the likelihood 
that underperforming companies would make director additions that are 
consistent with their views regarding value-maximization would be for a Big 
Three manager itself to communicate with its portfolio companies about the 
particular directors that it believes would be best for the company. 
The Big Three’s reluctance to be involved in selecting directors is 
difficult to reconcile with the value-maximization view. But it is consistent 
with, and can be explained by, our incentive analysis and the agency-costs 
view. Identifying directors who should be added or removed requires 
significant time and resources. Avoiding such actions is consistent with the 
Big Three’s incentives to underinvest in stewardship, and with the limited 
resources they actually allocate to stewardship at particular portfolio 
companies. Furthermore, deference to corporate managers on the choice of 
 
Three completely avoided any such filing during the twelve-year period we examined, and 
one of the Big Three almost entirely avoided such filings during that period. 
 179. This is also consistent with statements from the Big Three regarding what they do, 
and what they do not. For instance, Vanguard states, “We don’t: Nominate directors or seek 
board seats, [or] submit shareholder proposals . . . .” Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, 
at 11. 
 180. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 26) (“[I]ndividual fund 
complexes interact and rely upon . . . activist hedge funds to supplement their voice, 
monitoring and information gathering processes.”). 
 181. For an example of such criticism, see State St. Glob. Advisors, Protecting Long-
Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements 1 (2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180430162941/https://www.ssga.com/investment-
topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Protecting-Long-Term-Shareholder-
Interests-in-Activist-Engagements.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (expressing 
concern regarding “settlement agreements entered into rapidly between boards and activists 
and without the voice of long-term shareholders”). 
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directors (assuming general process requirements are met) is also consistent 
with the incentives for index fund managers to be excessively deferential to 
corporate managers that our agency-costs analysis identifies.182 
3. Eliminating Divergences from Governance Principles 
Supporters of index fund stewardship stress that index fund managers, 
and in particular the Big Three, have substantial advantages in bringing about 
similar governance improvements in a large number of firms, and that index 
fund stewardship is a natural fit for that objective.183 For example, Fisch, 
Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon state that “the Big Three enjoy substantial 
economies of scale with respect to corporate governance and market-wide 
initiatives.”184 These authors also claim that contributing to similar 
governance improvements in many companies is something that the Big 
Three are both naturally well placed to do, and actually do.185 
Similarly, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock discuss the economies of 
scale advantages that the Big Three have with respect to “recurring 
governance issues,” where they obtain “information in the course of their 
other votes . . . that is material to a current vote they are asked to cast.”186 
These authors stress that, with respect to recurring governance issues, “the 
Big Three are likely to have incentives and information that is superior to 
those of advisors of actively managed funds” and “an inherent advantage” 
that comes from their larger size.187 
As these commentators discuss, a main way in which the Big Three 
contribute to bringing about governance changes they favor is by voting in 
support of shareholder proposals calling for such changes.188 Under Rule 14a-
8, promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, shareholders 
 
 182. See supra section I.E. 
 183. See, e.g., Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, at 
113 (stating that passive investors “might be effective at engaging in widespread, but low-
cost, monitoring of firms’ compliance with what they consider to be best governance 
practices”). 
 184. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 15). 
 185. As the authors write, “[P]assive investors are particularly well-placed to evaluate 
[corporate governance] provisions . . . and to determine whether these provisions are likely, 
as a general matter, to increase or decrease firm value at the majority of portfolio companies. 
They are more likely to internalize any spillover effects that may arise from governance 
provisions.” See id. (manuscript at 18). 
 186. Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 44. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 18) (“Voting on [issues raised by 
shareholder proposals] gives passive investors a powerful tool to pressure issuers for change 
. . . .”). 
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may submit proposals calling for governance changes to be voted on at the 
company’s annual meeting.189 Shareholder proposals advocating governance 
changes that receive majority support commonly lead to companies adopting 
those changes.190 As a result, when governance changes are widely viewed 
by investors as best practice, shareholder proposals advocating such changes 
have been very successful in bringing those changes about in companies that 
have not yet implemented them. For example, shareholder proposals have led 
a large number of public companies to eliminate staggered boards, remove 
supermajority provisions, and adopt majority voting—all governance 
arrangements that have received broad support from investors.191 
However, as we explain below, while the Big Three have contributed to 
obtaining governance changes that their governance principles favor by 
voting for shareholder proposals advocating such changes, they use their 
power to bring about governance changes they favor only in a limited way.192 
In particular, because the Big Three have chosen not to put forward for a vote 
proposals advocating changes they favor and merely vote on proposals 
submitted by others, they have forgone the potential for governance changes 
that they favor in a large number of companies.193 
 
 189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019). 
 190. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’ 
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. Corp. Fin. 53, 
54, 62–64 (2010) (describing empirical evidence on the determinants of the likelihood of 
implementation of shareholder proposals). 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 54 (regarding majority voting); Emiliano M. Catan & Michael 
Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really 
Destroyed Billions in Value? at 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 17-39, 2017) (regarding declassification); Tara Bhandari, Peter Iliev & Jonathan 
Kalodimos, Governance Changes Through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy 
Access 1 (Feb. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635695 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (regarding proxy access). 
 192. The analyses in section II.B.3, including Table 9, are based on shareholder proposal 
data and governance arrangement data from SharkRepellent.net (last visited June 10, 2019). 
Russell 3000 constituent data is also from SharkRepellent.net (last visited June 10, 2019). 
We exclude social responsibility proposals, and proposals that are part of proxy contests. 
Proposals receiving majority support are those for which votes cast in favor represent a 
majority of the votes cast in favor, against, and in abstention. 
 193. In advancing their views that the Big Three perform well with respect to governance 
issues that recur in many situations, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon cite to and rely 
on Appel, Gormley, and Keim. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 8) (citing 
Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, among others, as 
preliminary evidence “that the effect of [passive investor stewardship] has been to improve 
both governance and performance”). The Appel, Gormley, and Keim study reported that 
increased holdings by index funds are associated with certain governance improvements, 
including greater board independence, a removal of takeover defenses, and a lower 
likelihood of unequal voting rights. See Appel et al, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 
 
2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 77 
Table 9 reports data on shareholder proposals during the five-year period 
2014-2018. As Table 9 indicates, during the five-year period from 2014 
through 2018, approximately 1,500 shareholder proposals were submitted to 
companies in the Russell 3000 index, and more than 300 of those proposals 
received majority support. Table 9 also reports on the three types of proposals 
that received majority support most frequently: (i) proposals to declassify the 
board of directors, (ii) proposals to eliminate supermajority requirements to 
amend certain provisions of the company’s charter or bylaws (or both), and 
(iii) proposals to require that receiving a majority of votes cast, rather than a 
plurality, be necessary for directors to be to elected. As Table 9 shows, there 
were approximately 50 successful proposals of each kind over the five-year 
period, and approximately 150 such successful proposals in total. 
 
supra note 150, at 114. Importantly, however, a full acceptance of the findings of Appel, 
Gormley, and Keim in no way addresses the concerns raised in this section about the failure 
of the Big Three to advance governance changes they support by bringing shareholder 
proposals in a large number of portfolio companies that do not have these improvements. 
 Appel, Gormley, and Keim find that increased holdings by index finds are associated 
with some reduction in the incidence of governance arrangements that the voting guidelines 
of the Big Three oppose. For example, they report that “[a] one standard deviation increase 
in ownership by passive funds is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of removing a poison pill and a 2.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
reducing restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.” Id. Because such 
eliminations of antitakeover defenses often result from the passage of shareholder proposals 
calling for such removal, and because the Big Three commonly vote for such removal, such 
an association is only to be expected. But our analysis in this section does not question that 
the strong governance preferences of the Big Three—as expressed through their votes on 
relevant shareholder proposals—have an effect. Rather, the main point of our analysis is to 
raise concerns as to the extent to which the Big Three take actions to use their power to get 
their preferences implemented, and to bring about governance improvements on the large 
scale that their power and holdings would allow. 
 What we have explained is that, if the Big Three did not limit themselves to being merely 
reactive and supporting the governance changes only in those situations in which other 
shareholders submit shareholder proposals, and if they instead took an active role, they would 
be able to bring about the changes that their own voting guidelines view as desirable at many, 
or most, of the public companies in their portfolios that currently do not have the 
arrangements they favor. The results reported by Appel, Gormley, and Keim are consistent 
with, and do not question, the importance of this concern. 
 Finally, we note that the commentators relying on the Appel, Gormley, and Keim study 
do not engage with subsequent empirical work that reports findings that increased holdings 
by index funds is associated with certain adverse governance effects. See Cornelius Schmidt 
& Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect 
Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 293–94 (2017) (finding that 
increases in passive ownership increase the likelihood that a CEO becomes chairman or 
president and that fewer new independent directors will be appointed). 
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Table 9. Submission of Shareholder Proposals 
Year Shareholder 
Proposals 












2014 289 64 16 7 14 
2015 377 105 13 8 8 
2016 302 80 5 10 17 
2017 245 55 5 13 9 
2018 285 39 7 9 3 
Total 1,498 343 46 47 51 
 
The Big Three’s voting guidelines express broad support for proposals to 
introduce annual elections, eliminate supermajority requirements, or adopt 
majority voting.194 Consistent with these guidelines, our review indicates that 
BlackRock and SSGA voted in favor of a majority the proposals in each 
category each year for the five-year period we consider, and Vanguard voted 
in favor of a majority of proposals to introduce annual elections and majority 
voting each year for that period. 
However, while the Big Three have been very active in supporting 
proposals advocating governance changes favored by their governance 
principles, they have completely refrained from initiating such proposals. Our 
review of the approximately 1,500 shareholder proposals submitted during 
the examined five-year period did not identify a single proposal submitted by 
any of the Big Three. To be sure, it is unsurprising that none of the Big Three 
submitted any proposals in the categories that they generally do not support. 
Our concern, however, is that each of the Big Three also chose not to submit 
any proposals of the type that they generally do support.195 
We would like to discuss an argument that might be made in an attempt 
 
 194. For examples of proxy voting guidelines supporting such proposals, see BlackRock, 
Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra note 158, at 2–6; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and 
Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111; Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra 
note 111, at 16–17. 
 195. Consistent with the evidence we provide, a BlackRock release notes that “we have 
never filed a shareholder proposal on any company’s proxy statement.” BlackRock, 
Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 10. But BlackRock does not explain how the 
interests of investors in its funds are served by its choice not to file shareholder proposals, 
even when companies have been persistently unresponsive to BlackRock’s concerns over a 
long period. 
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to “justify” and reconcile the Big Three’s avoidance of shareholder proposal 
submissions reflecting their governance principles with the value-
maximization view. First, it might be argued that the Big Three have no need 
to submit shareholder proposals because all the proposals that would serve 
the interests of their beneficial investors are already being submitted by 
others. But many shareholder proponents have much more limited resources 
than the Big Three. As a result, many proposals that the Big Three would 
support are not submitted at all or are submitted only after a delay of many 
years. 
In particular, a large proportion of the Big Three’s portfolio companies 
have classified boards rather than annual elections, supermajority rather than 
regular majority requirements to amend charters and bylaws, and plurality 
voting rather than majority voting. As of June 30, 2019, 1,157 companies in 
the Russell 3000 (39% of Russell 3000 companies) had classified boards; 
1,681 (56%) companies required a supermajority to amend certain provisions 
of the charter or bylaws (or both); and 1,440 (48%) companies had plurality 
voting, rather than majority voting. 
Annual elections, regular majorities for charter and bylaw amendments, 
and majority voting are all arrangements called for by the Big Three’s voting 
guidelines.196 But the great majority of those portfolio companies have yet to 
receive shareholder proposals calling for such arrangements. Any of the Big 
Three submitting proposals advocating those changes would likely have led 
to their adoption by many companies. Given the Big Three’s focus on 
governance arrangements in general, their support for these arrangements in 
particular, and the effectiveness of shareholder proposals in obtaining such 
arrangements, it would be natural to expect them to make extensive use of 
shareholder proposals at those companies.197 
By refraining from submitting shareholder proposals, the Big Three 
enable many portfolio companies to maintain governance arrangements that 
are inconsistent with the Big Three’s governance principles. As a result, 
consistent with the agency-costs view, the Big Three’s stewardship activities 
 
 196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 197. In discussing how shareholder proposals can bring about improvement in 
governance arrangements, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon note that “issuers are 
responsive to the interests of large investors and will frequently modify their policies rather 
than putting issues to a vote that they expect to lose.” Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript 
at 19) (citing Rob Bauer, Frank Moers & Michael Viehs, Who Withdraws Shareholder 
Proposals and Does It Matter? An Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 Corp. 
Governance 472 (2015)). Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon are correct that submission 
of shareholder proposals sometimes brings about governance improvements without the need 
for the proposal to go to vote. But they do not engage with the evidence that the Big Three 
do not submit any shareholder proposals, and therefore do not lead companies to reach a 
settlement that would avoid a vote. 
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serve their beneficial investors significantly less than they could. Thus, the 
Big Three’s practice of voting consistently for shareholder proposals 
advocating certain changes yet never initiating such proposals is difficult to 
reconcile with the value-maximization view. 
This reactive-only approach, however, is both consistent with and can be 
explained by the agency-costs view. Whereas corporate managers have come 
to expect and accept the Big Three voting reactively for shareholder proposals 
advocating changes consistent with governance best practices, corporate 
managers might view the proactive submission of proposals as adversarial or 
even confrontational. Although a reactive-only approach to shareholder 
proposals does not serve the interests of the Big Three’s beneficial investors, 
it is consistent with the deference incentives that we have identified. 
4. Contributing to Corporate Governance Legal Reforms 
The Big Three’s beneficial investors would benefit from having their 
index fund managers contribute to corporate governance reforms that are 
likely to have a material effect on their portfolio companies. The Big Three 
could serve their investors’ interests by either facilitating desirable rule 
changes or impeding undesirable changes. Commentators have long observed 
that index fund investors have an especially keen interest in rule changes that 
could enhance the value of a large number of companies, even by a small 
amount.198 
Supporters of index fund stewardship argue that index fund managers 
have substantial advantages over other kinds of investors in bringing about 
similar governance improvements in a large number of firms. This view also 
implies that index fund stewardship would include facilitating legal reforms 
that would apply to a large number of companies.199 Indeed, given the Big 
Three’s focus on governance practices, supporters of index fund stewardship 
have argued that the Big Three are well positioned to contribute in this way.200 
For instance, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon argue that “[p]assive 
investors regularly comment upon and call for change to the rules adopted by 
 
 198. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: 
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1991) (“[I]ndexed 
institutional investor[s] should seek a corporate governance system that . . . can improve the 
performance of all companies.”). 
 199. See supra notes 183–187 and accompanying text. 
 200. For such arguments by supporters of index fund stewardship, see, e.g., Eckstein, 
supra note 134 (manuscript at 30–38) (arguing that the broad ownership of the Big Three 
gives them incentives to address “macro-legal risks” that apply to significant numbers of 
their portfolio companies); Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 29–30) (discussing index 
fund managers’ active influence on regulatory policy). 
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SEC under the federal securities laws.”201 Yet these commentators do not 
provide any empirical evidence in this study, and they do not engage with the 
empirical evidence provided in this section that the Big Three’s participation 
in the comment process is, in fact, very limited. 
In this section we provide empirical evidence about two key ways in 
which institutional investors can seek to influence legal rules regarding public 
companies: by commenting on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate 
governance, and by filing amicus curiae briefs in significant precedential 
litigation in this field.202 We find that the Big Three have participated very 
little in either of these activities. Instead, our analysis reveals a pattern of the 
Big Three systematically staying on the sidelines on those decisions and 
generally avoiding expressing any position or preference with respect to SEC 
proposals and judicial precedential decisions under consideration. We explain 
that systematically staying on the sidelines does not serve the interests of 
index fund investors but is consistent with the private incentives of index fund 
managers. 
(a) SEC Comment Letters. By submitting comments on proposed SEC 
rules, commenters can influence SEC rulemaking. Under the value-
maximization view, since the Big Three hold more than 20% of the equity in 
large corporations,203 they should be expected to frequently express their 
views on proposed SEC rules. Clearly, when a Big Three manager views a 
proposed SEC rule as desirable or undesirable, submitting a comment would 
help increase the value of portfolio companies, or avoid value decreases. 
Furthermore, even if the index fund manager viewed a proposed rule as 
practically insignificant for investor interests, expressing this view could still 
 
 201. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 29). 
 202. The analyses in section II.B.4(a), including Table 10, regarding SEC comment 
letters are based on a review of comment letters submitted for SEC proposed rules and which 
are listed on the SEC webpage for each proposed rule. The total number of comments for 
asset owners are less than the sum of comments by CalPERS and CalSTRS as several 
comments were submitted jointly. The Big Three comments in Table 10 include two letters 
from subsidiaries of State Street Corporation that operate different businesses from SSGA. 
For SEC webpages of proposed rules, see Proposed Rules, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml [https://perma.cc/7UGK-LB5L] (last visited Sept. 
8, 2019). 
 The analyses in section II.B.4(b) regarding amicus curiae briefs, including Table 11, are 
based on a review of the dockets and decisions for the cases listed in Table 11. For the 
Supreme Court decisions listed in Table 11, the amicus briefs considered include those 
submitted regarding petitions for certiorari. 
 203. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 733–34 
(presenting evidence that the Big Three held 20.5% of the equity of S&P 500 companies in 
2017). 
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benefit the manager’s beneficial investors by directing the SEC’s limited 
resources and attention to changes with greater potential to benefit investors. 
We hand-collected from the SEC website all comments on SEC proposed 
rules regarding corporate governance during the twenty-four-year period 
from 1995 through 2018. We found 80 proposed rules regarding corporate 
governance during this period, and we reviewed all comments submitted in 
relation to each of these rules. As Table 10 indicates, each of the Big Three 
submitted comments on only one or two of the twenty proposed rules that 
attracted the most comments. By comparison, the two largest asset owners, 
CalPERS and CalSTRS—whose assets are largely indexed but are very small 
compared to those managed by the Big Three—submitted comments on 
twelve and seven proposed rules, respectively. A similar picture emerges 
when we examine the larger set of proposed rules that received relatively less 
attention. Of those sixty proposed rules, each of the Big Three submitted 
comments with respect to no more than four rules (less than 10%). In contrast, 
CalPERS and CalSTRS submitted comments with respect to nine and eight 
rules, respectively.204 
 
 204. Some commentators who view index fund stewardship favorably have 
noted that index fund managers conduct meetings with regulators. See Fisch et al., supra note 
16, at 30 (discussing such meetings); Eckstein, supra note 134, (manuscript at 45) (same). 
The SEC website discloses all meetings held by SEC personnel with respect to proposed 
rules. We collected data from the website about meetings that the Big Three and the largest 
asset owners conduct with the SEC regarding the universe of proposed rules considered in 
Table 10. The Big Three conducted a total of 5 meetings with the SEC, regarding 2 proposed 
rules, all of which were in the most commented 25% of rules: BlackRock conducted no 
meetings, Vanguard conducted 3 total meetings on 2 proposals, and SSGA conducted 2 
meetings on a single proposal. In contrast, the two largest asset owners conducted 14 
meetings with the SEC, regarding 6 different proposed rules. 
Considering how many SEC proposed rules the Big Three engaged with in any way—
either commenting or meeting with the SEC—increases their incidence of engagement with 
proposed rules slightly but does not qualitatively change the results reported in Table 10; that 
incidence remains low and considerably below that of the two largest asset managers. In 
particular, when both comments and meetings are considered, out of the 20 proposed rules 
that attracted highest number of comments, BlackRock engaged with 1 proposed rule, 
Vanguard 3, and SSGA 3. Furthermore, because none of the Big Three conducted meetings 
with respect to the proposed rules in less commented 75% of proposed rules, including 
meetings in the analysis does not change any of the figures in Table 10 that relate to those 
proposed rules. 
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Table 10. Involvement in SEC Proposed Rules  
Regarding Corporate Governance 
 
Index Fund Managers Asset Owners 
BlackRock Vanguard SSGA Total CalPERS CalSTRS Total 
Most Commented 25% 
of Proposed Rules (20) 
       
Comments 1 3 2 6 19 16 34 
Comments per 
Proposed Rule 
0.05 0.15 0.10 0.30 0.95 0.80 1.70 
Proposed Rules 
Commented On 




5% 10% 10% 25% 60% 35% 60% 
Remaining 75% of 
Proposed Rules (60) 
       
Comments 1 3 1 5 14 9 22 
Comments per 
Proposed Rule 
0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.37 
Proposed Rules 
Commented On 




2% 5% 2% 8% 23% 15% 25% 
 
It could be argued that another explanation for our findings is that the 
Big Three consider filing comments with the SEC to be a futile exercise, since 
they may expect them to have little effect on the SEC’s decisions.205 
Following this view, the submission of a large number of comments by 
others, rather than the infrequent submission of comments by the Big Three, 
should be viewed as surprising. But the SEC releases issued following a 
comment process often cite and discuss submitted comments,206 and there is 
 
 205. We are grateful to Stephen Davidoff Solomon and Stephen Fraidin for stressing the 
usefulness of considering this objection. 
 206. To illustrate, the SEC’s final rule regarding Pay Ratio Disclosure referred to 250 
different comment letters and its final rule regarding Conflict Minerals referred to 247 
different comments. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9877, 80 Fed. Reg. 
50103 (Aug. 18, 2015); Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
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little reason to view the submission of comments by many profit-making 
players (such as issuers) as irrational or wasteful. 
Moreover, and importantly, even if we were to accept that the average 
comment submitted by investors should be expected to have no effect on SEC 
decisions, it would be unlikely that a comment filed by one of the Big Three 
would have the same lack of effect. Instead, if one or more Big Three 
managers took a clear position on proposed SEC rule, the trillions of dollars 
of their equity investments, and the breadth of their investments across all 
significant U.S. public companies, would likely give substantial weight to 
their comment and cause the SEC to give it significant attention. 
We note that four of the six final SEC rules that resulted from the 25 
most-commented rule proposals cited comments by the Big Three. For 
instance, the SEC’s final rule in 2010 regarding proxy access, Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, referenced Vanguard’s comment letter 16 
times,207 and the SEC’s Amendments to Regulation SHO in 2009 referred to 
two comment letters from Vanguard a total of twelve times.208 Views 
expressed by the Big Three on corporate governance matters also often attract 
substantial attention and commentary from prominent advisory firms, the 
media, and other institutional investors.209 Thus, the common tendency of the 
Big Three to stay on the sidelines and avoid filing SEC comments stating 
their position is unlikely to be explained by a general expectation that doing 
so could be expected to have no effect on SEC considerations. 
(b) Amicus Curiae Briefs in Precedential Litigation. Supporters of index 
fund stewardship have claimed that “[i]nstitutional investors now regularly 
file amicus briefs.”210 We therefore examine the submission of amicus briefs 
in cases important for protecting and enhancing the value of index fund 
portfolios. 
Table 11 presents data from 2008 through 2017 on the ten cases of 
 
 207. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
 208. Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232, 11238, 11246, 11248, 11251, 
11272, 11292-94, 11313 (Mar. 10, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242 (2018)). In addition, 
the SEC’s final rule, Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6020, 6029 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 
240, 249 & 274), referred to Vanguard’s comment letter five times, and the SEC’s Securities 
Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722, 44745, 44767 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249 & 274), referred to SSGA’s comment letter twice. 
 209. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text (detailing examples of prominent 
law firms and media reports referring to changes in the corporate governance policies of the 
Big Three). 
 210. See Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 30 & n.191) (citing a blog post as 
“reporting that BlackRock signed an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for 
marriage equality for same sex couples”). 
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precedential litigation regarding investor protection that the Council of 
Institutional Investors identified as sufficiently important to warrant the filing 
of an amicus brief.211 We reviewed the filings in each of these cases to identify 
all of the briefs submitted. Eight of the ten cases gathered a significant 
number of amicus curiae briefs, with six of the ten drawing between 10 and 
30 briefs. Consistent with the possibility that amicus briefs could have an 
influence, our review indicated that seven of the ten judicial decisions cited 
amicus briefs, with five of those ten decisions citing more than one amicus 
brief. 
Reviewing the filed briefs, we find that the two largest asset owners, 
CalPERS and CalSTRS, filed their own briefs or joined the Council of 
Institutional Investors’ brief in four of the ten cases. Their assets are largely 
indexed, although in each case less than 5% of the assets under management 
were held by BlackRock. But our review of the filings indicated that none of 
the Big Three filed a single amicus curiae brief in any of the ten cases of 
precedential litigation that we consider. In these cases, the voices of the Big 
Three, which represent more than 20% of corporate equities, were not heard. 
 
 211. We are grateful to the General Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) 
for providing us with this list. We did not include CII amicus briefs submitted in cases that 
were not related to corporate governance, such as a case relating to stock market regulation, 
or an amicus brief in support of a petition for certiorari that was denied. These exclusions 
did not affect our results as none of the Big Three submitted amicus briefs in any of these 
cases. 
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Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
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Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
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Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010) 
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Merck & Co. v. Richard Reynold, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) 15  
New York State Teachers’ Retirement System v. The Mercury 
Pension Fund Group, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) 
1  
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 
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13  
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 6 ** 
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(2014) 
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Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Communications 
Corp., 792 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2015) 
3  
✓✓ Briefs filed separately by both of the asset owners 
** Brief filed by both of the asset owners, jointly with CII 
 
* * * 
Thus, although supporters of index fund stewardship have argued that 
the Big Three are well positioned to contribute to legal reforms affecting a 
large number of public companies, our evidence indicates that their activities 
in this regard are very modest. Indeed, the Big Three have collectively 
contributed fewer comments on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate 
governance, and fewer amicus briefs in precedential litigation, than the two 
largest asset owners, which have corporate equities with an aggregate value 
that is less than 5% of the assets under management of BlackRock or 
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Vanguard.212 
Under the value-maximization view, more involvement should be 
expected from investors that collectively hold more than $5 trillion in 
corporate equities. But the reluctance of the Big Three to contribute to 
corporate governance reforms is consistent with, and can be explained by, the 
incentives identified by the agency-costs view described in section I.C. The 
incentives of the Big Three to defer to corporate managers discourage them 
from supporting reforms that strengthen shareholder rights. At the same time, 
the Big Three’s interest in reducing the salience of their deference gives them 
incentives not to oppose such reforms. Thus, the interests of the Big Three 
are likely served by generally staying on the sidelines and not lending their 
influential support either in favor of or against such reforms. 
5. Involvement in Securities Litigation 
Securities litigation provides an important instrument for deterring 
misconduct by corporate insiders, and for compensating investors if such 
misconduct occurs. The “lead plaintiff” that is selected in any securities class 
action plays a significant role in navigating the litigation. The lead plaintiff 
chooses class counsel, sets the terms of engagement with class counsel, and 
oversees the terms of any settlement, including monetary recovery and 
prospective corporate governance changes required as part of the settlement. 
Since the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) in 1995, securities law has followed a presumption that the plaintiff 
with the largest financial interest in a class action should be the lead 
plaintiff.213 This reflects a view that it is advantageous for investors to have 
an institutional investor with significant “skin in the game” to play the role 
of lead plaintiff, because such investors have the greatest incentive and ability 
to monitor the litigation and ensure that it is conducted in the interest of 
investors.214 
 
 212. As of June 30, 2018, CalPERS held U.S. equities with an aggregate market value 
of $84.7 billion, and CalSTRS held U.S. equities with an aggregate market value of $65.0 
billion. See 2017–2018 Annual Investment Report, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (2018), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/annual-investment-report-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N8RQ-XXPD]; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report 117 (2018), https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/cafr2018.pdf?1546017967 [https://perma.cc/9YQE-TAUT] (listing a global 
equity portfolio of $120.3 billion, of which 54% was held in U.S. equities). 
 213. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2012). 
 214. For an influential article written during the debate leading to the passage of the 
PSLRA that advocated having institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, see Elliott J. 
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors 
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With over $5 trillion in corporate equities, the Big Three’s beneficial 
investors have significant monetary interests in the outcome of many 
securities class actions. The legal rules and policies of the PSLRA suggest 
that the interests of these investors are best served by having the Big Three—
institutional investors with very substantial skin in the game—play the role 
of lead plaintiffs in significant securities class actions. As lead plaintiffs the 
Big Three could help to ensure that the outcome of those actions would best 
serve investors. Among other things, they could ensure that class counsel has 
adequate incentives and that corporate governance reforms are part of any 
settlement where they are necessary.215 However, as we show below, the Big 
Three have also chosen to “stay on the sidelines” with respect to the 
leadership of securities litigation. 
To identify the decisions made by the Big Three in this area, we examine 
the extent to which the Big Three served as lead plaintiffs in significant 
securities cases during the twelve-year period from 2007 through 2018.216 
Table 12 presents data that we gathered regarding the incidence of securities 
class actions over that period. To avoid marginal cases that are more likely to 
be frivolous we focus on cases settled for more than $10 million, and the 
subset of those cases settled for more than $100 million. These cases can be 
expected to be brought regardless of who serves as lead plaintiff. As they are 
likely to take place in any event, there are significant benefits for investors 
from having the litigation overseen by a lead plaintiff with substantial skin in 
the game. Table 12 shows that 408 class actions settled for more than $10 
million from 2007 through 2018, with total recovery of $43.3 billion. Of these 
 
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2121 (1995) 
(“[I]nstitutional investors could realize substantial benefits by serving as lead plaintiffs in 
class actions.”). 
 215. One commentator responded to our analysis in this section by arguing that there are 
legal complexities, grounded in the difference between the characteristics of index funds and 
those of other investors, which might preclude index funds from obtaining a lead plaintiff 
position even when they have a large stake. See Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 
53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40–41), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3430643 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). But in 
some well-known cases, public pension funds have served as lead plaintiffs, even though—
as John Coates explains—the equity portfolios of many public pension funds are largely 
based on portfolios that are passively managed based on broad indexes. See Coates, supra 
note 16, at 10–11. For an example of a class action led by CalPERS, see In re UnitedHealth 
Group Inc. PSLRA Litigation, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Minn. 2019). Furthermore, Platt 
does not cite any cases in which courts have turned down requests to appoint one of Big 
Three as lead plaintiffs. 
 216. The analyses in section II.B.5, including Table 12, are based on securities class 
action settlement data from Institutional Shareholder Services’ Securities Class Action 
Database (last visited July 2, 2019). Cases involving multiple or partial settlements are 
included in the year in which the settlement was made but only if the aggregate settlement 
for that case has exceeded $10 million or $100 million, as appropriate. 
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408 cases, 90 settled for more than $100 million, with total recovery of $32.8 
billion. 
Table 12. Securities Class Action Cases 
Year 
Cases Settled for 
over $10m 
Total Recovery in 
Cases Settled for 
over $10m ($m) 
Cases Settled 
for over $100m 
Total Recovery 
in Cases Settled 
for over $100m 
($m) 
2007 39 $6,507 9 $5,501 
2008 35 $1,896 5 $922 
2009 42 $4,451 10 $3,656 
2010 39 $2,013 6 $950 
2011 29 $2,813 6 $1,910 
2012 29 $2,816 8 $1,939 
2013 34 $5,822 9 $5,000 
2014 30 $1,776 4 $940 
2015 34 $4,654 12 $3,993 
2016 39 $4,692 13 $3,793 
2017 30 $1,409 3 $527 
2018 28 $4,485 5 $3,695 
Total 408 $43,335 90 $32,827 
 
For the reasons discussed above, the Big Three’s beneficial investors 
could well have benefited from having their fund managers serve as lead 
plaintiff in some of these significant securities class actions. But our review 
of the data indicates that none of the Big Three served as lead plaintiff in any 
of these securities class actions during the ten-year period that we 
examined.217 
 
 217. Responding to our analysis in this section, Alexander Platt argues that, although the 
Big Three have indeed avoided taking any lead plaintiff positions, they have in some cases 
taken direct action, or opted out of class action litigation and pursued claims against 
defendants separately. See Platt, supra note 215 (manuscript at 41–43). However, Platt notes 
only a handful of cases in which such direct actions or opt-outs took place, and an empirical 
study cited by Platt reports that, out of the 1,458 securities litigation cases reviewed between 
1996 to 2014, only twenty cases involved opt-outs by “other institutional investors,” in which 
broad category the study included mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investment 
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The avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions by the Big Three is in 
tension with the value-maximization view.218 But this pattern is consistent 
with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view and its incentive 
analysis.219 First, the empirical pattern is consistent with the incentive to 
underinvest in stewardship.220 If an index fund manager serving as lead 
plaintiff in a significant class action would increase portfolio value by $1 
million, doing so is efficient if the marginal investment in stewardship 
required is less than $1 million. However, if the index fund manager has a 
fractional share of 1%, serving as lead plaintiff position is not in the 
manager’s interests if the additional marginal stewardship investment 
required would exceed $10,000. 
Similarly, the avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions is also consistent 
with the Big Three’s deference incentives.221 Being an effective lead plaintiff 
may require taking strong positions against certain corporate managers, 
which corporate managers may view unfavorably. At the same time, because 
decisions made in securities class actions are public, lead plaintiffs’ decisions 
can be scrutinized. For a Big Three lead plaintiff to be excessively deferential 
toward corporate managers would make that deference more salient to 
outsiders. Avoiding lead plaintiff positions allows index fund managers to 
avoid both frictions and undesirable perceptions. 
In response to our analysis it could be argued that it is not surprising that 
index fund managers avoid service as lead plaintiffs because they would not 
consider serving as a lead plaintiff to be economically worthwhile.222 
 
companies. See id. (manuscript at 17 n.100) (citing Amir Rozen, Brendan Rudolph & 
Christopher Harris, Opt-Out Cases in Securities Class Action Settlements: 2012–2014 
Update 3 (2016)). Likely many fewer than twenty of these cases involved opt-outs by any of 
the Big Three. See id. (noting also that “the most common plaintiffs in opt-outs are pension 
funds. Pension funds were present in 21 out of these 43 opt-out cases during 1996 to 2014.”). 
Furthermore, the few cases of opt-outs do not explain why none of the Big Three took any 
lead plaintiff positions in the very large number of cases in which such opt-outs did not take 
place. In those cases, becoming the lead plaintiff would have enabled an index fund manager 
to lead the litigation while having their litigation costs shared with the rest of the securities 
class. 
 218. See supra section I.C. 
 219. See supra section I.C. For a related discussion of why large investment managers 
do not become lead plaintiffs, see David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and 
Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class 
and Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 907, 920–33 (2013); David H. Webber, 
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 201, 217–23 (2015). 
 220. See supra section I.D. 
 221. See supra section I.E. 
 222. For articles expressing such a view, see, for example, Platt, supra note 215 
(manuscript at 41 n.209) (citing James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff 
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. 
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However, this is exactly our point: Avoiding such positions is indeed 
consistent with the cost-benefit analysis of the index fund manager from their 
private economic perspective, even when taking such a position would serve 
the interests of the index fund’s beneficial investors. It is for this reason that 
the avoidance of lead plaintiff positions, like the other patterns documented 
in this Part, is consistent with the agency-costs view of index fund 
stewardship. 
III. POLICY 
Our analysis in Part I has identified the incentives of index fund 
managers to underinvest in stewardship and to defer to corporate managers, 
and Part II has shown empirical evidence consistent with the significant 
influence of these incentives. In this Part we turn to the policy implications 
of our analysis. 
We begin in section III.A by discussing a number of regulatory measures 
that would address these incentive problems, as well as some that should be 
avoided. In each case, we do not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
each measure or to give a blueprint for its implementation; rather, we wish to 
put these measures on the table for subsequent discussion as partial solutions 
to the considerable problems that we have identified. Our aim is also not to 
present an exhaustive identification of approaches that should be considered, 
but to highlight the availability of a range of measures for consideration and 
the potential benefits of reforms in this area. 
In section III.B we turn to the significant implications that our analysis 
holds for two important ongoing debates in the corporate law field. We 
discuss the heated debates on common ownership (section III.B.1) and on 
hedge fund activism (section III.B.2). In both cases, we explain how our 
analysis undermines claims made in these debates, introduces new issues into 
the debates, and calls for revision of positions taken in the debates. 
Finally, in section III.C, we comment on a more direct avenue through 
which our analysis could impact stewardship. We argue that, because index 
fund managers care about how their stewardship is viewed and wish to be 
perceived as good stewards, this is an area in which the mere recognition of 
incentive problems by the public might have an effect on index fund manager 
behavior. In particular, public recognition of the problems we analyze can 
induce index fund managers to make changes that would reduce the force of 
 
Rev. 1587, 1602–10 (2006)); Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional 
Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
471, 472 (2008). A similar point was raised by Stephen Fraidin, a discussant of this Article 
at the 2019 NYU Roundtable on Corporate Governance. 
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those problems. 
A. Regulatory Reforms 
We begin this Part’s analysis by considering what should and should not 
be considered to address the incentive problems that we have identified and 
documented in the preceding Parts of this Article. Section III.A.1 starts by 
explaining why precluding index funds from voting, or requiring them to 
adopt “pass-through” voting, should not be considered as solutions to the 
problems we identify. In section III.A.2–III.A.6 we focus in turn on five types 
of measures that should be considered, either individually or in combination: 
measures to encourage the use of stewardship tools by index fund managers; 
measures to address problems arising from business relationships; measures 
to bring transparency to private engagements; reconsideration of the 
application of Section 13(d) to index funds; and measures to limit the 
aggregate amount of assets managed by each index fund manager. 
1. Letting Index Fund Managers Vote  
Before discussing regulatory reforms that would be worthwhile for 
policymakers to consider, we would like to note two approaches that are not 
worthy of further consideration as solutions to the problems we identify. 
Given our analysis of the agency problems with the stewardship decisions of 
index fund managers, a natural response may be to suggest eliminating or 
reducing the power of index fund managers to make stewardship decisions. 
In particular, we discuss below two alternative approaches in this direction: 
One is to “disenfranchise” index funds by precluding them from affecting the 
outcome of corporate votes; the other is to require index funds to adopt pass-
through voting that would enable decisions to be made by beneficial investors 
rather than index fund managers. We explain below why we view each of 
these measures as unwarranted and counterproductive. 
(a) Taking voting power from index funds. Dorothy Shapiro Lund has 
made a provocative and widely-noticed proposal to address problems with 
index fund stewardship by precluding index fund managers from voting.223 
 
 223. A proposal to preclude any voting by index funds was put forward in Lund, supra 
note 16, as well as in a subsequent op-ed article, M. Todd Henderson & Dorothy Shapiro 
Lund, Opinion, Index Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, Wall 
St. J. (June 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-great-for-investors-
risky-for-corporate-governance-1498170623 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a 
proposal that would preclude index fund voting on all matters other than contested elections, 
see Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Voting 
Authority (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 463/2019, 2019), 
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Under one version of this approach, the votes associated with shares held by 
index funds would not count at all.224 This would result in an increase in the 
power of corporate insiders that could adversely affect all public investors. 
Under an alternative version designed to address the pro-management voting 
behavior of index fund managers, the votes associated with the shares held 
by index funds would be voted in the same way and in the same proportions 
as the votes cast by shareholders other than index funds and corporate 
insiders.225 In this version, the voting power of index funds would essentially 
pass to those shareholders that are not index funds or corporate insiders, 
whom we refer to as the “nonindexed public investors.” 
We do not support such a transfer of voting power from index funds to 
nonindexed public investors.226 Although this Article has focused on the 
problems with index fund stewardship, the existence of these problems does 
not imply that the voting decisions of nonindexed public investors are, on the 
whole, superior to those of index funds. Although supporters of this approach 
oppose index fund voting on the grounds that index funds are insufficiently 
informed,227 they fail to consider the problems with voting by nonindexed 
public investors. However, most individual retail investors are likely to have 
considerably weaker incentives to acquire information about the 
consequences of upcoming votes than index funds, and as a result are likely 
to be considerably less informed. Furthermore, we explain elsewhere that a 
careful comparison of the incentives of active mutual funds managers and 
those of index fund managers does not suggest that active mutual fund 
managers are generally likely to invest more in informing themselves about 
voting decisions than index fund managers.228 We therefore oppose taking 
away voting power from index funds. 
(b) Taking voting power from index fund managers. As an alternative to 
taking voting power from index funds, several authors have suggested taking 
voting power from the managers of index funds. These authors advocate 
 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404298 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Concerns about 
index fund voting have also been expressed by Weil, supra note 115 (arguing that because 
passive investors dedicate limited energy to voting, “[t]he SEC should acknowledge the 
diluting effect of these votes and reverse their guidance on abstentions”). 
 224. See Lund, supra note 16, at 528–30. 
 225. See id. at 530–31. 
 226. Unsurprisingly, neither do index fund managers. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do, 
supra note 34, at 7 (“If Vanguard didn’t speak on behalf of its more than 20 million investors, 
whose voice would hold sway? That of activists? Company management? Proxy advisors?”). 
 227. See Lund, supra note 16, at 513, 529 (arguing that the “low-cost, unthinking 
approach to governance” of index fund managers risks doing “more harm than good,” and, 
more generally, that permitting index funds to vote hurts investors). 
 228. For our analysis of this issue, see generally Bebchuk & Hirst, Active Mutual Funds, 
supra note 22. 
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“pass-through” requirements that would enable the beneficial investors of 
index funds to determine how the votes associated with the funds’ shares will 
be cast.229 We view such requirements as also unwarranted, for three reasons. 
First, implementing full pass-through arrangements would involve 
substantial practical difficulties and expense.230 Consider an individual who 
is a beneficial investor in an S&P 500 index fund. The individual would be 
asked each year to make voting decisions on all the proposals that will go to 
a vote at the annual meetings of each of the hundreds of companies in the 
S&P 500, which would likely amount to thousands of proposals each year.231 
Even putting aside the costs to index fund investors of informing themselves 
about those proposals, merely communicating thousands of voting decisions 
each year would not be feasible for most index fund investors. 
Second, even if these index fund investors could hypothetically 
determine their preferences with respect to each of a vast number of votes 
without substantial effort or expense, the voting decisions of index funds 
produced by this process would likely be based on very little information. 
The great majority of individual beneficial investors would have little or no 
information about the thousands of proposals on which the index fund would 
have to cast votes. Having decisions made in a centralized fashion for the 
portfolio as a whole produces large economies of scale compared with the 
pass-through approach. By forgoing these economies, the pass-through 
approach would produce a process that would be both costly and uninformed. 
Finally, a pass-through approach to voting would not permit index funds 
to use their substantial voting power to produce benefits through engagement. 
If an index fund manager did not have the power to determine how to cast the 
 
 229. For other articles proposing pass-through voting as a mandatory or default 
arrangement, see, e.g., Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the 
Index Fund Giants, Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34–35), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365222 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Griffith, supra 
note 223, at 33–43; Lund, supra note 16, at 530–31. An earlier article by one of us explained 
why investment managers may choose to poll their beneficial investors regarding their 
preferences on certain matters to assist in determining their voting policies. See Hirst, supra 
note 31, at 237–40. 
 230. For an earlier version of this objection to pass-through voting by one of us, see 
Hirst, supra note 31, at 237–38. 
 231. Some authors suggest pass-through voting arrangements in which beneficial 
investors would give general principles in advance or designate an agent to choose their 
preferred vote, instead of reporting preferences on each decision. See, e.g., Griffin, supra 
note 229 (manuscript at 34–35). But if index fund investors were to provide some general 
principles or preferences, those would not determine many votes and thus would leave 
significant discretion to the investment manager. And if index fund investors were asked to 
choose an agent for selecting their preferred voting decision, this would require the investors 
to inform themselves adequately regarding the agent and the quality of its decisions, which 
would again be impractical for many index fund investors. 
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votes associated with shares held by the fund, then portfolio companies would 
have little incentive to listen to the index fund manager, and the index fund 
manager would have commensurately little ability to influence the company 
through such engagement. At the same time, the dispersed nature of the index 
fund investors that would determine how votes are cast means that they are 
unable to effectively communicate or engage with portfolio companies. Thus, 
a pass-through approach would eliminate any potential benefits from 
stewardship activities other than voting. 
2. Encouraging Investment in Stewardship 
We now turn to regulatory reforms that in our view should be considered. 
The evidence that we presented in section II.A.1 shows that, consistent with 
our incentive analysis, the Big Three make investments in stewardship that 
are very small relative to the number of their portfolio companies and the 
value of their equity assets: Each allocates to stewardship less than 0.2% of 
their estimated fees and devotes, on average, only a few thousand dollars in 
stewardship costs to large positions.232 These levels of stewardship are likely 
to be less than optimal from the collective perspective of index fund 
investors, who would be better off if all index fund managers were to increase 
their investments in stewardship and pass on the costs to their beneficial 
investors. 
Policymakers should explore ways to encourage index fund managers to 
move towards these higher levels of stewardship investment. As we explain 
below, because current stewardship budgets are economically negligible 
relative to the fee income of the Big Three, pressure from investors and from 
the public alone could lead the Big Three to raise their stewardship budgets 
considerably. Given the importance of increasing investment in stewardship, 
it would also be worthwhile for policymakers to consider measures to 
encourage such investment. We suggest that they consider three potential 
measures. 
(a) Charging Stewardship Costs to the Index Fund. One way to respond 
to the identified incentive problems is to facilitate the ability of index fund 
managers to charge stewardship costs directly to the index fund so they are 
borne by the index fund investors that also capture the gains from stewardship 
activity. This would mean that index fund managers would no longer have to 
 
 232. See supra section II.A.1(a). 
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bear the cost of stewardship investments while capturing only a tiny benefit 
of the gains such investments generate.233 
As we explained above, the stewardship efforts of index fund families 
are generally undertaken by a centralized department on behalf of all the 
funds in the fund family.234 A significant impediment to charging stewardship 
costs to index fund investors is the difficulty of allocating centralized 
stewardship costs to the index funds in the fund family without risking 
litigation. Regulators could help alleviate this problem. One solution could 
be for the SEC to adopt a safe harbor that would allow fund families that have 
a central stewardship unit to allocate its costs to the different funds in the 
family, and to do so proportionately to the value of the portfolio of each 
fund.235 
(b) Sharing Outside Research Services. As section II.B.1 explained, it
would be desirable for index fund managers to monitor portfolio companies 
to detect underperformance, to assess the characteristics and fit of their 
directors, and—when appropriate—to identify which directors should be 
added or removed. Such stewardship activities require close attention to the 
particular circumstances of individual companies and, are therefore costly. 
But such information acquisition could serve more than one index fund 
manager. Policymakers should thus facilitate the pooling of research, 
including having outside organizations undertake such research on behalf of 
multiple index fund managers.236 
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that there were 
three substantial organizations that monitored each company in the major 
indexes to reveal underperformance and identify changes—including choices 
of directors—that could improve performance. Suppose also that the Big 
Three and other index fund managers shared the costs of these organizations 
and received reports from them to inform their stewardship decision making. 
In our view such pooling of resources could also improve index fund 
stewardship. 
233. See Assaf Hamdani, Eugene Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman & Yishay Yafeh,
Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment, 
2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 49, 54 (2017) (advocating performance fees for retirement savings funds 
as an alternative approach). 
234. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
235. For example, the safe harbor could provide a precise formula, such as dividing the
cost proportionately by portfolio value at the end of each quarter. 
236. For recent policy discussions about pooling of resources by institutional investors,
see Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network 
Theory Perspective, 2019 U. Ill. L. Rev. 223, 254–57 (discussing the benefits of cooperation 
among investors); and Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 163, 182–89 
(2015) (advocating greater pooling of resources). 
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Policymakers should facilitate such pooling by making it clear that such 
resource sharing would not create a “group” for the purposes of Section 
13(d).237 We note that the European Securities and Market Authority provides 
a safe harbor for certain collective efforts by shareholders,238 and that some 
form of pooling of resources is already taking place in Europe.239 We believe 
that U.S. policymakers should also consider the adoption of a safe harbor to 
encourage pooling. 
(c) Mandating Minimum Stewardship Expenses. A third measure for
policymakers to consider is to require each index fund manager to invest an 
amount in stewardship that is above a specified minimum fraction of its 
indexed assets under management. Consider, as a thought experiment, a 
requirement that all index fund managers allocate for stewardship an amount 
equal to at least 0.0005% or 0.001% of their indexed equity assets under 
management. Although this investment would remain an economically 
negligible fraction of total index fund manager fee revenue, it would lead to 
a substantial increase in stewardship budgets. 
Of course, as with any such mandate, a difficult issue would be the 
specific investment requirement. But as long as the required investment was 
held to a multiple of existing stewardship investments, the risk of 
overshooting the desirable stewardship level would remain relatively low 
compared to the economic benefit from reducing underinvestment. Indeed, 
even if policymakers did not adopt such a mandate, merely considering it 
would likely encourage index fund managers to increase their stewardship. 
3. Business Relationships with Public Companies
As section I.E explained, index fund managers’ business relationships 
with public companies provide significant incentives for them to be 
excessively deferential to corporate managers. Below we put forward two 
alternative measures that could be considered to address this problem: limits 
237. For a review of these rules, see Jacobs, supra note 91, §§ 2:21–28.
238. See European Securities and Markets Authority, Information on Shareholder
Cooperation and Acting in Concert Under the Takeover Bids Directive 2 (2019), 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma31-65-
682_public_statement_concerning_shareholder_cooperation_and_acting_in_concert.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9M6-FATT] (creating a “White-List” of permissible activities). 
239. In the United Kingdom some pooling of stewardship is done through the Investor
Forum. See Investor Forum, About the Investor Forum, 
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/about [https://perma.cc/3DR8-PX9H] (last visited Aug. 7, 
2019). For a detailed and insightful comparison of the U.K. and the U.S. approaches, see 
Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1459, 1464–503 (2019). 
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on business relationships and disclosure requirements.240 
(a) Limiting Business Relationships. One natural approach for regulators 
to consider is constraining or prohibiting business relationships between 
index fund managers (and potentially some other investment managers) and 
their portfolio companies. Their substantial assets under management should 
give index fund managers sufficient scale that they can operate solely as 
investment managers without engaging in other business activities. Put 
another way, there would not appear to be substantial efficiency gains from 
investment managers also operating such other businesses, so precluding 
them from doing so would not have significant social costs.241 
For example, public officials should consider prohibiting investment 
managers from administering 401(k) plans for employers. This is a business 
that inherently places index fund managers into meaningful conflicts of 
interest with a significant number of portfolio companies over which they 
conduct stewardship.242 As explained earlier, empirical evidence suggests 
that these conflicts of interest distort investment managers’ stewardship 
incentives.243 More broadly, policymakers should review investment 
managers’ range of business relationships with portfolio companies and 
compare (i) the efficiencies that result from combining these businesses with 
(ii) the adverse effects of these businesses on the incentives of investment 
managers. 
(b) Disclosing Business Relationships. A more moderate approach would 
be to require index fund managers to disclose their business relationships 
with portfolio companies with particularity. Index fund managers currently 
provide some information about their policies and practices with respect to 
conflicts of interest, but they do not provide particularized information about 
the actual cases in which potential conflicts arise.244 Disclosure alone would 
not preclude business relationships between index fund managers and their 
portfolio companies, but it would shed light on those relationships, enabling 
 
 240. For early discussions of regulatory responses and reforms to address conflicts of 
interest arising from business relationships, see Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 
17, at 884–85; Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers 
to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 887–92 (2009). 
 241. Indeed, in our view, public officials may wish to consider whether index fund 
managers should also manage actively managed funds, as the Big Three currently do. We 
leave detailed consideration of this question to future work. Cf. Griffith & Lund, supra note 
80, at 1182–84 (noting the policy problems raised by mutual fund sponsors centralize voting 
for both active and passive funds). 
 242. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 81, 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 244. In particular, there is not such particularized information in the Big Three Annual 
Stewardship Reports, supra note 127. Similarly, the release cited in supra note 82 and 
discussing conflicts does not include such particularized information. 
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outsiders to assess how they affect stewardship decisions. Such scrutiny may 
help offset the undesirable incentives of index fund managers and thus have 
positive effects on their stewardship activities. Transparency would also 
provide a basis for regulators to make informed decisions regarding the 
desirability of substantive restrictions on business relationships. 
4. Bringing Transparency to Private Engagements 
As we have discussed, the leaders of the Big Three consider private 
engagements with portfolio companies as the major channel through which 
they conduct stewardship.245 As we described in section II.A, private 
engagement takes place with a very small minority of portfolio companies.246 
Nonetheless, used effectively, private engagement by index fund managers 
could have a powerful influence on portfolio companies. Our analysis 
suggests that it would be desirable for index fund managers to provide much 
more detailed disclosure regarding their private engagements. 
Each of the Big Three publishes an annual stewardship report with the 
number of its engagements, and the illustrative topics they covered.247 In 
recent years each of the Big Three has started to list all of the particular 
companies with which they engaged in the preceding year; Vanguard began 
providing such information in its 2019 Annual Stewardship Report, 
BlackRock in 2018, and SSGA in 2014.248 SSGA also issues quarterly 
stewardship reports with lists of companies engaged with in the preceding 
quarter.249 Whereas BlackRock’s disclosure is limited to a list of companies 
 
 245. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
 246. For evidence of the proportion of portfolio companies that each of the Big Three 
engage with, see supra section II.A.2 (showing that the average number of portfolio 
companies that the Big Three engaged with over the last three years was 9.8%). 
 247. For recent stewardship reports from the Big Three, see BlackRock, Annual 
Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship 
Report 2018, supra note 52; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127. 
For SSGA’s disclosure regarding one such general category of engagement, regarding 
executive compensation concerns, see State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 
2018–2019, supra note 52, at 40–41. 
 248. See Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 36–59; 
BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 144, at 25–31; State St. Glob. 
Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2014 Year End 28–37 (2015), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Annual-
Stewardship-Report-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG2X-PVQU]. 
 249. See, e.g., State St. Glob. Advisors, Stewardship Activity Report Q1 2019, at 5–6 
(2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/2019/06/asset-stewardship-report-q1-july-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKD9-
8EHA]. SSGA’s CEO has indicated that SSGA “believe[s] in the importance of full 
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with which it had discussions,250 Vanguard and SSGA also include the general 
categories for the subject of engagements.251 In this section we propose 
bringing greater transparency to this important component of fund 
stewardship for all index fund managers. 
In particular, it would be worth considering having index fund managers 
provide additional material details about each engagement, such as the 
number of conversations, which side initiated them, what changes if any the 
investment fund manager demanded, and what information the issuer 
provided that could be material for the investment fund manager’s voting 
decisions. It also would be worth considering whether such information 
should be provided to other investors and the marketplace in a more timely 
fashion than through a stewardship report that is published a substantial 
period after the engagements take place. Below we do not attempt to put 
forward a specific set of disclosure requirements, but rather explain the value 
of expanding disclosure in this area. 
(a) The Value of Transparency. We believe that making index fund 
engagements more transparent would be desirable for two reasons. The first 
reason is that transparency would provide all investors with material 
information. Private engagements involve both information flows from 
public companies to index fund managers, and vice versa.252 Index fund 
managers seek information that they view as useful for their voting decisions: 
For instance, during Vanguard’s engagements with two companies on climate 
risk disclosure, corporate managers made commitments to improve 
disclosure that caused Vanguard to vote against a shareholder proposal 
requesting such disclosure.253 In BlackRock’s engagements, it “seek[s] to 
better understand how boards assess their effectiveness and performance, 
along with the skills and expertise needed to take a company through its 
future . . . multi-year strategy” and “continue[s] to engage with companies to 
better understand their progress on improving diversity in the boardroom.”254 
If either BlackRock or Vanguard receives information that it deems material 
 
transparency in terms of the issues we choose to highlight in our asset stewardship practice.” 
Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, supra note 34, at 1. 
 250. See BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 31–37. 
 251. See Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 36–59; State 
St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52, at 106–149. 
 252. See Mallow & Sethi, supra note 142, at 393 (“Engagement could take the form of 
consultation for the purpose of enhancing two way information flow between shareholders 
and management.”). 
 253. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 12. 
 254. BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 4. 
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for its voting decisions, such information is also likely to be material to the 
voting decisions of other investors. 
In addition, private engagements also involve index fund managers 
communicating their views that portfolio companies should change their 
governance practices in certain ways. For example, SSGA provided feedback 
to VeriFone Systems, Inc. and Exelon Corporation regarding their 
compensation plans, as a result of which the companies made the desired 
changes to those plans.255 Private engagement by the Big Three is predicated 
on the belief that such communications increase the likelihood that requested 
changes will occur. Information that the Big Three have made such requests 
would thus be material for other investors. 
The second reason why transparency would be desirable is that it should 
lead to more meaningful engagement by index fund managers. Thus far we 
have taken the stewardship decisions of index fund managers as given. But 
transparency is likely to affect stewardship decisions in desirable ways. Once 
investors are informed about the companies with which engagements took 
place and the subjects of those engagements they will be better able to assess 
the effectiveness of such engagements. This would motivate index fund 
managers to achieve more significant outcomes from their private 
engagements. 
The SEC’s Regulation FD requires companies to disclose material 
information that they provide to some investors.256 In our view, it would be 
reasonable to interpret Regulation FD as requiring companies to disclose the 
existence and contents of all of their significant engagements with major 
investors. That Vanguard believes information from its private engagements 
with a company to be material is highly suggestive that other investors would 
regard it as material as well, and the information should therefore also be 
considered material to the company. Vanguard knows what demands it has 
communicated and how the company has responded; Regulation FD should 
require the disclosure of this information to all investors. Counsel to public 
companies and to the SEC should consider whether Regulation FD already 
requires companies to disclose the existence and contents of their 
engagements with index fund managers. 
If the SEC does not consider such disclosure to be currently required 
under Regulation FD it should consider amending Regulation FD or adopting 
other rules to require such disclosure, either by companies or by investment 
managers. In designing such disclosure rules, the SEC should aim to place 
other investors on an equal informational footing with the index fund 
manager undertaking the engagement. Such disclosure may include the 
engagements that took place, their duration, whether they were by phone or 
 
 255. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2017, supra note 144, at 50. 
 256. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2019). 
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in person, the main topics discussed, the positions that the index fund 
manager expressed, and the company’s responses. Were investors aware of 
this information, they could assess how effectively index fund managers 
wield their considerable power. 
(b) Objections to Transparency? It might be argued by index fund 
managers and supporters of index fund stewardship that the disclosure we 
suggest could chill private engagement: Companies might not be willing to 
engage privately with index fund managers if they know their 
communications would be disclosed. We do not believe this to be a realistic 
concern. Companies are unlikely to reject conversations with their largest 
shareholders. All of the Big Three now disclose the identity of the companies 
with which they engage; SSGA has also disclosed the topics of its 
engagements since 2014 without any apparent effect on its ability to 
engage.257 Indeed, if disclosure included whether particular companies 
declined to engage, the possibility of such disclosure alone would likely 
discourage any companies from declining engagement with index fund 
managers. 
In addition, it could also be argued that disclosure would make 
engagements less effective in producing results. Companies may be more 
willing to accept private requests because they would prefer not to appear 
susceptible to outside pressure. But any promise to accede to or seriously 
consider a request is even more likely to be material and therefore subject to 
Regulation FD. If an engagement involves only a request by the index fund 
manager, it is debatable whether disclosing the request would make the 
company less likely to heed it. Following a long-term investor’s request may 
be positively regarded. The willingness of companies to implement precatory 
shareholder proposals that receive majority support demonstrates that the 
visibility of shareholder pressure is generally not a barrier to management 
responsiveness.258 While these costs should be considered, they do not appear 
sufficient to maintain the lack of engagement transparency. 
5. Rethinking Section 13(d) Rules 
The analysis of the preceding Part took as given the application of 
Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 13d promulgated 
thereunder, which require certain extensive disclosures in the event that an 
investor crosses the 5% ownership threshold with the purpose of influencing 
 
 257. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 258. For empirical evidence that many shareholder proposals receiving majority support 
are subsequently implemented, see, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 190, at 54, 62–64. 
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the control of the portfolio company.259 In section I.E.3 we explained that this 
rule deters the Big Three, each of which holds a very large number of 
positions of 5% or more, from engaging in activities that could be regarded 
as seeking to influence corporate decision making.260 Furthermore, in section 
II.B.2 we presented evidence consistent with a strong deterrent effect: We 
documented that, despite having each a vast number of 5% plus positions, the 
Big Three have not filed a single Schedule 13D in the past decade, 
presumably by avoiding any of the influence-seeking activities that could 
trigger Rule 13d obligations.261 While the above analyses took Rule 13d as 
given, they suggest that it would be worthwhile to reconsider the design of 
Rule 13d or at least its application to index funds. 
To begin, although Rule 13d might be regarded as a disclosure 
requirement aimed at bringing certain information to the market, our analysis 
makes clear that the application of Rule 13d to index funds has thus far not 
provided any material information to the market. Whereas the application of 
Rule 13d to activist hedge funds has led to the filing of hundreds of Schedule 
13Ds providing the market with information,262 section II.B.2 explains that 
the application of Rule 13d to index funds has not resulted in any Schedule 
13Ds being filed by index funds.263 
Indeed, section II.B.2 shows that, although each of the Big Three has 
held stakes exceeding 5% in a large number of public companies during the 
past decade, they have avoided filing even a single Schedule 13D.264 In our 
view, these empirical patterns raise the concern that, to the extent that the 
application of Rule 13d to index funds has had any practical effect, it has 
done so by deterring index funds from taking certain potentially influence-
seeking activities, such as communicating with the company about particular 
directors that should be added to or removed from the board of directors, that 
could require such a filing.265 Thus, in assessing the current operation of Rule 
13d with respect to index funds, we should consider not whether providing 
some information to the market in certain circumstances would be desirable, 
but whether deterring index funds from engaging in activities that would 
trigger disclosure obligations under the current design of Rule 13d is 
 
 259. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra section I.E.3. 
 261. See supra section II.B.2. 
 262. For empirical evidence about the large incidence of Schedule 13D filings, see 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure 
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. Corp. L. 1, 7–9 (2013). 
 263. See supra section II.B.2. 
 264. See supra section II.B.2. 
 265. See supra section I.E.3 (explaining that such communications could require a filing 
on Schedule 13D). 
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desirable. Our analysis raises concerns that such deterrent effects might be 
undesirable. 
Furthermore, a main policy goal underlying the adoption of Rule 13d and 
Section 13(d), and the disclosure required thereby, is to alert the market 
before an investor that seeks to influence corporate decisions rapidly acquires 
a substantial stake in the company.266 Clearly, the application of Rule 13d to 
the case of an activist hedge fund could reduce the risk that the fund would 
rapidly accumulate a large stake. But index funds can be expected to increase 
their stakes in individual portfolio companies only gradually, as funds flow 
into the index fund over time, so there is no risk of the rapid accumulation of 
a large stake. 
A detailed analysis of the optimal redesign of Rule 13d, or at least its 
application to index funds, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, our 
analysis does suggest considerations that should be examined in any such 
redesign. In particular, such considerations should include (i) the chilling 
effect that the current application of Rule 13d to index funds has on 
stewardship activities by index funds; (ii) the potential value of such 
stewardship activities for the index fund investors; and (iii) the reasonable 
expectations, grounded in the modus operandi of index funds, that an index 
fund would increase its position in a particular portfolio company only 
gradually. We believe that a reconsideration of the current application of Rule 
13d to index funds that takes those issues into account would be warranted. 
6. Size Limits 
As we show in section I.A, the Big Three already owns 5% or more of a 
vast number of companies.267 Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, we 
document in an empirical study supplementing this Article that the index fund 
sector can be expected to continue growing and be dominated by the Big 
Three, and the Big Three can be estimated to cast as much as 40% of the votes 
in S&P 500 companies on average within two decades.268 We argue in this 
section that this growing concentration of equity in the hands of three large 
players raises significant policy concerns, and that policymakers should 
consider measures to limit or reverse this trend.269 
 
 266. For a discussion of the legislative history and policy goals of Section 13(d), see 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90, at 44–46. 
 267. See supra section I.A. 
 268. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 269. See also Coates, supra note 16, at 2–3 (expressing concerns about the rising 
concentration of corporate equity in the hands of a small number of players). Although 
Coates’s essay and this Article share a concern about the rising concentration of equity, our 
approaches differ in key respects. To begin, Coates focuses on what he labels “the problem 
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Measures to limit or discourage large financial stakes are not unknown 
in the U.S. regulatory framework. Longstanding rules deter investment funds 
from holding more than 10% of any portfolio company.270 However, these 
rules apply only to individual funds and do not prevent investment managers 
from advising fund complexes that cross these thresholds in the aggregate.271 
We believe that policymakers should consider measures to prevent or deter 
investment fund managers from managing investment funds that cross certain 
thresholds in the aggregate, whether by fiat, tax penalties, or other means. 
Such an approach would have an important effect on the trajectory of 
index fund growth. Suppose that the proportion of U.S. equity in index funds 
is expected to grow to 45%. As the Big Three can be expected to continue to 
dominate the sector if there is no regulatory intervention, suppose that the Big 
Three become the “Giant Three,” each owning approximately 15% of each 
large public company. Consider a regulatory approach that would prevent 
investment fund managers from managing funds holding, in the aggregate, 
more than 5% of any company.272 Suppose also that this would lead to the 
sector being divided equally among nine index fund managers—the “Big-ish 
Nine”—each holding about 5% of each large public company. 
In our view, policymakers should consider whether the Big-ish Nine 
scenario is preferable to the Giant Three scenario. Having the sector in the 
hands of three players rather than nine is unlikely to result in significant 
incremental economies of scale. Each of the Big-ish Nine would likely 
manage more than a trillion dollars, so each would still have substantial 
economies of scale, similar to those of the current Big Three. Since 
economies of scale are unlikely to significantly favor one of the scenarios 
 
of twelve”—the possibility that twelve management teams will gain “practical power over 
the majority of U.S. public companies.” See id. at 1. By contrast, we focus on the possibility 
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ownership in most public companies, becoming the Giant Three. Furthermore, and 
importantly, our view on the problems with the growing concentration of ownership 
substantially differs from that of Coates. Coates seems to be concerned that investment 
managers will make excessive use of the power that comes from their large ownership stakes. 
See id. at 2–3. By contrast, as discussed in the preceding Parts, we have a very different 
concern—that the Giant Three will have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate 
managers, and that their substantial proportion of equity ownership and incentives towards 
deference may depress shareholder intervention overall, resulting in insufficient checks on 
corporate managers. 
 270. For an account and discussion of these rules, see Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 
89, at 20–21. 
 271. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 851(a) (2012) (defining “regulated investment companies,” 
for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, as meaning an (individual) registered 
investment company or unit investment trust). 
 272. Since our aim is to put this general idea on the table for discussion, we do not discuss 
the design and implementation issues it would entail; instead, we focus on the basic 
conceptual question of whether this regulatory direction is worth pursuing. 
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over the other, comparing the two scenarios requires close attention to their 
consequences for stewardship. 
Because each of the Giant Three would capture a larger fraction of 
generated governance benefits than would each of the Big-ish Nine, each of 
the Giant Three would have a somewhat greater incentive to invest in 
stewardship. Precluding the Giant Three scenario would forgo the benefits of 
such increase. At the same time, however, the Giant Three scenario would 
involve three significant costs, which would be reduced by precluding the 
Giant Three scenario. 
First, incentives to be excessively deferential would be greater in the 
Giant Three Scenario than in the Big-ish Nine scenario. In the Giant Three 
scenario, each of the index fund managers would be continually apprehensive 
that its 15% block would raise concerns about its power and legitimacy, 
triggering demand for regulatory intervention to impose size limits or to 
break up the Giant Three. By contrast, in the Big-ish Nine scenario, with 
reasonable size limits already in place and voting power divided among the 
nine players, index fund managers would have significantly less concern 
about additional regulatory intervention. On this view, because the desire to 
avoid size limits currently provides the Big Three with incentives to be 
excessively deferential to reduce the risks of such limits, putting these limits 
in place could well have a positive effect on the stewardship of large index 
funds by decreasing the force of such incentives. 
Second, since their blocks would not exceed 5%, none of the Big-ish 
Nine could be required to file on Schedule 13D, so they would not be 
discouraged from interventions by a desire to avoid Schedule 13D filings. 
These factors would substantially reduce the incentives of the Big-ish Nine 
managers to be deferential to corporate managers, thereby allowing them to 
be more effective stewards of the interests of index fund investors. 
Third, having nine decision makers rather than three would substantially 
reduce risks, and concomitant legitimacy problems. Consider what would 
happen if one of the Giant Three were to make a stewardship decision with a 
reasonable, good-faith expectation of increasing portfolio value that 
nonetheless turned out to be detrimental to their portfolio companies. The 
consequences would be large, because there is no feedback mechanism to 
correct such a decision: The index funds of that manager would perform no 
worse than those of any rival index fund manager, so they would not suffer 
in the marketplace and their market share would not contract. 
There is also no market mechanism that rewards index fund managers 
for good judgment about stewardship for their portfolio companies. The 
financial success of index fund managers depends on their prowess at 
operating funds that mechanically track an index at low cost. Thus, there is 
no necessary association between this ability and judgment with respect to 
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the stewardship of portfolio companies. A Giant Three scenario, then, would 
produce a significant risk (and accompanying legitimacy concerns) that the 
stewardship judgments and attitudes of one managerial team would have a 
major effect on our capital markets without any market mechanism that 
would provide a check against serious flaws in these judgments and attitudes. 
Clearly, precluding or discouraging a Giant Three scenario would 
represent a major step in the regulatory intervention into the distribution of 
control in the economy, a step that should not be taken lightly. The challenge 
posed by the Giant Three scenario is unusual in its economic significance and 
merits the consideration of such measures. 
B. Implications for Key Debates 
1. The Debate on Common Ownership 
A significant body of recent academic work has expressed serious 
concerns about one of the consequences of the rise of index funds: increases 
in common ownership, whereby an investment manager holds positions in all 
the companies in a given sector of the economy.273 These authors argue that 
a rise in common ownership, whether from index funds or otherwise, can be 
expected to produce significant anticompetitive effects that are detrimental to 
the economy.274 This view has led prominent legal scholars and economists—
including Einer Elhauge, Herbert Hovenkamp, Eric Posner, Fiona Scott 
Morton, and Glen Weyl—to propose strong measures to constrain the rise of 
common ownership. Such measures include limiting investment managers to 
holding only one company in each economic sector, and having antitrust 
regulators scrutinize the behavior of index funds and other similar 
investors.275 
 
 273. For comprehensive reviews of this literature, see Matthew Backus, Christopher 
Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, The Common Ownership Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence 
18–24 (2019) [hereinafter Backus et al., The Common Ownership Hypothesis], 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ES_20190205_Common-
Ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5JP-SAGU]; Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership 
Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 413, 419–40, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046829 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 274. For a review of the common ownership literature from the perspective that argues 
that common ownership is likely to have a significant effect on the economy, see Schmalz, 
supra note 273, at 417 (“Shareholder diversification across competitors can therefore remove 
firms’ incentives to compete and void Adam Smith’s idea that the pursuit of shareholders’ 
self-interest leads to maximization of social welfare.”). 
 275. For articles suggesting such policy measures, see generally Einer Elhauge, 
Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267 (2016); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 Yale L.J. 2026 (2018); Eric 
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The reform proposals put forward by the common ownership critics were 
significantly motivated by, and have substantially relied on, recent empirical 
work that claimed to find evidence that increases in common ownership bring 
about anticompetitive effects and, in particular, higher market prices.276 
However, other economic and empirical analyses have contested the findings 
and conclusions of this empirical work and argued that it does not provide a 
solid empirical basis for the concerns of the common ownership critics.277 
Putting aside the debate on whether the empirical hypothesis of the common 
ownership critics is consistent with the available empirical evidence, an 
important question is whether, on a conceptual level, it is reasonable to expect 
that an increase in common ownership in general, and such an increase due 
to a rise of index fund ownership in particular, should be expected to bring 
about anticompetitive effects. Our analysis questions the plausibility of this 
key theory.278  
We agree that, in a hypothetical world without any agency costs between 
index funds and their beneficial investors (or more generally, between 
investment fund managers and their beneficial investors), a rise in common 
ownership could have anticompetitive effects. Suppose, hypothetically, that 
 
A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive 
Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust L.J. 669 (2017). 
 276. For an influential empirical study on the airline industry that has received a great 
deal of attention, see generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive 
Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018). For another empirical study reporting 
similar findings with respect to the banking industry, see José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C. 
Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 277. See, e.g., Backus et al., The Common Ownership Hypothesis, supra note 273; 
Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We 
Know Less than We Think, 81 Antitrust L.J. 729 (2017); Matthew Backus, Christopher 
Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25454, 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25454.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Jacob 
Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, The Effect of Common Ownership on Profits: Evidence from 
the U.S. Banking Industry (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper 
No. 2018-069, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269120 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common 
Ownership (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2017-029, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940137 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Pauline 
Kennedy, Daniel P. O’Brien, Minjae Song & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of 
Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence (July 24, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008331 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 278. For an in-depth response to our analysis as it relates to the debate on common 
ownership, see Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 19 
(manuscript at 39–58). 
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the Big Three could be expected to make stewardship decisions as if they 
each had a sole owner acting to maximize the value of its portfolio. In this 
hypothetical scenario, it would be reasonable to be concerned that three large 
sole owners with large stakes in all significant public companies would have 
incentives to encourage anticompetitive effects. But as Parts I and II have 
shown, the world we inhabit is very far from such a hypothetical scenario. 
In our world, the real worry is not that index funds might do too much, 
but that they might do too little.279 This Article identifies significant 
incentives of index fund managers, which common ownership critics fail to 
take into account. In particular, as Parts I and II have shown, index fund 
managers have inadequate incentives to engage in stewardship aimed at 
enhancing the value of particular companies, and they have significant 
incentives to defer to the preferences of corporate managers. Thus, contrary 
to the concerns of common ownership scholars, index fund managers should 
not be expected to push corporate managers to engage in business strategies 
that they would not wish to pursue on their own. 
Indeed, we believe that the alarmism over common ownership and the 
scrutiny that such alarmism brings may have two important negative 
consequences. First, they may push index fund managers to act even more 
deferentially than they have to date. Such alarmism could move stewardship 
even further in the wrong direction by pushing the Big Three to be even more 
excessively deferential. 
Furthermore, common ownership alarmism might push antitrust 
regulators in the wrong direction. There is evidence that concentration in 
many markets and the associated increases in markups have been on the rise 
in recent decades.280 Dealing with such concentration requires antitrust 
regulators to focus their attention on the decisions of corporate managers. 
Common ownership concerns are a red herring that distracts antitrust 
regulators by unnecessarily focusing their attention on ownership patterns 
and the stewardship of index fund managers. 
2. The Debate on Hedge Fund Activism 
The past decade has witnessed a heated debate over the merits of hedge 
 
 279. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of our view on this subject than in the 
current section, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Misguided Attack on Common Ownership, supra note 
19. 
 280. For a study providing empirical evidence on the rise in market concentration, see 
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated?, 23 Rev. Fin. 697, 698 (2019) (reporting evidence that, “over the last two 
decades the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index [a measure of market concentration] has 
systematically increased in more than 75% of US industries”). 
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fund activism and how it should be governed.281 Supporters of hedge fund 
activism contend that it brings about value-enhancing changes in activism 
targets, and that it exerts a disciplinary force that induces incumbents to be 
more attentive to shareholder interests.282 Opponents of hedge fund activism 
claim that it pushes public companies to improve short-term outcomes at the 
expense of long-term value, which is detrimental to investors in those 
companies, as well as to the economy.283 This has led these opponents to 
advocate for various measures to constrain activist hedge funds.284 
Our analysis has significant implications for the ongoing debate on hedge 
fund activism. As explained below, our analysis has implications for 
understanding the interaction between index funds and activist hedge funds 
and its expected consequences. We make two main points in this regard. In 
section III.B.2(a) we explain that the rise of index funds in general, and the 
Big Three in particular, cannot substitute for the important role that activist 
hedge funds play in the corporate governance system. In section III.B.2(b) 
we show that although activist hedge funds play a beneficial role, their 
presence cannot fully make up for the significant problems that we identify 
with index fund stewardship, since these problems mean that the combination 
of index funds and activist hedge funds cannot fully address common 
corporate governance failures. 
(a) The Limits of Index Fund Stewardship. Given the long-term focus of 
index funds, opponents of hedge fund activism view index fund stewardship 
as a preferable substitute for the activities of activist hedge funds, and have 
urged index fund managers to support companies against activist hedge 
funds.285 However, the analysis in this Article suggests that understanding the 
 
 281. For articles putting forward policy arguments for and against hedge fund activism, 
see, respectively, Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 174, at 1147–54, and Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge 
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1956–
70 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds]. 
 282. For works that provide a favorable assessment of hedge fund activism, see generally 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund 
Activism: A Review, 4 Found. & Trends Fin. 185 (2009). 
 283. For works that analyze potential costs of hedge fund activism in detail, see, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism 
on Corporate Governance, 1 ANNALS CORP. GOVERNANCE (2016); Strine, Who Bleeds, 
supra note 281; Martin Lipton, The Threat to the Economy and Society from Activism and 
Short-Termism, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Jan. 22, 
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/22/the-threat-to-the-economy-and-society-
from-activism-and-short-termism [https://perma.cc/ZD6X-R7ZZ]. 
 284. For a review of such measures proposed by opponents of hedge fund activism, see 
Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 174, at 1147–54. 
 285. For example, Martin Lipton, a well-known opponent of hedge fund activism, has 
stated that “[BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs] is a major step in rejecting 
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stewardship incentives and behavior of index fund managers should lead to 
support for hedge fund activism rather than opposition. The shortcomings of 
index fund stewardship that we identify mean that index fund stewardship 
cannot be a substitute for hedge fund activism. To the contrary, these 
shortcomings mean that hedge fund activism has a critical role in 
stewardship. 
The incentives of hedge fund managers differ from those of the index 
fund managers that we have analyzed in three key ways. First, whereas index 
fund managers capture a tiny fraction of the governance gains that they 
produce, the so-called “2-and-20” compensation arrangements of hedge fund 
managers enable them to capture a meaningful proportion of any governance 
gains they bring about. Second, index fund managers hold the same portfolios 
as rival managers tracking the same indexes and thus cannot improve 
performance relative to rivals by bringing about governance gains. In 
contrast, activist hedge funds have concentrated portfolios, and governance 
gains in their main portfolio companies can thus greatly enhance their 
performance relative to rivals. Third, hedge fund managers generally do not 
have other business relationships with their portfolio companies, so they lack 
the other types of incentives that we have identified as inducing index fund 
managers to be excessively deferential to corporate managers. 
These different incentives cause hedge fund managers to invest 
substantial amounts in the stewardship of their portfolio companies.286 Hedge 
fund managers closely follow the particular business circumstances of those 
companies and identify ways to remedy underperformance. They can also use 
the full toolkit of shareholder powers—including nominating directors—vis-
à-vis companies that they identify as underperforming. 
Given these substantial differences in incentives and consequent 
stewardship behavior, index fund stewardship cannot substitute for hedge 
fund activism, and especially not with respect to remedying the 
underperformance of portfolio companies. The work of activist hedge funds 
in targeting and remedying underperformance can partially address the 
substantial gap left by the lack of stewardship by index fund managers, and 
thereby benefit index fund investors. Conversely, opposition to hedge fund 
 
activism and short-termism,” Lipton, New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, supra note 
13, and that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard have continued to express support for 
sustainable long-term investment,” Lipton, State of Play, supra note 43. For a review of the 
opposition to hedge fund activism coauthored by one of us, see Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism, supra note 174, at 1093–96. 
 286. For a more detailed analysis of why agency problems afflict the stewardship 
decisions of activist hedge funds to a lesser extent than they do for the stewardship decisions 
of index funds and other mutual funds, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors, supra note 15, at 104–06. 
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activism would be contrary to the interests of index fund investors. 
(b) The Limits of Hedge Fund Activism. In a well-known and influential 
article, Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon express a more optimistic view on 
this subject and argue that the current interaction of index funds and activist 
hedge funds works very well to address corporate governance problems at 
portfolio companies.287 In the view of Gilson and Gordon, the actions of the 
two types of players complement each other well: Hedge funds identify target 
companies in which changes would enhance value, and index funds (and 
other mutual funds) provide the activist hedge funds with support in those 
cases where changes would be value-enhancing. Subsequently, 
commentators taking issue with our work and evaluating index fund 
stewardship more favorably than we do have also taken the view that the 
interaction between activist hedge funds and index funds works well and 
enables problems of underperformance to be effectively addressed.288 The 
assistance of these investment managers thus enables hedge fund activists to 
bring about these value-enhancing changes. 
Below we explain that, although hedge fund activism can partially 
substitute for the shortcomings of index fund stewardship that we analyze, 
such activism cannot fully make up for these shortcomings. In particular, the 
current interaction of activist hedge funds and index funds cannot fully 
address corporate governance problems as is hoped by Gilson and Gordon 
and commentators taking issue with our view of index fund stewardship, for 
three reasons. 
First, an activist hedge fund can be successful at a company only if that 
company’s management expects index fund managers to support the activist 
hedge fund.289 However, as we have explained in the preceding Part, index 
fund managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate 
managers, and the recent study by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James 
Pinnington provides empirical evidence that index funds are indeed less 
likely than other institutional investors to support activists in contested 
elections.290 To the extent that index fund managers are expected not to 
support some value-enhancing changes that activist hedge funds would like 
to bring about, activist hedge funds would likely be unable to bring about 
 
 287. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 17, at 897–900. 
 288. For articles by such commentators, see, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript 
at 19) (“Passive funds also play a complementary role in the more focused engagement 
provided by hedge funds”); Jahnke, supra note 60, at 3 (“[I]nterviews with activist investors 
suggest that index investors do not pose barriers to successful campaigns.”). 
 289. For discussions of the need for hedge fund activists to obtain the support of 
investment managers in order to be successful, see Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90, at 52–
53; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 17, at 897–900. 
 290. See Brav et al., Picking Friends, supra note 167. 
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such changes themselves. 
Second, not only do activist hedge funds require the support of index 
funds to succeed in engagements that they undertake, but the expectation of 
a lack of index fund support might have an adverse ex ante effect: It could 
discourage hedge fund activists with companies in the first place. Consistent 
with this observation, the recent study by Alon Brav et al. shows that activist 
hedge funds are less likely to engage with an underperforming company 
when institutional investors are less likely to vote for activist hedge funds 
nominees.291 
Third, activist hedge funds have incentives to undertake stewardship 
activities only when such activities could result in very large increases in 
value. Activist hedge funds invest substantial resources in stewardship and 
take on considerable risks in their activities, including liquidity risk and the 
risk of unsuccessful engagements. To compensate, activist hedge funds’ own 
beneficial investors demand higher returns, which must sustain first paying 
the substantial 2-and-20 fees charged by the hedge fund manager. As a result, 
activist hedge fund managers will take on engagements only where they 
would likely bring about large returns, sufficient to compensate their 
investors on a risk-adjusted basis after the managers’ high fees. There will be 
many opportunities for smaller gains from stewardship—say, of 
approximately 5% to 10% —that activist hedge funds will ignore but that 
would significantly benefit index fund investors if they were realized. 
 
 291. See id. at 24–25. The findings of Brav et al. are consistent with those reported by 
an earlier study by Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, at 
114. 
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For these three reasons, activist hedge funds can be only a limited 
substitute for the lack of stewardship by index fund managers. Consequently, 
the problems with index fund stewardship identified in this Article will 
remain of substantial concern—even if activist hedge funds are allowed to 
continue to operate without the impediments sought by their opponents. 
C. Recognition and Reality 
Recognition by policymakers and the public of the problems that we have 
analyzed in this Article would be necessary to bring about significant reforms 
in this area. Sections III.A.2–III.A.6 have put forward several measures that 
policymakers should consider to improve the stewardship of index fund 
managers. Before we conclude this Part we wish to note that this is an area in 
which improved understanding of problems can also directly contribute to 
their solution.292 Thus, we hope that improving the understanding of current 
problems can by itself contribute to improving index fund stewardship. 
As we explained in section I.F, the Big Three have significant incentives 
to be perceived as responsible stewards. A public perception that they are 
otherwise might adversely affect their flow of funds or increase the risks of 
backlash. The Big Three thus have reasons to communicate in ways that 
portray their stewardship in a favorable light, and to make stewardship 
decisions that reduce the salience of their underinvestment in stewardship and 
their excessive deference to corporate managers. Therefore, recognition by 
investors and the public of the incentive problems of index fund managers 
could, by itself, lead to improved stewardship by the Big Three. In particular, 
recognition of the extent of the Big Three incentives to underinvest in 
stewardship might counteract their incentives to underinvest. Similarly, 
recognition of the extent of the deference incentives of index fund managers 
might constrain such deference. 
To illustrate, the evidence that we have provided regarding the scale of 
the Big Three’s investments in stewardship could contribute to public 
pressure on the Big Three to increase their investments in stewardship. 
Discussions of Big Three stewardship levels by Big Three leaders and 
supporters of index fund stewardship have thus far paid close attention to the 
significant increases in personnel in the Big Three’s stewardship departments 
 
 292. For a discussion of another context in which recognition of existing problems by 
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Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 201–16 (2004) (explaining that recognition 
of the problems with executive pay arrangements can by itself improve matters). 
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in recent years and the significant number of people currently employed in 
these departments.293 However, the evidence that we describe in Part II shows 
that, notwithstanding the increases in personnel in recent years, the Big 
Three’s investments in stewardship currently enable them to devote limited 
resources to stewardship in the great majority of the companies in which they 
hold positions of significant monetary value. Introducing this point could be 
salient for public discussions. 
To take another example, the evidence we describe in section II.B 
regarding the Big Three’s failure to use certain potentially-valuable 
stewardship tools could increase investor and public pressure on the Big 
Three to use those tools. In particular, our analysis in section II.B.3 showed 
that the Big Three have generally avoided any submission of shareholder 
proposals of the type that they generally support and that could bring about 
governance changes that the Big Three’s own governance principles consider 
valuable. Public recognition of these findings could contribute to investor and 
public pressure on the Big Three to consider active submission of shareholder 
proposals to bring about these governance reforms. Similarly, our analysis in 
section II.B.4 shows that the Big Three have commonly chosen to remain on 
the sidelines in cases of SEC consideration of proposed rules and precedential 
litigation; these findings could thus lead to investor and public pressure on 
the Big Three to increase their involvement in such activities. 
This is therefore an area in which recognition of problems might by itself 
contribute to improving matters. We therefore hope that this Article, and the 
analysis and empirical evidence that we provide, will contribute to investor 
and public recognition of the problems afflicting index fund stewardship. 
CONCLUSION 
With index funds owning a large and steadily-increasing proportion of 
the equity capital of all significant American public companies, 
understanding the stewardship decisions of index fund managers—and how 
they can be improved—is of critical importance for all interested in the 
governance and performance of public companies. In this Article we have 
sought to contribute to this understanding. 
This Article has put forward an analytical framework for understanding 
the incentives of index fund managers. Our framework has enabled us to 
identify and analyze two types of incentives that could adversely affect the 
stewardship decisions of index fund managers: incentives to underinvest in 
stewardship, and incentives to defer excessively to the preferences and views 
of corporate managers. 
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This Article has also provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
full range of stewardship activities that index fund managers do and do not 
undertake. We have explained that the empirical evidence is, on the whole, 
consistent with the predictions of our incentive analysis. The empirical 
evidence thus reinforces the concerns raised by our analysis. 
Finally, this Article has considered the significant policy implications of 
the incentives problems that we identify analytically and document 
empirically. We propose a set of significant measures that policymakers 
should consider to address the concerns that our analysis and evidence have 
highlighted. We also show that our analysis undermines the arguments that 
critics have made against common ownership by institutional investors and 
activism by hedge funds, thereby contributing to these important policy 
debates. 
We hope that the analytical framework, evidence, and policy proposals 
we have put forward for consideration will all prove useful for policymakers 
and market participants in considering the opportunities and challenges posed 
by the rise of index funds. How well those policymakers and market 
participants assess and respond to these opportunities and challenges will 
have profound effects on the governance and performance of public 
companies and, in turn, on the prosperity of investors and the success of the 
American economy. 
